The uncertainty which exists in relation to a fact, a proposition, or other thing; an equipoise of the mind arising from an equality of contrary reasons. Ayliffe, Pand. 121. The most embarrassing position of a judge is that of being in doubt; and it is frequently the lot of the wisest and most enlightened to be in this condition: those who have little or no experience usually find no difficulty in deciding the most problematical questions. Some rules, not always infallible, have been adopted in doubtful cases, in order to arrive at the truth. 1. In civil cases, the doubt ought to operate against him who, having it in his power to prove facts to remove the doubt, has neglected to do so. In cases of fraud, when there is a doubt, the pre- sumption of innocence ought usually to remove it. 2. In criminal cases, whenever a reasonable doubt exists as to the guilt of the accused, that doubt ought to operate in his favor. In such cases, par- ticularly when the liberty, honor, or life of an indi- vidual is at stake, the evidence to convict ought to be clear and devoid of all reasonable doubt. The term reasonable doubt is often used, but not easily defined. "It is not mere possible doubt; be- cause everything relating to human affairs and de- pending on moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and considera tion of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in such a condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. The burden of proof is upon the prosecutor. All the presumptions of law independ- ent of evidence are in favor of innocence; and proved guilty. upon such proof there is reason- every person is presumed to be innocent until he is able doubt remaining, the accused is entitled to the benefit of it by an acquittal. For it is not sufficient to establish a probability, though a strong one aris- ing from the doctrine of chances, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary; but the evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty, a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. This is proof beyond reasonable doubt; because if the law, which mostly depends upon considerations of a moral na- ture, should go further than this and require abso- lute certainty, it would exclude circumstantial evi- dence altogether." Per Shaw, C. J., in 5 Cush. 820; 1 Gray 534; 2 Dev. & B. L. 311; 1 Houst. Cr. Rep. 316. In approving the opinion of Shaw, C. J., the court, in 59 Cal. 395, says: "There can be no 'reason- able doubt of a fact after it has been clearly estab- lished by satisfactory proof." No man should be deprived of life under the form of law unless the jury can say upon their conscience that the evi- dence is sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of every fact necessary to con- stitute the crime charged; 100 U. S. 460. It must be an actual, substantial doubt, arising from the evi- dence or want of evidence in the case; 32 Neb. 782. If the evidence produced in a criminal action be of such a convincing character that the jurors would unhesitatingly be governed by it in the weighty and important matters of life, they may be said to have no reasonable doubt respecting the guilt or innocence of the accused, notwithstanding the uncertainty which attends all human evidence. Therefore, a charge to the jury that if after an impartial com- parison and consideration of all the evidence, they can truthfully say that they have an abiding convic- tion of the defendant's guilt, such as they would be willing to act upon in the more weighty and impor- tant matters relating to their own affairs, they have no reasonable doubt, is not erroneous; 120 U. S. 431. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not beyond all possible or imaginary doubt, but such proof as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it tends to support. It is proof to a moral certainty, as distinguished from an absolute cer- tainty. As applied to a judicial trial for crime, the two phrases are synonymous and equivalent; and each signifies such proof as satisfies the judgment and consciences of the jury, r.s reasonable mer. and applying their reason to the evidence before them, the that the crime charged has been committed by the defendant, and so satisfies them as to leave no other reasonable conclusion possible: 118 Mass. 24. See Best, Pres. § 195: Will. Cir. Ev. 825: 83 How. St. Tr. 506; Burn. Cr. Law of Scotl. 522; 1 Greenl. Ev. $1; D'Aguesseau, Œuvres, xiii. 2:2; 103 U. S. 312; 26 N. J. L. 615; 76 Me. 125; 100 N. Y. 510; 122 111. 201 2 Green, Cr. Cas. 434; 10 Am. L. Rev. 642; 14 Cent. L. J. 446; 47 Ala. 78: PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE. See REASONABLE DOUBT. RATIONAL DOUBT.