Arbitrators. DICTUM (also, Obiter Dictum). An opinion expressed by a court, but which, not being necessarily involved in the case, lacks the force of an adjudication. It frequently happens that, in assigning its opin- ion upon a question before it, the court discusses collateral questions and expresses a decided opinion upon them. Such opinions, however, are frequently given without much reflection or without previous argument at the bar; and as, moreover, they do not enter into the adjudication of the point at issue they have only that authority which may be ac- corded to to the opinion, more or less deliberate, of the Individual judge who announces it. Chase, Bla. Com. 86, n. It may be observed that in recent times, particularly in those jurisdictions where appeals are largely favored, the ancient practice of courts in this respect is much modified. Formerly, judges aimed to confine their opinion to the precise point involved, and were glad to make that point as nar- row as it might justly be. Where appeals are fre- quent, however, a strong tendency may be seen to fortify the judgment given with every principle that can be invoked in its behalf,-those that are merely collateral, as well as those that are necessarily in- volved. In some courts of last resort, also, when there are many judges, it is not unfrequently the case that, while the court come to one and the same conclusion, the different judges may be led to that conclusion by different views of the law, so that it becomes difficult to determine what is to be regarded as the principle upon which the case was decided and what shall be deemed mere dicta. It is not easy to define the term with such precísion as to afford an exact crite- rion by which to decide when the language of a court or judge is entitled to be con- sidered as a precedent and followed as an authority. Judicial references to the sub- ject indicate that expressions which would be included under the term dicta are never- theless afterwards treated by other courts with respect if not with the binding force of adjudicated cases. Possibly no batter definition can be found than that of Folger, J., in 62 N. Y. 68: "Dicta are the opinions of a judge which do not embody the resolu- tion or determination of the court, and, made without argument or full considera- tion of the point, are not the professed, de- liberate determinations of the judge him- self; obiter dicta are such opinions uttered by the way, not upon the point or question pending, as if turning aside for the time from the main topic of the case to collateral subjects." The general rule, broadly stated by the United States supreme court, is that to make an opinion a decision "there must have been an application of the judicial mind to the precise question necessary to be determined to fix the rights of the parties, . and, therefore, this court has never held itself bound by any part of an opinion which was not needful to the ascertainment of the question between the parties." "Per Curtis, J., in 16 How. 287. And in Cohen 1. Virginia, when the case of Marbury v. Madison was very earnestly pressed upon the attention of the court, Marshall, C. J., said; "It is a maxim not to be disregarded that general expressions in every opinion are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in & subsequent case when the very point is presented; " 6 Wheat. 399. In 8 How. 292, Catron, J., dissenting, strongly criticised the majority of the court for a long discus- sion of the power of a court as to which they decided that they had no authority to review its decisions. In a later case the same court said, in reference to an allusion to the opinion in a case previously decided; "This was the only question before the court and the decision is authority only to the extent of the case before it; if more was intended by the judge who delivered the opinion it was purely obiter;" 96 U. S. 211. The great powers and peculiar func- tions included in the constitutional powers of that court, as well as the conclusiveness of its judgments as declarations of con- stitutional contruction, make it not only proper but essential that its decisions should be confined to the points necessa- rily involved in the case and embraced in the argument. And the same rea- sons not only warrant but require a rigid exclusion of mere dicta from the category of authorities. The reason for the enforce- ment of the rule, as against expressions of opinion upon points not fairly raised by the case, is very well stated by the supreme court of Pennyslvania: "What I have said or written outside of the case trying, or shall say or write in such circumstances, may be taken as my opinion at the time, without argument or full consideration; but I will not consider myself bound by it when the point is fairly trying and fully argued and considered." Per Huston, J., 17 S. &