FANT

4 definitions found across Law Mind sources

FANTAuthored
The Law Mind • 562 words
Definition
"Fant" does not appear as a substantive legal term in the historical or modern legal lexicon. The Bouvier's entries provided under this heading are misassigned fragments — one addressing the doctrine of election and waiver of remedies, the other addressing minority voting in deliberative assemblies — neither of which defines or uses "fant" as a term of art. These passages appear to be indexing or extraction errors rather than genuine definitional entries for the word itself. In the limited historical record, "fant" surfaces occasionally as a dialectal or archaic English word meaning an infant or young child (related to "infant" through French and Latin roots), but it did not achieve independent legal standing as a term of art in English or American law. It is not treated as a defined term in Bouvier's, Black's, or other standard legal dictionaries. As a result, no authoritative legal definition for FANT as a standalone legal term can be provided.
Common Confusion
"Fant" is most likely to be confused with INFANT in research contexts — both as a reading error in historical documents and as a truncation artifact in digitized sources. INFANT in law carries a precise meaning (a person under the age of legal majority, capable of holding certain rights but with limited contractual capacity), entirely distinct from any general notion of a young child. Researchers who locate "fant" in an index or search result and assume it is a meaningful legal term may be tracing a ghost entry. Verify the original document before treating any occurrence as substantive.
Why It Matters in Research
Researchers encountering "fant" in a legal corpus should treat it with caution in three scenarios. First, it may be an OCR or transcription artifact — historical legal texts digitized from manuscript or early print sources sometimes render "infant" as "fant" when the leading syllable is cut off by a page break, damaged margin, or column split. Second, it may be a surname appearing in a case caption or party listing, not a substantive term at all (consistent with the Wiktionary note that "fant" is primarily recognized today as a surname). Third, in very early English legal records, particularly those drawing on Norman French or Anglo-Latin sources, abbreviated or contracted forms of "infans" or "enfant" occasionally appear in ways that a modern index might surface as "fant." In each of these scenarios, the correct research path leads elsewhere: to INFANT, to MINOR, or to the specific case or document generating the hit. If you are researching the doctrine referenced in the Bouvier's fragment above — a party choosing between available legal steps and being bound by that choice — the operative term is ELECTION OF REMEDIES, not "fant."
Historical Dictionary Support
Bouvier's Law Dictionary does not define "fant" as an independent term. The passages associated with this entry in the source material are clearly fragments from the entries for ELECTION (specifically, election of remedies and waiver) and MINORITY (voting minority in a deliberative body). Bouvier's editorial structure sometimes groups related terms in ways that cause adjacent or nearby content to be attributed to a preceding headword in automated extraction. Neither passage uses "fant" in its text. No synthesis across historical dictionaries is possible for a term that none of them recognizes.
Related Terms
INFANT MINOR ELECTION OF REMEDIES WAIVER MAJORITY (voting) MINORITY (voting)
FANTmain
Bouvier's Law Dictionary • 1928
Whenever, by law or contract, a party has laid before him a variety of steps, the taking of one of which excludes another, or the rest, he must choose between them. After his choice is made, and by words or acts expressed in a manner suited to the particular case, he cannot reverse it; he is said to have elected the one step, and waiv- ed the other; Bish. Cont. § 808. Other cases in law arise: as in case of a person holding land by two inconsistent titles; 1 Jenk. Cent. Cas. 27; dower in a piece of land and that piece for which it was exchanged; 3 Leon 271. See Sugd. Pow. 498. In Equity. A choice which a party is compelled to make between the acceptance of a benefit under a written instrument, and the retention of some property already his own, which is attempted to be disposed of, in favor of a third party, by virtue of the same paper. The doctrine of election pre- supposes a plurality of gifts or rights, with an intention, express or implied, of the party who has a right to control one or both, that one should be a substitute for the other; 1 Swanst. 394, note (b); 3 Woodd. Lect. 491; 2 Rop. Leg. 480; Snell, Pr. Eq. 287. The doctrine of election rests upon the principle that he who seeks equity must do it, and means, as the term is ordinarily used, that where two inconsistent or alter- native rights or claims are presented to the choice of a party, by a person who manifests the clear intention that he should not enjoy both, then he must accept or re- ject one or the other; and so, in other words, that one cannot take a benefit under an in- strument and then repudiate it; 183 U. S.695. Where an express and positive election is required, there is no claim, either at law or in equity, to but one of the objects be- tween which election is to be made; but in many cases there is apparent, from the whole of an instrument, the intention that the party to be benefited shall be benefited on certain conditions. In such cases, equity will require the party to elect; Bisph. Eq. sec. 295. The question whether an election is re- quired occurs most frequently in case of de- vises; "because deeds being generally mat- ters of contract, the contract is not to be in- terpreted otherwise than as the considera- tion which is expressed requires; " L. R. 8 Ch. 578; but it extends to deeds; 1 Swanst, 400; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1075, n.; and it has been held to apply to "voluntary deeds, to cases of contracts for valuable consideration resting in articles, to contracts for value completely executed by conveyance and as- sigments; per Selborne, Ld. Ch., L. R. 8 Ch. 578, where the authorities are collected. The doctrine also applies to powers of ap- pointment; 2 Ves. Jr. 367: L. R. 9 Eq. 519; 22 Ch. D. 555; 27 id. 696 ; 34 id. 160. In the case, not strictly of election, but often so treated, of two distinct gifts of a testator's own property, one onerous and the other not, it is the general rule that the donee may take one and reject the other, unless it appear that it was the testator's intention that the option should not exist; 22 Ch. D. 573, 577; and where a gift is made by a deed of which the consideration is partly invalid by reason of the disability of the parties, the parts of the deed are read together and the burden is treated as the consideration for the benefit; Brett, L. Cas. Mod. Eq. 263. When a married woman made a valid appointment by will to her husband under a power, and also bequeathed personal property (not her sepa- rate estate) to another person to which the power did not extend, the husband was not put to his election, but took both under the power and jure mariti, as to the property ineffectually bequeathed; 9 Ves. 369. There must be a clear intention by the tes- tator to give that which is not his property; 1Sim. 105; 18 Ves. 41; 1 Ed. Ch. 582; L. R. 7 Eq. 291 And if the testator has some interest in the thing disposed, the presumption that he intended to dispose only of his interest must be overruled in order to make a case of election; 6 Dow. 149, 179: 1 Ves. 515. The intention of the testator to put the devisee to his election must appear from the will itself; but surrounding circum- stances may be shown by parol; 41 Ark. 64; 30 Beav. 14. The time in which election may be exercised must be reasonable; 30 Beav. 235; 77 Va. 198; 19 Ves. 663; 34 Ala. 558; 30 Ia. 465; 4 McLean 99. The doctrine applies to every species of property or interest, whether the donor does or does not know of his right to dispose of it; Wats. Comp. Eq. (2d. ed.) 177; cases of transactions involving property of the wife; 23 Beav. 457; 30 Gratt. 83; satisfaction of dower; Ambl. 466, 682; 8 Paige, Ch. 325; 2 Sch. & L. 452; 14 Sim. 258; 1 Drur. & W. 107. The doctrine does not apply to cred- itors; 12 Ves. 354; 1 Pow. Dev. 437. As to the right or duty of election by per- sons under disability, there is much appar- ent confusion in the cases both as to theory and practice. Story states the rule general- ly that married women, infants, and lu
FANTmain
Bouvier's Law Dictionary • 1928
The smaller number of votes of a deli- berative assembly: opposed to majority, which see. The minority of a committee to which a corporate power has been delegated, can- not bind the majority, or do any valid act in the absence of any special provision otherwise: 127 U. S. 579.
Fantname
Wiktionary (English) • 2026
Wiktionary contributorsCC BY-SA 4.0 • via Kaikki
Extracted and formatted for display by Law Mind. Source link opens the current Wiktionary page and its contributor history; it is not a frozen copy of this extract.
A surname.

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