presiding officer except to either House on a motion A very common example is the choice a widow makes to withdraw. Sec. 6. That when the two Houses separate to decide upon an objection that may have been made to the counting of any electoral vote or votes from any State, or other question arising in the matter, each Senator and Representative may speak to such objection or question five minutes, and not more than once; but after such debate shall have lasted two hours it shall be the duty of the presiding officer of each House to put the main question without further debate. Sec. 7. That at such joint meeting of the two Houses seats shall be provided as follows: For the president of the Senate, the speaker's chair; for the speaker, immediately upon his left; the Senators, in the body of the hall upon the right of the presiding officer; for the Representatives, in the body of the hall not provided for the Senators; for the tellers, secretary of the Senate, and clerk of the House of Representatives, at the clerk's desk; for the other officers of the two Houses, in front of the clerk's desk and upon each side of the speaker's platform. Such joint meeting shall not be dissolved until the count of electoral votes shall be completed and the result declared; and no recess shall be taken unless a question shall have arisen in regard to counting any such votes, or otherwise under this act, in which case it shall be competent for either House, acting separately, in the manner hereinbefore provided, to direct a recess of such House not beyond the next calendar day, Sunday excepted, at the hour of ten o'clock in the forenoon. But if the counting of the electoral votes and the declaration of the result shall not have been completed before the fifth calendar day next after such first meeting of the two Houses, no further or other recess shall be taken by either House. See BALLOT; BRIBERY; CANDIDATE; CONGRESS; DEPOSIT, 1 (1); HOLIDAY; QUALIFIED, 1; VACANCY; VOTE. 2. The obligation imposed upon a party to choose between two inconsistent or alternative rights or claims, in cases where there is a clear intention of the person from whom he derives one that he should not enjoy both. This, technically, is " election," or the “doctrine of election," at law and equity. In equity jurisprudence, presupposes a plurality of gifts or rights, with an intention, express or implied, of the party, who has a right to control one or both, that one should be a substitute for the other.1 Thus, one may have an election: to pay money or deliver goods, as a consideration; to observe a contract, or pay damages or forfeit a sum; to retain a security for a debt, or surrender it and share as a distributee in a dividend; to rescind or affirm a voidable contract; between a statutory and common-law remedy; between a joint and a several action; between suing an agent and suing his undisclosed principal; between independent grounds of defense or of action. between dower and a testamentary provision. A person who is entitled to any benefit under a will or other instrument, must, if he claims that benefit, abandon every right or interest the assertion of which would defeat, even partially, any of the provisions of the instrument. But in no case is one to be put to an election unless it is clear that the provisions of the instrument in some degree would be defeated by the assertion of his other rights.1 The doctrine rests upon the equitable ground that no man can be permitted to claim inconsistent rights with regard to the same subject, and that any one who asserts an interest under an instrument is bound to give full effect, as far as he can, to that instrument. Or, as it is sometimes expressed, he who accepts a benefit under a deed or will must adopt the contents of the whole instrument, conforming to all its provisions and relinquishing every right inconsistent with it.2 An election may be implied as well as expressed. Whether there has been an election must be determined upon the circumstances of the particular case, rather than upon general principles. It may be inferred from the conduct of the party - his acts, his omissions, and his mode of dealing with the property. Unequivocal acts of ownership, with knowledge of the right to elect, and not through a mistake with respect to the condition and value of the estate, will generally be deemed an election to take under a will. It has become a maxim that no one is bound to elect in ignorance of his rights. Compare SATISFY, 2 (2). 3. The right to choose, or the act of choosing, between different actions or remedies, where the plaintiff has suffered one species of wrong from the act complained of. This right arises where he may sue in tort or upon the contract implied by law in the case; or where he may bring an action of a purely equitable nature, or such as merely seeks a money judgment.4 Relates to capacity of holding as well as of being elected to an office.s Incligible. Refers as well to disqualification to hold, as to disqualification to be elected to, an office. 1 Gibson v. Gibson, 17 E. L. & E. 353 (1853), Kindersley, V. C.; 14 Gratt. 548; 76 Va. 123. 2 Penn v. Guggenheimer, 76 Va. 846 (1882), Staples, J. 376 Va. 850, supra; Burroughs v. De Couts, 70 Cal. 370 (1886); Streatfield v. Streatfield (1735), 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., W. & T., 504, 510, 541; 2 Story, Eq. §§ 1076-98. 4 See 22 Cent. Law J. 533-38 (1886), cases. 5 [Carson v. McPhetridge, 15 Ind. 331 (1860); 15 Cal. 12 Story, Eq. § 1075; 1 Pomeroy, Eq. § 461 et seq.; 54 117; 3 Nev. 566. Me. 458. State v. Murray, 28 Wis. 99 (1871).