DICTUS

2 definitions found across Law Mind sources

DICTUSAuthored
The Law Mind • 655 words
Definition
Latin past participle of *dicere* (to say or speak). In legal usage, *dictus* means "said," "named," "called," or "spoken." It appears almost exclusively as a component of compound legal phrases rather than as a freestanding term of art. Its most significant appearances are in *obiter dictum* (something said in passing) and *alias dictus* (otherwise called), the latter being the form Anderson's Dictionary cross-references directly.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): Not in general English use as a standalone word; recognized only as a Latin term meaning "said" or "having been said." Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): Not listed as an English entry; treated as Latin. The gap here is one of register rather than meaning: English speakers encounter *dictus* only in legal and scholarly Latin compounds. Because it never migrated into ordinary English as an independent word, it carries no false-friend risk — but researchers unfamiliar with Latin may encounter it in historical pleadings or case captions and not recognize it as a purely grammatical element rather than a term of independent legal significance.
Common Confusion
*Dictus* is sometimes loosely treated as synonymous with *dictum* (plural *dicta*). They are not the same. *Dictum* is a noun meaning "a thing said" or "a statement." *Dictus* is a participial adjective meaning "having been said" or "called." When a court opinion or historical document uses *dictus*, it is almost always modifying a noun — a person, a place, a thing — rather than standing alone as a statement of legal principle. Conflating the two causes misreading: a phrase such as *alias dictus* describes a named person, not a legal proposition.
Why It Matters in Research
Anderson's cross-reference to ALIAS is the key navigational signal. In historical pleadings, indictments, and case captions, *alias dictus* (often abbreviated *a.k.a.* in modern practice or rendered *alias* in later common law documents) identified a defendant or party by an alternative name. Researchers working with pre-twentieth-century criminal indictments, property records, or ecclesiastical court documents will encounter *dictus* most frequently in this alias construction. Two research traps: First, because *dictus* is grammatical scaffolding rather than a substantive term, it will not appear as a headword in most legal indexes or digests — searchers must look under the compound phrase (*alias dictus*, *obiter dictum*, *bene dictus*, etc.). Second, in manuscript sources and early printed law reports, *dictus* is frequently abbreviated as *d.* or *dict.*, which can be confused with other standard abbreviations. The Anderson entry's garbled surrounding text — which appears to be a definition fragment about insanity and insurance, almost certainly a typesetting or OCR error — should be disregarded entirely. It bears no relationship to *dictus* and likely reflects a page-boundary error in the source.
Historical Dictionary Support
Anderson's Dictionary addresses *dictus* only by cross-reference to ALIAS, confirming that the dictionary treats the term as legally significant only in the *alias dictus* compound. No independent substantive definition is offered, which accurately reflects the word's status: it is a grammatical component, not a doctrine. The Latin dictionary source confirms the form: *dictus, a, um*, the standard past participle of *dicere*. This is consistent with classical and medieval legal Latin usage throughout the common law tradition. Historical legal dictionaries generally do not give *dictus* its own full entry. Bouvier's Law Dictionary, for instance, handles the concept under DICTUM and ALIAS rather than under *dictus* as a separate headword. This pattern across reference works confirms that researchers should not expect to find substantive doctrine attached to *dictus* alone.
Related Terms
ALIAS — the functionally significant English-law term that *alias dictus* underlies DICTUM — the noun form; statements of legal principle in judicial opinions OBITER DICTUM — judicial statement made in passingnot essential to the holding OBITER — the adverbial companion term A.K.A. — modern practical equivalent of *alias dictus* in criminal pleading contexts RATIO DECIDENDI — the counterpart to obiter dictum; the binding holding
DICTUSmain
Anderson's Dictionary of Law • 1890
See ALIAS. the assured, he knowing and intending that death shall be the result of his act, but when his reasoning faculties are so far impaired that he is not able to understand the moral character, the general nature, consesequences, and effects of the act; or when he is impelled thereto by an insane impulse, which he has no power to resist, - such death is not within the contemplation of the parties, and the insurer is liable.1 The proviso refers to an act of criminal self-destruction; it does not apply to an insane person who takes his own life intending to take it, and knowing that death would be the result.2 "Die by his own hand," "die by suicide," and "commit suicide," are synonymous with voluntary suicide. But the addition of the condition "sane or insane" will relieve the insurer, whatever be the condition of mind of the insured. 3, 2 In 1872, when Terry's Case was decided, there was a conflict of opinion as to the interpretation to be placed upon the words "die by his own hand" or "die by suicide." All authorities agreed that the phrases did not cover every possible case of self-destruction in a blind frenzy or under an overwhelming insane impulse. Some courts held that they included every case in which a man, sane or insane, voluntarily took his own life; others, that insane self-destruction was not within the condition. If a man's reason is so clouded or disturbed by insanity as to prevent his understanding the real nature of his act, as regards either its physical consequence or its moral aspect, the case appears to come within the forcible words uttered by the late Mr. Justice Nelson, when Chief Justice of New York, in the earliest American case upon the subject: "Self-destruction by a fellow-being, bereft of reason, can with no more propriety be ascribed to his own hand than to the deadly instrument that he may have used for the purpose; " and, whether it was by drowning, poisoning, hanging or other man. ner, "was no more his act, in the sense of the law, than if he had been impelled by irresistible physical DIE; DYING; DEATH. In several power. "4 phrases, have a technical meaning: Die by his own hand or by suicide. In policies of life insurance, used in a proviso exempting the company from liability. In such case the words mean: (1) That if the assured, being in the possession of his ordinary reasoning faculties, from any cause and by any means, intentionally takes his own life, there can be no recovery; 1 Medbury v. Watson, 6 Metc. 259 (1843); Gordon v. Parmelee, 2 Allen, 214 (1861). Die in consequence of a violation of law. Expresses another condition under which a policy of life insurance will be rendered void. In a recent case it was held that so long as there was a violation of law on the part of the assured, and death as its result, it was immaterial in what manner the death was produced, excepting that there must 1 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. 583 (1872), Hunt, J.; 1 Dill. 403. State v. Clarke, 3 Nev. 572 (1867), Beatty, C. J. 2 Bigelow v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 93 U. S. 286 * Rohrback v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 62 Ν. Υ. 58 (1876), cases; Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Groom, (1875), Folger, J. 86 Pa. 96-98 (1878), cases; Cooper v. Massachusetts Life Buchner v. Chicago, &c. R. Co., 60 Wis. 267-69 Ins. Co., 102 Mass. 228 (1869), cases; Knights of the (1884), Cassoday, J. Golden Rule v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 444-49 (1882), cases. 3 Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. v. Rodel, 95 U. S. 232 (1877), cases. * Carroll v. Lessee of Carroll, 16 How. 287 (1853), Curtis, J.; 6 Wheat. 399. • United States v. County of Clark, 96 U. S. 218 (1877), Strong, J.; 107 id. 179. See 17 F. R. 423, 425. 4 Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Broughton, 109 U. S. 127, 131 (Νοv. 5, 1883), cases, Gray, J., quoting Breasted v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 4 Hill, 75 (1843).

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