That state of the mind in A court of equity will notaid parties in the consummation or perpetration of a fraud; it will not assist a party to the betrayal of a trust to derive advantage which it acts without being directed by the therefrom; it will not undertake to unravel a tangled web of fraud to enable one of the parties to consummate his design. A complainant must come before the court with clean hands.2 The court will not enforce alleged rights resting upon a prohibited contract. In the application of the rule it is necessary to give parties a right to plead and to prove the nature of the transaction. Whatever is stated in a contract for an illegal purpose, as, the violation of a statute, the defendant may show as the turpitude of himself and the plaintiff to prevent its enforcement. The objection is allowed on general principles of policy." Lord Mansfield, in 1760, laid down the doctrine, which has ever since been followed, that if the act be in itself immoral, or a violation of the general laws of public policy, both parties are in pari delicto; but where the law is designed for the protection of the subject against oppression, extortion, and deceit, and the defendant takes advantage of the plaintiff's condition or situation, then the plaintiff shall recover. Where the illegality consists in the contract itself, and that contract is unexecuted, there is a locus pœnitentice, the delictum is incomplete, the contract may be rescinded by either party and money paid recovered. There is no parity where the law protects one party, or one acts under constraint, though the transaction is completed.. 1 See Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 343 (1775), Mansfield, C. J.; Smith, Contr. 27, 205, 263, 296. 2 Farley v. St. Paul, &c. R. Co., 14 F. R. 114, 117 (1882), Treat, D. J.; Lewis v. Meier, ib. 311 (1882); 2 McCrary, 599. Funk v. Gallivan, 49 Conn. 128-29 (1881), cases; Heineman v. Newman, 55 Ga. 262 (1875), cases; Myers v. Meinrath 101 Mass. 368 (1869), cases. Harris v. Runnels, 12 How. 86 (1851), Wayne, J. • Smith v. Bromley, 2 Doug. 697: Thomas v. Richmond, infra. • Thomas v. City of Richmond, 12 Wall. 355-56 (1870), power of volition, which is wholly or partially suspended.6 A temporary derangement of mind preceded or attended by a feverish and highly diseased state of the body.7 It may vary from slight wandering to violent derangement, and be accompanied, in a greater or less degree, with stupor or insensibility. A continuing insanity will not be presumed, where the malady was temporary and occasional." See INSANITY; INTEM-