It is quite ap- parent that some principles other than those of the common law must regulate the ex- ercise of such a jurisdiction. That law could not mitigate its rigor upon its own principles. And as, down to the time of Edward III., and, with few exceptions, to the 21st of Henry VIII., the chancellors were ecclesiastics, much more familiar with the principles of the Roman law than with those of the common law, it was but a matter of course that there should be a larger adoption of the principles of that law; and the study of it is of some impor- tance in this connection. Still, that law cannot be said to be of authority even in equity proceedings. The commons were jealous of its introduction. "In the reign of Richard II. the barons protested that they would never suffer the kingdom to be governed by the Roman law, and the judges prohibited it from being any longer cited in the common-law tribunals." This opposition of the barons and of the common-law judges furnished very suf- ficient reasons why the chancellors should not profess to adopt that law as the rule of decision. In addition to this, it was not fitted, in many respects, to the state of things existing in England: and so the chancellors were of necessity compelled to act upon equitable principles as expounded by themselves. In later times the common- law judges in that country have resorted to the Roman law for principles of decision to a much greater extent than they have given credit to it. Since the time of Henry VIII. the chan- cery bench has been occupied by some of the ablest lawyers which England has pro- duced, and they have given to the proceed- ings and practice in equity definite rules and forms, which leave little to the per- sonal discretion of the chancellor in deter- miming what equity and good conscience require. The discretion of the chancellor is a judicial discretion, to be exercised ac- cording to the principles and practice of the court. See DISCRETION. The avowed principle upon which the jurisdiction was at first exercised was the administration of justice according to hon- esty, equity, and conscience, which last, it is said, was unknown to the common law as a principle of decision. In the 15th of Richard II. two petitions, addressed to the king and the lords of par- liament, were sent to the chancery to be heard, with the direction, "Let there be done, by the authority of parliament, that which right and reason and good faith and good conscience demand in the case." These may be said to be the general prin- ciples upon which equity is administered at the present day. The distinctive principles of the courts of equity are shown, also, by the classes of cases in which they exercise jurisdiction and give relief, allowing it to be sought and administered through process and pro- ceedings of less formality and technicality than are required in proceedings at law. This, however, has its limitations, some of its rules of pleading in defence being quite technical. And it is another peculiar feat- ure that the relief is administered by a de- cree or process adapted to the exigencies of the particular case.