Definition
A Latin term appearing in the maxim *de tempore cujus contrarii memoria hominum non existit* — meaning "from time whereof the memory of man does not exist to the contrary." In legal usage, *existit* functions as the operative verb in this phrase of art, signifying the outer boundary of legal memory or recorded human recollection. The phrase as a whole describes time immemorial: a period so remote that no living person, nor the oldest witnesses they can produce, has knowledge of a different state of affairs. The legal consequence is that a right, custom, or usage established as existing since time immemorial is presumed to have always existed and requires no further proof of origin.
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Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): "Existit" has no standard entry in modern English reference works; it is the third-person singular present active indicative of the Latin verb *existere*, meaning "he/she/it exists" or "stands out."
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): Not separately defined. The root *exist* is treated as deriving from Latin *existere*, to stand forth or emerge into being.
The gap between the Latin grammatical form and its legal significance is substantial. In common Latin, *existit* is simply a conjugated verb meaning "exists." In legal sources, it appears almost exclusively as a component of the fixed phrase of art cited in Littleton, where its meaning is inseparable from the doctrine of legal memory. A researcher encountering *existit* in a legal text should recognize it immediately as a signal that the time immemorial doctrine is being invoked, not merely a generic assertion that something exists.
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Common Confusion
*Existit* is sometimes read in isolation — as a mere assertion of present existence — rather than as part of the frozen phrase *de tempore cujus contrarii memoria hominum non existit*. Historical legal texts, particularly those transcribed or abridged, occasionally truncate the phrase, leaving *existit* standing alone at the end of a clause. Researchers should reconstruct the full maxim before interpreting the passage. The phrase is also closely related to, but distinct from, *memoria hominis non est in contrarium*, a variant formulation used in some prescription and custom contexts; the doctrinal meaning is the same, but the phrasing differs across jurisdictions and authorities.
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Why It Matters in Research
*Existit* as an isolated word rarely appears as a term of art — it matters almost entirely in context, as the final word of the *de tempore* maxim. Researchers working in the Law Mind corpus should be alert to several navigational challenges:
**Truncation in historical records.** Medieval and early modern legal manuscripts frequently abbreviate familiar phrases. The appearance of *existit* at the close of a Latin clause is a reliable marker that the time immemorial doctrine is operative, even when the full phrase is not written out.
**Littleton's Tenures as the anchor source.** Both Black's and Burrill's trace this phrase directly to Littleton § 170, making Littleton the primary interpretive source. Any corpus research involving this term should route through Littleton and Coke's commentary upon it, as Coke's *Institutes* substantially shaped how English common law courts understood and applied the doctrine.
**Custom, prescription, and real property.** In corpus searches, *existit* (or the full *de tempore* phrase) will appear most densely in materials treating custom, prescriptive easements, common rights, and immemorial usage. It is rarely encountered in criminal, contract, or early equity contexts.
**The 1189 threshold.** English common law fixed the date of legal memory at the accession of Richard I (1189) by the Statute of Westminster I (1275), but this statutory boundary does not always appear alongside uses of the *de tempore* phrase in pre-modern sources. Researchers should not assume that every invocation of *existit* in this phrase implies knowledge of the statutory date — earlier writers sometimes used the phrase more loosely.
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Historical Dictionary Support
Black's Law Dictionary and Burrill's Law Dictionary are in complete agreement on the definition and source: both render the phrase as "from time whereof the memory of men does not exist to the contrary" and both cite Littleton § 170 as the authority. Neither dictionary elaborates on the substantive doctrine of time immemorial beyond the translation, treating *existit* as a vocabulary item rather than a doctrinal term requiring extended analysis.
What the historical dictionaries omit is notable. Neither source explains the legal consequences of successfully invoking this phrase — that is, the presumption of antiquity sufficient to establish custom or prescription without further evidence of origin. Neither addresses the statutory boundary of 1189 or the divergence in treatment between English and other common law jurisdictions. Researchers should treat the dictionary entries as definitional starting points only and consult Coke on Littleton and the standard prescription treatises for substantive doctrine.
Burrill adds no independent analysis beyond Black's formulation; the entries are functionally identical, which reflects the derivation of both from the same underlying source in Littleton.
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Jurisdictional Note
The *de tempore* phrase and its invocation of time immemorial originates in English common law and is most fully developed in that tradition. American courts inherited the doctrine but modified its application — the 1189 date has no practical force in U.S. jurisdictions, which typically assess immemorial usage by reference to living memory or, in some states, by statute. Scottish and other civil law systems use different mechanisms for establishing ancient custom.
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