ity, can prevent the acquisition of the means or instruments by which alone governmental functions can be performed. No one doubts the existence in the State governments of the right of eminent domain, - a right distinct from and paramount to the right of ultimate ownership. It grows out of the necessities of their being, not out of the tenure by which lands are held. It may be exercised, though the lands are not held by grant from the government, either mediately or immediately, and independent of the consideration whether they would escheat to the government in case of a failure of heirs. The right is the offspring of political necessity; and it is inseparable from sovereignty, unless denied to it by its fundamental law. But it is no more necessary for the exercise of the powers of a State government than for the exercise of the conceded powers of the Federal government. That government is sovereign within its sphere, as the States are within theirs. When the power to establish post-offices and to create courts within the States was conferred upon the Federal government, included in it was authority to obtain sites for such offices and for court-houses, by such means as were known and appropriate. The right of eminent domain was one of those means well known when the Constitution was adopted, and employed to obtain lands for public uses. Its existence, therefore, in the grantee of that power ought not to be questioned. The Constitution itself contains an implied recognition of it beyond what may justly be implied from the express grants. The Fifth Amendment contains a provision that "private property" shall not "be taken for public use without just compensation." What is that but an implied assertion that, on making just compensation, it may be taken. This power of the Federal government has not heretofore been exercised adversely; but the non-user of a power does not disprove its existence. In some instances the States, by virtue of their own right of eminent domain, have condemned lands for the use of the general government, and such condemnations have been sustained by their courts, without, however, denying the right of the United States to act independently of the States. The proper view of the right of eminent domain seems to be that it is a right belonging to a sovereignty to take private property for its own public uses, and not for those of another. Beyond that there exists no necessity; which alone is the foundation of the right. If the United States have the power, it must be complete in itself. It can neither be enlarged nor diminished by a State. Nor can any State prescribe the manner in which it must be exercised. The consent of a State can never be a condition precedent to its enjoyment. Such consent is needed only, if at all, for the transfer of jurisdiction and of the right of exclusive legislation after the lands shall have been acquired.1 The right requires no constitutional recognition. When the use is public, the necessity or expediency of the appropriation is not a subject of judicial cognizance. The power may be delegated to a private cor1 Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 371-74 (1875), cases, Strong, J. Approved, Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 id. 531 (1885); Roanoke City v. Berkowitz, 80 Va. 619, 623 (1885). poration, to be exercised in the execution of a work in which the public is interested. Whether attached conditions have been observed is a matter for judicial cognizance.1 Ascertainment of the amount of compensation to be made is not an essential element of the power of appropriation. The constitutional provision for "just compensation" is merely a limitation upon the use of the power. It is no part of the power itself, but a condition upon which the power may be exercised. The proceeding for the ascertainment of the value of the property and the compensation to be made is merely an inquisition to establish a particular fact as a preliminary to the actual taking; and it may be prosecuted before commissioners, special boards, or the courts, with or without the intervention of a jury, as the legislative power may designate. All that is required is that it shall be conducted in some fair and just manner, with opportunity to the owners of the property to present evidence as to its value, and to be heard thereon. Whether the tribunal shall be created directly by an act of Congress, or one already established by the States shall be adopted for the occasion, is a matter of legislative discretion.2 The right over the shores and the land under the water of navigable streams resides in the State for municipal purposes, within legitimate limitations.3 Land taken for one purpose cannot, without special authority from the legislature, be appropriated, by proceedings in invitum, to a different use. The power of eminent domain expropriates, upon indemnity for public utility; the "police power" is exercised without making compensation - any loss occasioned is damnum absque injuria. See A judgment, decree, sentence. Dome-book. Any book of judgments. Alfred collected the customs of the kingdom and reduced them to a system or code in his "Dom-bec," 1 Mississippi, &c. Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 406 (1878). 2 United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 518-19 (1883), Field, J. See Wagner v. Railway Co., 38 Ohio St. 35 (1882). 3 Omerod v. New York, &c. R. Co., 13 F. R. 370 (1882). 4 Prospect Park, &c. R. Co. v. Williamson, 91 N. Y. 552, 561 (1883); Anniston, &c. R. Co. v. Jacksonville, &c. R. Co., 82 Ala. 300 (1886), cases. Bass v. State, 34 La. An. 496 (1882); Davenport v. Richmond City, 81 Va. 639 (1886); 17 F. R. 114; 81 Pa. 85. See generally 3 Law Q. Rev. 314-25 (1887), cases; 2 Kent, 339; 19 Bost. Law Rep. 241, 301. •West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 540 (1848);