The superior right of property subsisting in a sovereign- ty, by which private property may in cer- tain cases be taken or its use controlled for the public benefit, without regard to the wishes of the owner. The power to take private property for public use. 6 How. 536. The right of every government to ap- propriate otherwise than by taxation and its police authority (which are distinct powers), private property for public use. Dill. Mun. Corp. § 584. Different theories are advanced as to the precise nature of the power, and it has been defined to be the right retained by the people or government over the estate of individuals, to reclaim the same for public use, a kind of reserved right or estate re- maining in the sovereign as paramount to the individual title. This conception of the right was at one time very generally accepted. The result of this view is to consider the right, theoretically at least, as so much of the original proprietorship retained by the sovereign power in granting, lands or franchises to individuals or corporations, wher- ever the common-law theory of original proprietor- ship prevails. An argument by analogy in support of this view is derived from the able examination and explanation of the origin of the jus publicum in 7 Cush. 90. See, also, remarks of Daniell, J.; 6 How. 533. Perhaps no better statement of this doctrine is to be found than this: "The highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity, giving a right to resume the possession of the property in the manner directed by the con- stitution and the laws of the state whenever the public good requires it." 3 Paige, Ch. 78; or, "The true theory and principle of the matter is, that the legislature resume dominion over the property, and having resumed it, instead of using it by their agents, to effect the intended public good, and to avoid entanglement in the common on business of life, they revest it in other individuals or corporations to be used by them in such manner as to effect, directly or indirectly, or incidentally, as the case may be, the public good intended." 34 Conn. 78; see also 8 Yerg. 41; 8 Barb. 486; 118 Ν. Υ. 275; 28 Mo. 507. But this theory of resumption of original pro- prietorship is disapproved by the most authorita- tive writers, and with reason; the weight of author- ity and of argument are both against it. In this country the right is exercised by two governments, each sovereign, operating on the same property; the federal power can, upon no hypothesis, be be based upon original grant in the older states, nor perhaps the state power, in the new states; a new sove reignty by acquiring territorial rights succeeds to this right over property, of which the original grant was from the prior one; property may be ap- propriated a second time after the power has been already exercised and, upon the theory under con- sideration, necessarily exhausted; personal property is subject to the right; although the doctrine of re- served right cannot apply to it, while the reversion of the state will supply no argument, as it applies equally to personal property in which the state never had any title; and any ny paramount of reserved right could be granted, but this right never can; 118 111. 427; 36 Conn. 196. All these considerations are inconsistent with the theory suggested and seem to leave no alternative but to recognize the right as an attribute of sovereignty and in no sense an in- terest or estate. See Lewis, Em. Dom. $ 8; Rand. Em. Dom. $8; 32 Ia. 66; 2 Dev. & B. L. 451; 18 Wend. 9, 57; 2 Redf. Railw. 229, This right is distinguished from public do- main, which is property owned absolutely by the state in the same manner as an in- dividual holds his property; 37 Am. Jur. 121; 2 Kent, Com. 339; 3 Yerg. 389; 6 How. 540; termed by Cooley "the ordinary do- main of the state"; Const. Lim. 642. The right of eminent domain is not to be confounded with cases in which there ex- ists a sovereign right to take or destroy private property without making compen- sation. The familiar case of taxation is readily distinguished. An owner is not en- titled to compensation for damage or loss to property taken or destroyed during war. As to the distinction between the war power and eminent domain see 13 Am. L. Reg. 265, 337, 401; Mills, Em. Dom. § 3. So property may be taken under a controlling necessity, or to prevent the spread of a fire; 12 Co. 63; 23 N. J. L. 605; 50 Тех. 614; 7 Metc. 462; 13 Minn. 38; 18 Wend. 126; or, under the police power, to abate a nuisance (q. v.); 7 Cush. 53 (in which Shaw, C. J., draws the distinction between the police power and eminent domain); 126 Mass. 438; or by restraining the owner of land from making a noxious use of it; 105 III. 888; or by removing sand, etc., from beaches; 11 Metc. 55; compelling railroads to erect cattle guards; 27 Vt. 140; or holding them responsible for damages by fire (q.v.) from loco