Law in its regular course of administration through courts of justice. 3 Story, Const. 264, 661; Miller, Const. 664; 18 How. 272; 13 Ν. Υ. 378. Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice. 110 U. S. 516. Due process of law has never been pre- cisely defined; while its fundamental require- ment is opportunity for hearing and defense, the procedure may be adapted to the case, and proceedings in court are not always essential. 204 U. S. 241. While the exact definition of the term "due process of law" may be uncertain, it is cer- tain that it inhibits the taking of one man's property and giving it to another, contrary to settled usages and modes of procedure, and without notice or an opportunity to be heard. 230 U. S. 140. While the words "due process of law," as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, pro- tect fundamental rights, the Amendment was not intended to interfere with the power of the State to protect the lives, liberty and prosperity of its citizens, nor with the power of adjudication of its courts in administering the process provided by the law of the State. 200 U. S. 164. This term is considered by Coke as equi- valent to the phrase "law of the land " (used in Magna Charta, c. 29), and is said by him to denote "indictment, or present- ment of good and lawful men." Co. 2d Inst. 50. Amendment V. of the con- stitution of the United States provides: "No person shall . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Amendment XV. prohibits a state from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. A similar provision exists in all the state con- stitutions; the phrases "due course of law" and "the law of the land" are sometimes used; but all three of these phrases have the same meaning; 96 U. S. 97; Cooley, Const. Lim. 437, where the provisions in the various state constitutions are set forth. Miller, J., says, in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 103, that a general definition of the phrases which would cover every case would be most desirable, but that, apart from the risk of failure to make the defini- tion perspicuous and comprehensive, there is a wisdom in ascertaining the extent and application of the phrase by the judicial process of exclusion and inclusion as the cases arise. In that case, however, he says also, that it must be confessed that the con- stitutional meaning or value of the phrase remains without that satisfactory precision of definition which judicial decisions have given to nearly all the other guaranties of personal rights found in the constitutions of the several states and of the United States. As contributory to the discussion, he proceeds, for the court, to lay down the following proposition: "That whenever by the laws of a state, or by state authority, a tax, assessment, servitude, or other burden is imposed upon property for the public use, whether it be for the whole state or of some more limited portion of the com- munity, and those laws provide for a mode of confirming or contesting the charge thus imposed, in the ordinary courts of justice, with such notice to the person, or such proceeding in regard to the property as is appropriate to the nature of the case, the judgment in such proceedings cannot be said to deprive the owner of his property without due process of law, however ob- noxious it may be to other objections." In the case just cited it is remarked that dur ing nearly a century while this provision was in the constitution of the United States, as a restraint upon the authority of the federal government, and during that time the powers of that government were watched with jealousy, this special limita- tion on its powers was seldom invoked; but after it became, as part of the Fourteenth Amendment, a limitation upon the powers of the states, in a very few years, the docket of the supreme court was crowded with cases in which it was invoked. See 140 U. S. 316; 133 id. 660; 154 id. 421. The full significance of the clause "law of the land" is said by Ruffin, C. J., to be that statutes which would deprive a citizen of the rights of person or property without a regular trial according to the course and usage of the common law would not be the law of the land; 4 Dev. 15. Mr. Webster's ex- planation of the meaning of these phrases in the Dartmouth College Case (4 Wheat.