Definition
A technical term of pleading used in criminal indictments for extortion. When inserted in a charging instrument, "extorsively" functions as a term of art that supplies the allegation of corrupt intent necessary to sustain an extortion charge — specifically, that the defendant took money or property unlawfully and with full knowledge that it was not owed, or was taken in excess of what was owed, or was taken before it became due. Its presence in an indictment is understood to convey not merely the act of taking but the wrongful, oppressive character of that taking.
The word is essentially an adverbial pleading formula, not a substantive legal standard in its own right. Its function is procedural: to satisfy the requirement that the charging instrument allege a corrupt or extortionate intent without needing to spell out each element of that intent in separate language.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): "In an extorsive manner; extortionately."
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): No entry. The term does not appear in Webster's 1913 as an ordinary English word.
The gap here is one of register, not meaning. In common use, "extorsively" simply means "in an extortionate way" — a plain adverb. In law, the word does something more precise: it operates as a term of art in criminal pleading that is recognized by courts as sufficient, standing alone, to aver corrupt intent. A pleader who understood only the common meaning might treat the word as merely descriptive; in practice, its inclusion or omission from an indictment carried procedural consequence.
Common Confusion
"Extorsively" and "extortionately" are near-synonyms in ordinary language but are not interchangeable in formal pleading contexts. Historical sources treat "extorsively" as the established technical term for indictments; substituting a plain-English equivalent may or may not satisfy a jurisdiction's pleading requirements. Researchers should also note the spelling: "extorsively" (with an "s") is the recognized legal form, derived from the Latin extorsio, and should not be silently corrected to "extortively" when transcribing historical documents.
Why It Matters in Research
This term is almost exclusively a creature of criminal pleading practice and appears in historical indictments, not in modern statutory or common law analysis. Researchers working with pre-twentieth-century criminal records, especially indictments for official extortion or extortion by color of office, will encounter "extorsively" as a stock formula word. Its presence signals that the drafter was following established indictment practice; its absence may signal a defective indictment that was challenged or quashed.
Two jurisdictional wrinkles documented in historical sources are worth flagging. First, North Carolina courts held that the crime of extortion could be charged without using the word, suggesting that even in the nineteenth century the term was treated as sufficient but not always necessary. Second, the term's operative force — that it alone averred corrupt intent — means that historical appellate decisions sometimes turned on whether "extorsively" appeared in the charging language, making it a useful index word when searching early appellate records for extortion cases.
Researchers using keyword searches in digitized case law should note that OCR errors in older databases frequently render "extorsively" as "extortively," "extorsively," or garbled variants. Cross-check against the original record when the word appears in a critical pleading context.
The Latin maxim recorded in Rapalje & Lawrence — extortio est crimen quando quis colore officii extorquet quod non est debitum, vel supra debitum, vel ante tempus quod est debitum (10 Co. 102) — is the doctrinal backdrop against which "extorsively" functions. Understanding that definition (extortion is a crime when someone under color of office extorts what is not owed, or more than is owed, or before it is due) explains why inserting "extorsively" into a charging instrument was understood to invoke all three variants of the offense simultaneously.
Historical Dictionary Support
The four source dictionaries are in substantial agreement. Black's (both editions) and Bouvier's each define "extorsively" as a technical pleading word in extortion indictments and agree that it constitutes a sufficient averment of corrupt intent. Black's 2nd edition adds the citation to Leeman v. State (Arkansas), which anchors the proposition to actual appellate authority.
Bouvier's contributes the most analytically useful observation: that the word itself, by its import, signals that the defendant was not taking possession of something that was his own — a shorthand for the wrongful-taking element. Bouvier's also supplies the North Carolina exception, a point neither edition of Black's addresses.
Rapalje & Lawrence treats the term more briefly, glossing it simply as "oppressively" and cross-referencing EXTORT rather than developing a standalone definition. Its value lies in preserving the Latin maxim from Coke, which situates the pleading term within the broader doctrinal tradition of extortion by color of office.
None of the historical sources addresses modern usage, which is expected: "extorsively" as a live pleading term belongs entirely to the common law indictment tradition and has no significant role in modern criminal practice, where statutory charging language has displaced formulaic terms of art.
Jurisdictional Note
Extorsive pleading formulas were more firmly required in some jurisdictions than others. North Carolina courts permitted extortion charges without the word; other courts treated its presence as dispositive of the intent averment. Researchers should not assume uniform practice across American jurisdictions in the nineteenth century.