The preclusion of a person from asserting a fact, by previous conduct inconsistent therewith, on his own part or the part of those under whom he claims, or by an adjudication upon his rights which he cannot be allowed to call in question. A preclusion, in law, which prevents a man from alleging or denying a fact, in consequence of his own previous act, allega- tion, or denial of a contrary tenor. Steph. Pl. 239. A plea which neither admits nor denies the facts alleged by the plaintiff, but denies his right to allege them. Gould, Pl. c. 2, § 89. A special plea in bar, which happens where a man has done some act or executed some deed which precludes him from aver- ring anything to the contrary. 8 Bla. Com. 308. Where a fact has been admitted or asserted for the purpose of influencing the conduct or deriv- ing a benefit from another so that it cannot be denied without a breach of good faith, the law enforces the rule of good morals as a rule of policy, and precludes the party from repudiating his representations or denying the truth of his admissions; 5 Ohio 199; Rawle, Cov. 407. This doctrine of law gives rise to a kind of plead- ing that is neither by way of traverse, nor confes- sion and avoidance, viz.: a pleading that, waiving any question of fact, relies merely on the estoppel, and, after stating the previous act, allegation, or denial of the opposite party, prays judgment if he shall be received or admitted to to aver contrary to what he before did or sald. This pleading is called a pleading by way of estoppel. Steph. Pl. 240; 120 Mass. 21; 18 Hun 163; 57 Miss. 631; 81 La. Ann. 81, 108; 8 Baxt. 289; 90 İll. 604; 6 Wash. 244. See 95 Cal. 541. Formerly the questions of regarding estoppel arose almost entirely in relation relation to transfers of real prop- erty, an 1 the rules in regard to one kind of estoppel were quite fully elaborated. In more modern time the principle has come to be applied to all cases where one by words or conduct wilfully causes an- other to believe in the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief or to alter his own previous position; 2 Exch. 653; 1 Zab. 403; 28 Me. 525; 9 N. Y. 121; 40 Mo. 348. See, as to the reason and propriety of the doctrine, Co. Litt. 352 a; 11 Wend. 117; 1 Dev. & B. L. 404; 12 Vt. 44. "The correct view of estoppel is that taken in a recent work (Bigelow, Est.). Certain admissions,' it is there said, 'are indisputable, and estoppel is the agency of the law by which evidence to controvert their truth is excluded.' In other words, when an act is done, or a statement made by a party the truth or efficacy of which it would be a fraud on his part to controvert or impair, the character of an estoppel will be given to what would otherwise be a mere matter of evidence. The law of estoppel, 'therefore, is a branch of the law of evidence, it has become a part of the jurisdiction of chancery,simply because in equity alone, or rather by equitable con- struction alone, has that full effect been given to this species of evidence which is necessary to the due administration of justice." Bisph. Eq. § 280. See Tiedm Eq. Jur. 106 Where there is an attempt to apply the doctrine of estoppel, one essential in such a case is that the party in whose favor it is invoked must himself act in good faith; 50 Kan. 773.