Definition
Latin: "by the provision of man." A phrase used in property and estates law to describe a legal result, limitation, or disposition that arises from the express arrangement of a private party — as opposed to one that arises by operation of law. When an interest in land or property passes, vests, or terminates because a grantor, testator, or settlor specifically directed it to do so, that result occurs ex provisione hominis. The contrasting concept is ex dispositione legis — by the disposition of the law — where the legal outcome is imposed by statute or common law rule rather than by any act of the parties.
Common Confusion
Ex provisione hominis is sometimes loosely treated as the equivalent of "by agreement of the parties" or "by contract," but the phrase is more precise than that. It refers specifically to a disposition or limitation in a property instrument — a deed, will, or settlement — rather than to contractual arrangements generally. The antonym, ex dispositione legis, is equally important to keep in view: many historical passages use one phrase only in contrast to the other, and understanding either in isolation can distort the intended meaning.
Why It Matters in Research
This phrase is almost exclusively a term of art from classical English real property law, appearing most frequently in early modern treatises and Year Book-era commentary on future interests, remainders, and executory limitations. Researchers working in historical property records, conveyancing materials, or pre-twentieth-century equity opinions may encounter it as a shorthand for distinguishing privately created limitations from those imposed by the legal system.
The distinction matters in several research contexts. First, in tracing the history of future interests and the Rule Against Perpetuities, the question of whether an interest arose ex provisione hominis or ex dispositione legis had direct bearing on whether certain common law rules applied. Some restraints on alienation and vesting rules operated differently depending on the source of the limitation. Second, the phrase signals that you are in territory where close attention to the conveyancing instrument itself — the deed, will, or settlement — is essential, because the operative fact is the party's own language, not a default legal rule. Third, in historical equity research, the distinction between party-created and law-imposed dispositions sometimes determined which court had jurisdiction or which body of doctrine governed.
The phrase is rare in American materials and nearly absent from modern case law. When encountered in American sources, it almost always appears in a treatise or opinion drawing on English authorities. Researchers should treat it as a flag pointing toward English common law doctrine and should look to the surrounding context for the specific type of limitation being described.
Historical Dictionary Support
Black's (1st and 2nd editions) and Burrill's are in complete agreement, each offering the same single-sentence definition and citing the same authority: 11 Coke 80b (Co. 80b in Burrill's notation). The consistent citation to Coke — almost certainly a reference to Coke's Reports — anchors this phrase firmly in early seventeenth-century English property doctrine. The uniformity across all three sources reflects that this phrase had a fixed, narrow meaning that did not evolve across the period covered by these dictionaries. None of the entries elaborate on the specific legal contexts in which the distinction was applied, which is the principal gap researchers will encounter: the dictionary entries confirm the meaning but do not supply the surrounding doctrinal framework. For that, Coke's own reports and secondary commentary on future interests in real property are necessary.