EX PAUCIS

2 definitions found across Law Mind sources

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EX PAUCISAuthored
The Law Mind • 791 words
Definition
Latin: "from a few things" or "from a few words." A maxim of legal interpretation expressing the principle that a small number of stated particulars may be sufficient to imply, or allow a court to infer, a much greater body of meaning, intention, or legal consequence. The phrase appears in two classical formulations: (1) *Ex paucis dictis intendere plurima possis* — "From a few words, you may understand many things." (Littleton, sect. 384; Co. Litt. 237.) (2) *Ex paucis plurima concipit ingenium* — "From a few words or hints, the understanding conceives many things." (Littleton, sect. 550; Co. Litt. fol. 171.) Together, these formulations stand for the interpretive proposition that legal instruments — deeds, grants, pleadings, statutes — need not enumerate every consequence or implication exhaustively. Where a few words are used, the law permits, and at times requires, the reasoned extension of their meaning to cover what is fairly implied. It is not a license for speculation but a warrant for inference grounded in legal logic and like-case reasoning. ---
Common Confusion
*Ex paucis* should not be confused with doctrines permitting courts to supply omitted terms in contracts or statutes. The maxim applies to *understanding* what sparse language means — reading out the full implication of what was actually said — not to inserting terms the parties failed to address. The distinction matters when a researcher encounters the maxim cited in opposition to a claim of ambiguity: the citing party is typically arguing that the instrument, though brief, is complete as written and its consequences are legally determined. ---
Why It Matters in Research
This term is primarily encountered in older English common law materials and treatises rooted in Coke and Littleton. Researchers working in early property law, conveyancing, or the interpretation of ancient grants and pleadings will find it cited as authority for implication-based reasoning — particularly where a deed or instrument is sparse in its language but the surrounding legal context supplies the rest. The practical research trap is conflating *ex paucis* as a substantive rule with general canons of construction. It functions less as a rigid rule and more as a jurisprudential attitude embedded in the common law tradition: that legal instruments written in economy of language are not presumptively incomplete or ambiguous. Coke's endorsement of the maxim (Co. Litt. 237) gave it lasting authority in English legal writing and in American treatise literature that drew heavily from Coke. Researchers will rarely encounter *ex paucis* as a live citation in modern American cases. Its relevance in contemporary corpus research is almost entirely historical: it surfaces when tracing the intellectual genealogy of implication doctrines in property law, estates, and early contract interpretation. When a 19th-century court or treatise writer says that "inferences and conclusions in like cases are warrantable," the underlying logic often traces back to this maxim. Cross-corpus note: *Ex paucis* pairs naturally with other Coke-era maxims of construction and with the broader principle that grants are construed against the grantor. Researchers should follow threads to maxims governing implication in deed interpretation, surplusage rules, and the early doctrine that ambiguity in a deed may be resolved by reference to surrounding circumstances. ---
Historical Dictionary Support
Burrill's Law Dictionary is the primary source carrying this term in the Law Mind corpus. Burrill treats *ex paucis* by presenting both Latin formulations with attribution to Littleton and Coke, and quotes Coke's own gloss that "inferences and conclusions in like cases are warrantable." This is consistent with the way Coke used the maxim — not as a rule of last resort for filling gaps, but as affirmative authority for the common law's comfort with reasoning by implication from compact statements. No significant divergence appears across historical sources because the term was never highly disputed; it was an accepted maxim rather than a contested doctrine. What historical dictionaries collectively miss is any rigorous treatment of the maxim's limits — when *ex paucis* reasoning tips from permissible inference into judicial addition to an instrument. That line was developed through case law rather than dictionary treatment, which is why researchers following this maxim into practice should transition quickly from dictionary sources to the case materials themselves. The Littleton sections cited (384 and 550) concern tenures and the interpretation of feudal grants — context that explains why the maxim arose where it did. The economy of language in medieval conveyancing made a principle of liberal implication practically necessary. ---
Related Terms
Latin maxims of construction; implication (in deeds and grants); Co. Litt. (Coke on Littleton); canons of construction; surplusage rule; ambiguity (in instruments); grantconstruction of; Littleton's Tenures; ex parte (unrelated in meaningdistinguished by spelling and context)
EX PAUCISmain
Burrill's Law Dictionary • 1867
Lat. From a few things or words. Ex paucis dictis intendere plurima possis. From a few words, you may understand many things. Litt. sect. 384. "By this verse," says Lord Coke, "inferences and conclusions in like cases are warrantable." Co. Litt. 237. Ex paucis plurima concipit ingenium; from a few words or hints the understanding conceives many things. Litt. sect. 550. wards). Id. fol. 171. Sive ratum habuerit ab initio, vel ex post facto; whether he ratified it at the beginning or afterwards. Id. fol. 213. Item id quod ab initio non fuit nocumentum injuriosum, ex post facto, et per constitutionem fieri poterit injuriosum; also that which originally was not an injurious nuisance, may be made injurious by after-act or matter, and in consequence of agreement. Id. fol. 232. See Fleta, lib. 4, c. 26, § 4. Poterit esse [summonitio] legitima ab initio, sed inefficax ex post facto; the summons may be lawful at first, but become of no force in consequence of aftermatter, (or afterwards). Bract. fol. 336 b. It will be seen from the preceding quotations, that ex post facto has always been used in contrast with the still common phrase ab initio, which, indeed, seems to be its proper correlative; and hence the two phrases may be conveniently employed to illustrate each other. Thus, a man may become a trespasser ab initio, (from the beginning, or first act,) in consequence of a subsequent act, (ex post facto,) although his first act was, at the time it was done, a lawful one. Chase, J. 3 Dallas' R. 386. See Trespasser ab initio. On the other hand, an act unlawful in the beginning, (ab initio,) may in some cases become lawful by matter of after-fact, (ex post facto). Chase, J. ub. sup. Again, an act which was indifferent in itself when done, (that is, ab initio,) is sometimes made criminal or punishable ex post facto, (by a subsequent act, or matter,) that is, a law made afterwards, (ex lege post lata). See Ex post facto law. EX POST FACTO; properly, EX POSTFACTO, or EX POST-FACTO. Lat. From, by or in consequence of an after-act, or thing done afterwards; by matter of subsequent occurrence; by aftermatter. A term of the civil law, introduced into the common law at a very early period, and the precise import of which may be better understood from the following examples: Quæ ab initio inutilis fuit institutio, ex postfacto convalescere non potest. An institution or act which was of no effect at the beginning, (when made or done) cannot acquire force or validity from after-matter, (as by lapse of time). Dig. 50. 17. 210. Nunquam crescit ex postfacto præteriti delicti æstimatio. The estimate of the character of a past offence **Expost facto seems to have been a is never enhanced by after-matter. Dig. familiar phrase in English law in the time of 50. 17. 138. 1. Non ex post-facto, sed ex Bracton, and the very numerous examples præsenti statu damnum factum sit, necne, of its use and application furnished by that æstimari oportere, Labeo ait; Labeo says writer, (a few only of which have been that the question whether a damage be quoted,) show that its grammatical signifidone [to a building] or not, is to be detercation was then perfectly well ascertained. mined not from any after-act or occurrence, Afterwards, however, it fell into comparabut from the condition of the building at tive disuse, and it may now be said to be the time. Dig. 43. 24. 7. 4. Donationum, less common in English than in American quædam valida esse possunt ab initio, et injurisprudence. See Ex post facto law. Its valida fieri ex post facto, et è converso; of substantial import seems to be well enough gifts, some may be valid at the beginning understood, but its grammatical meaning (or when made,) and become invalid by has, in general, been either wholly misapsubsequent matter, and è converso. Bract. prehended, or singularly mixed up with fol. 11 b, 12. Non mandante, nec autori-error. Thus, it has been translated in two tatem præstante ab initio, sed ex post facto of the latest English law dictionaries,- ratum habente; not commanding nor giving "from something after the fact,"—" from authority at the beginning, (or originally,) an after act; after a deed is done." Wharbut ratifying it by an after-act, (or after-ton's Lex. Holthouse. See also the opin-

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