DELEGATUS

2 definitions found across Law Mind sources

DELEGATUSAuthored
The Law Mind • 991 words
Definition
A delegatus (plural: delegati) is a person appointed, commissioned, or empowered to act on behalf of another — a deputy, agent, representative, or trustee who holds derived rather than original authority. The term is Latin and appears primarily in legal contexts as a term of art, both standing alone to identify such a person and as the root of two foundational maxims governing the limits of delegated power: 1. Delegatus non potest delegare — A delegate cannot delegate. A person entrusted with authority by another cannot, without express permission, pass that authority on to a third party. The power was conferred on that person specifically, and the trust or discretion accompanying it is not transferable at will. 2. Delegata potestas non potest delegari — Delegated power cannot be redelegated. This is the broader formulation of the same principle, emphasizing that authority which is itself derivative in nature carries an inherent ceiling: it may be exercised, but not reassigned. Both maxims express the same underlying idea from slightly different angles — the first focuses on the agent, the second on the power itself. ---
Common Confusion
Delegatus is frequently encountered not as a standalone term but as the operative word in the two maxims above, and researchers sometimes treat the maxims as interchangeable. They are substantively the same rule, but the second formulation (delegata potestas non potest delegari) is the more general statement and the one most commonly cited in constitutional and administrative law contexts, where the source of power is a legislature or sovereign rather than a private principal. The first formulation (delegatus non potest delegare) tends to appear in agency and trust contexts. Neither formulation is absolute: subdelegation is permissible when the authorizing instrument expressly allows it, when custom of the particular office permits it, or when the nature of the duty is purely ministerial rather than discretionary. ---
Core Elements
The rule encoded in both maxims rests on three conditions that determine whether subdelegation is impermissible: 1. Personal or discretionary character of the authority — The original grant must have been made to a specific person in reliance on that person's judgment, skill, or trustworthiness. Where the duty is purely mechanical or ministerial, the maxim has less force. 2. Absence of express permission — The delegating instrument (statute, contract, commission, trust deed) must not have authorized further delegation. If it does, the maxim is superseded by that express grant. 3. Derived rather than original authority — The rule applies only to those who hold power at second hand. It does not constrain original grantors from delegating in the first instance. ---
Why It Matters in Research
Delegatus functions as a gateway term to a cluster of doctrines that cut across administrative law, constitutional law, agency, trusts, and corporate governance. Researchers working in any of these areas will encounter the maxims, but under varying labels and with varying force depending on context. In administrative and constitutional law, the non-delegation doctrine — the rule that a legislature cannot transfer its core lawmaking function to the executive branch or an administrative agency without sufficient standards — is a direct descendant of the delegatus maxims. American cases invoking non-delegation rarely use the Latin, but the underlying logic is identical. In agency law, the same principle appears under the heading of "personal services" contracts and the general rule that an agent's authority is not transferable without the principal's consent. In trust law, the historically strict rule that trustees could not delegate discretionary functions has been substantially relaxed by modern statute in many jurisdictions, but older sources will apply the maxim without qualification. Researchers consulting historical sources should be alert to the fact that pre-twentieth-century materials apply the delegatus rule more rigidly across all these fields. Modern doctrine — particularly in administrative law — has moved significantly toward permitting broad subdelegation with appropriate standards, while older treatises treat the maxim as near-absolute. Reading a nineteenth-century commentary on delegation without this adjustment will produce a distorted picture of current law. The term also appears in civil law jurisdictions and in ecclesiastical law, where delegatus carries additional technical meaning related to judges commissioned to hear specific causes (delegated jurisdiction as opposed to ordinary jurisdiction). Law Mind corpus researchers encountering delegatus in canon law or early modern civil law materials should not assume the administrative-law or agency-law sense controls. ---
Historical Dictionary Support
Anderson's Dictionary of Law captures the term accurately, giving both the personal sense (a person chosen or commissioned; a deputy, agent, representative, trustee) and the adjectival form delegata (deputed, empowered, entrusted), and reproducing both maxims. Anderson's entry cuts off mid-sentence before completing the explanation of when personal considerations make redelegation impermissible — a gap that affects its usefulness as a standalone source for the operative rule. Anderson does not distinguish between the two maxims beyond reproducing both, and does not address the exceptions (ministerial duties, express authorization, custom of office) that courts have consistently recognized. Researchers relying solely on Anderson for the scope of the rule will find it overstated. Supplement with treatise sources on agency and administrative law for the full shape of the doctrine. ---
Jurisdictional Note
The delegatus maxims are recognized across common law and civil law jurisdictions, but their force varies sharply by field. In American administrative law, the non-delegation doctrine remains formally intact but is rarely enforced to invalidate statutes. In trust law, the Uniform Trust Code and its state enactments have substantially modified the historical rule against delegation of discretionary trustee functions. Civil law jurisdictions apply the principle under their own doctrinal vocabulary. ---
Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
See Law Mind Encyclopedia — Delegation of Authority; Agency; Non-Delegation Doctrine; Trustee Powers ---
Related Terms
Delegation — Subdelegation — Non-delegation doctrine — Agency — Principal and agent — Trustee — Potestas — Mandatarius — Procurator — Ministerial act — Discretionary authority — Delegated legislation
DELEGATUSmain
Anderson's Dictionary of Law • 1890
L. A person chosen or commissioned: a deputy, agent, representative, trustee. Delegata. Deputed, emPowered, intrusted. Delegata potestas non potest delegari. Delegated authority cannot be redelegated. Delegatus non potest delegare. A deputy cannot deputize. Whenever, for personal or other considerations, authority is conferred upon a particular person he cannot lawfully devolve the duties of his appointment or the functions of his office upon any other person, unless allowed so to do by express words, by acts equivalent thereto, or by the usage of trade. Delegatus potestas, etc., as a general maxim, is correct when duly applied. For, to create a delegate by a delegate, in the sense of the maxim, implies an assignment of the whole power, which a delegate cannot make. A delegate has general powers, which he cannot transfer; but he may constitute another his servant or bailiff to do a particular act.2 A special authority is in the nature of a trust. It implies confidence in the ability, skill, or discretion of the party intrusted. The author of such a power may extend it if he will, as is done in ordinary powers of attorney, giving power to a person or his substitute to son v. Clarke, 6 How. 140 (1848); Crittenden v. Witbeck, 50 Mich. 419, 420 (1883); Story, Partn. §§ 195, 5; 3 Kent, 55; 1 Pars. Contr. 154; 17 F. R. 571. 1 Adams v. Power, 48 Miss. 454 (1873), Peyton, C. J.; 1 Domat, 919, § 2318. 2 Hunt v. Burrel, 5 Johns. *137 (1809), cases, Per • Kingman v. Spurr, 7 Pick. 238 (1828), cases; Mathew-Curiam.

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