Definition
Latin. "With his assent." A formulaic phrase appearing in the formal language of default judgments for damages, indicating that the defendant has, by his own assent — typically through failure to appear or contest — permitted the judgment to be entered against him. The phrase captures the legal fiction underlying default proceedings: that the defaulting party's silence or absence constitutes a form of acquiescence to the court's determination of damages.
Why It Matters in Research
This term is a procedural relic of common law pleading and is unlikely to appear in modern American or English legal materials outside of historical context. Researchers encountering it will do so almost exclusively in pre-twentieth-century reports, writs, and pleading records — particularly those governed by the forms of action.
The phrase signals that a judgment was entered by default rather than after contested litigation. When reading early English reports or colonial-era American decisions, distinguishing between judgments entered ex assensu suo and those entered after full hearing matters for understanding the precedential weight and finality of the ruling. Default judgments in this era could carry different collateral estoppel implications than contested judgments, and the formal language of the record was often the only indicator of which process had occurred.
Researchers working in historical court records should note that the phrase appears as part of the judgment roll's boilerplate — not as a substantive legal finding. Its presence tells you about procedure, not about the underlying merits. Do not read it as an admission by the defendant of liability in any substantive sense; it reflects procedural default, not confession.
The citation to "Comb. 220" in all three historical dictionaries refers to Comberbach's Reports, an English law reporter covering cases from the late seventeenth century (Sir Robert Comberbach, reports of cases 1685–1699). This is the sole authority cited across all three dictionary sources, suggesting the phrase had limited treatment even in classical legal literature and was understood primarily as a term of art within the pleading forms rather than a concept generating independent doctrine.
Historical Dictionary Support
All three source dictionaries — Black's (first and second editions) and Burrill's — offer identical or near-identical treatment: a Latin gloss ("with his assent"), a one-line functional description (formal words in judgments for damages by default), and the single citation to Comberbach 220. The uniformity across sources reflects the phrase's status as settled, narrow legal vocabulary rather than a contested concept requiring elaboration.
Burrill's reproduction of the same definition without supplementation is notable: Burrill was generally more expansive than Black's in treating Latin maxims and common law forms, yet this entry receives no additional commentary. This convergence suggests the term was well understood by practitioners of the era and required no interpretation — it was simply part of the forms they learned.
What the historical dictionaries do not address: the phrase's relationship to the broader doctrine of default judgment, its procedural prerequisites, or its treatment by equity courts. Researchers needing that context must look beyond dictionary literature to pleading treatises such as Chitty on Pleading or Stephen's Principles of Pleading, neither of which is indexed under this specific Latin phrase.
Jurisdictional Note
This phrase belongs to the common law pleading tradition of England and was carried into early American practice. It has no continuing significance in modern civil procedure under the Federal Rules or their state equivalents, where default judgment is governed by rule rather than formal Latin recitation.