Definition
Ferae naturae (sometimes rendered "ferz nature" in older transcriptions) is a Latin phrase meaning "of a wild nature" or "of a wild disposition." In law, it classifies animals that are, by their natural character, wild and untamed — as distinguished from animals that are by nature domesticated. The classification carries significant legal consequences for questions of ownership, liability, and property rights.
An animal classified as ferae naturae cannot be the subject of absolute private ownership in the same way a domestic animal can. Ownership rights in wild animals are qualified: they exist only while the animal is in actual possession or confinement. If the animal escapes and returns to its natural liberty, property rights in it are extinguished, and another person may lawfully acquire rights by capture.
This contrasts with animals classified as domitae naturae — naturally tame animals, such as horses, cattle, and dogs — over which a person may hold absolute, continuing property rights independent of possession.
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Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): "Feral" in ordinary English describes an animal that has returned to a wild state from a domestic one, or a person behaving in an uncontrolled manner. "Nature" describes the essential character of a thing.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): "Feral" — wild; untamed; savage; also, pertaining to a funeral.
The legal phrase ferae naturae does not describe an animal that was once tame and went wild (the common meaning of "feral"), but rather a species-level classification: animals that are, by their kind, inherently wild regardless of whether a particular specimen has been tamed or kept in captivity. A trained wolf and a penned bear remain ferae naturae in law; a domestic cat does not become ferae naturae by wandering loose.
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Common Confusion
Ferae naturae is frequently confused with the concept of a "dangerous animal" for tort liability purposes. The two are related but not identical. The ferae naturae classification informs strict liability analysis — keepers of wild animals are often held strictly liable for harm — but the classification itself is about property rights in animals, not directly about the standard of care owed to third parties. Additionally, some domesticated species that have been bred into dangerous variants may trigger strict liability without being ferae naturae in the property-law sense.
The distinction between ferae naturae and domitae naturae can also blur in practice with respect to animals in an intermediate category: animals that are wild by species but have been so thoroughly domesticated by long custom (such as certain livestock in particular jurisdictions) that courts have sometimes applied modified rules.
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Why It Matters in Research
Researchers will encounter ferae naturae primarily in three doctrinal contexts: (1) property law disputes over wildlife, hunting rights, and escaped animals; (2) tort and strict liability cases involving injuries caused by wild animals kept in captivity; and (3) older cases touching on state or sovereign ownership of wildlife as a public trust resource.
The Latin spelling varies across historical sources. Black's 2nd Edition transcribes it as "ferz nature" in some printings, a phonetic or typographic rendering. Researchers searching historical digests and reporters should search both "ferae naturae" and variant spellings to avoid missing relevant material.
The property-rights consequences of the ferae naturae classification were deeply embedded in common law but have been substantially modified by statute in most American jurisdictions. State wildlife codes now govern ownership, taking, and liability for wild animals, often displacing the common law rules. A researcher relying solely on common law ferae naturae doctrine without checking the applicable state wildlife statutes risks significant error.
In older New York reports, the doctrine appears in cases involving escaped game, deer, and fowl — particularly where neighboring landowners disputed rights upon escape or recapture. The cases cited in Black's (Fleet v. Hegeman, Gillet v. Mason) are New York sources and reflect that state's early common law development; they are not necessarily authoritative beyond that jurisdiction.
The doctrine also intersects with the public trust doctrine, under which wild animals in their natural state are held to belong to the sovereign or the public, with private rights arising only through lawful capture. Researchers working on wildlife law, environmental law, or natural resources questions should trace this connection carefully.
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Historical Dictionary Support
Black's Law Dictionary (2nd Ed.) defines ferae naturae concisely as animals "wild by nature or disposition," directly contrasted with domitae naturae. The entry is functionally a classification rule rather than an extended doctrinal treatment.
Black's entry is largely consistent with how the doctrine appears in treatises on personal property and common law. What the dictionary does not address — and what researchers should know — is the degree to which American courts in the 19th century developed the doctrine in ways that diverged from its English antecedents, particularly regarding state ownership claims over wildlife. The sovereign ownership theory, holding that wild animals belong to the state as a public trust until reduced to private possession, became a dominant American formulation that sits somewhat awkwardly alongside the pure common law property-rights framework implied by the ferae naturae/domitae naturae binary.
The cases cited by Black's (Fleet v. Hegeman, 14 Wend. (N.Y.) 43; State v. Taylor, 27 N.J. Law 119; Gillet v. Mason, 7 Johns. (N.Y.) 17) are genuine historical decisions and were frequently cited in 19th-century American courts working through the property consequences of escaped or recaptured wild animals.
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Jurisdictional Note
The common law ferae naturae doctrine has been largely superseded in American jurisdictions by state wildlife statutes that regulate ownership, taking, and liability directly. The underlying classification retains relevance in states where courts still apply common law strict liability rules to keepers of wild animals, but even there, the statutory framework typically governs first.
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