Definition
A Law French and Latin term meaning "anything done" — that is, an act, fact, or deed. In older English legal writing, *fait* carries two related but distinct senses:
1. A fact or accomplished act. Used in phrases like *matter in fait* to describe something that has legal effect through physical act or conduct rather than through record or written instrument.
2. A deed lawfully executed. In this sense, *fait* is roughly equivalent to *factum* — a formal legal instrument executed with proper ceremony, as distinguished from a mere agreement or informal transaction.
The compound *feme de fait* (also *femme de fait*) refers to a wife *de facto* — a woman living as a wife in practice, though not necessarily recognized as such in formal legal proceedings.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): Listed primarily as a surname; the word has no recognized standalone meaning in modern English common usage.
Historical common usage: Not listed as a standalone English word in Webster's 1913. In French, *fait* means simply "fact" or "deed" — a thing done.
The legal term is a direct borrowing from Law French, retained in English legal writing long after French ceased to be the language of the English courts. Researchers encountering *fait* in historical legal texts should not expect modern English dictionaries to illuminate it; its meaning is entirely a product of the legal vocabulary of medieval and early modern English law.
Common Confusion
*Fait* and *factum* are frequently used interchangeably in older legal sources, and both translate roughly as "a thing done" or "a deed." The distinction, when one is intended, turns on register: *fait* appears more often in Law French contexts and in older English common law writing; *factum* appears in Latin-inflected legal writing and in civil law traditions. In practice, many authorities treat them as synonyms. Researchers should also not confuse *fait accompli* — the modern French phrase meaning an accomplished fact that cannot be undone — with the technical legal use of *fait*, though the underlying meaning is related.
Why It Matters in Research
*Fait* is primarily a term of historical legal vocabulary. Researchers will encounter it in older English treatises, Year Books, and abridgments, particularly in discussions of deeds, infancy, and the distinction between matters of record and matters in fait. Anderson's entry is especially useful here: it notes that an infant may avoid a *matter in fait* before or at full age, but a *matter of record* only during majority — a distinction with real procedural consequences in historical cases.
The phrase *matter in fait* is a navigational signal: when encountered in early modern or medieval English legal sources, it points toward the law of deeds and executed acts as distinct from record-based obligations. Researchers working in the law of contracts, conveyancing, or infancy in historical English law should treat *fait* as a term of art requiring attention to context.
*Feme de fait* is a narrower term, appearing in older domestic relations and property law sources to describe a de facto marital relationship. It has no modern legal survival and should be read against contemporary discussions of coverture and the legal status of married women.
The term has essentially no modern American or English legal usage outside of historical quotation. Researchers finding it in a contemporary source should treat it as a deliberate archaism or a quotation from older authority.
Historical Dictionary Support
The four source dictionaries are in close agreement. All define *fait* as "anything done" — an act, deed, or fact — and all reference *feme de fait* or *femme de fait* as a wife de facto. Bouvier and Black (1st ed.) both cite Comyns' *Digest* as authority, which is the natural primary source for this term given that Comyns organized his abridgment partly around Law French vocabulary.
Anderson adds the most substantive legal content, noting the infancy doctrine's application to matters in fait versus matters of record. This is the entry most useful to a researcher trying to understand *fait* in its operative legal context rather than as a definition only.
What the historical dictionaries collectively miss is any extended treatment of how *fait* functioned in pleading practice or conveyancing — for that, researchers must go to the primary treatises, particularly Coke's *Institutes* and the older abridgments.