Definition
Ex concessis is a Latin phrase meaning "from the things granted" or "from the premises conceded." In legal argumentation, it refers to a conclusion or position that follows necessarily from what the opposing party has already admitted, conceded, or granted — whether in pleadings, argument, or prior judicial determination. To argue ex concessis is to hold an adversary to their own admissions: if you have already granted certain premises, you cannot logically resist the conclusion those premises compel.
The phrase operates as a form of argumentative shorthand, signaling that no further proof is needed on a point because the opposing side has already yielded the ground that would support it. It appears most often in appellate briefs, judicial opinions, and formal legal argument where consistency between a party's prior concessions and current position is at issue.
Common Language
This is pure Latin legal jargon with no meaningful presence in ordinary English usage. The COMMON LANGUAGE section is omitted.
Why It Matters in Research
Ex concessis is a navigational challenge in historical legal research because it appears almost exclusively in formal argument contexts — opinions, treatises, and briefs — rather than in procedural rules or statutory text. Researchers encountering the phrase in older case law or equity opinions should treat it as a signal that the court or advocate is invoking an internal consistency principle: the party being addressed cannot contest a point they have effectively surrendered.
The phrase carries particular weight in equity practice and in appellate review, where courts regularly hold parties to positions they adopted at trial or in earlier proceedings. A researcher tracing the doctrine of judicial estoppel or the broader principle of party admissions will find ex concessis in the older cases as a predecessor framing before those modern doctrines were fully systematized.
Trap for the unwary: do not confuse ex concessis with ex parte, which is structurally similar Latin but entirely unrelated in meaning. The visual and phonetic similarity causes occasional misfiling and misdirection in legal databases. When searching historical digests or early reporters, verify context carefully.
The phrase also appears in theological and philosophical argumentation inherited by the common law tradition, where it signals conclusions drawn from an opponent's own premises. Legal researchers working at the intersection of natural law theory and early Anglo-American jurisprudence will encounter ex concessis in that broader argumentative tradition. The legal use is a direct borrowing of the logical usage, with no meaningful divergence in meaning — only a narrowing of context.
Historical Dictionary Support
The three historical sources agree completely on the core meaning, which reflects the phrase's stability as a fixed Latin expression rather than a term that evolved through case law. Black's (both editions) renders it as "from the premises granted" and adds the practical gloss "according to what has been already allowed," which helpfully captures the argumentative function. Burrill is slightly more spare — "from things or premises granted" — but reaches the same place.
None of the historical sources elaborates on the procedural contexts in which ex concessis most commonly appears, nor do they connect it to the broader doctrines (judicial estoppel, admissions, issue preclusion) that modern researchers would associate with its underlying logic. This is a case where the historical dictionaries accurately define the phrase but leave its argumentative significance to be inferred. Researchers should not read the brevity of these entries as suggesting the phrase is merely ornamental — in context, it carries real argumentative weight.
Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
The matching encyclopedia entries (emergency ex parte orders of protection, Ex parte Young, and DTSA ex parte seizure) share the prefix "ex parte" but are unrelated to ex concessis in doctrine or function. No Law Mind Encyclopedia entry directly addresses this term.