Torts. A forcible resist- ance of an attack by force. A man is justified in defending his per- son, that of his wife, children, and servants, and for this purpose he may use as much force as may be necessary, even to killing the assailant, remembering that the means used must always be proportioned to the occasion, and that an excess becomes itself an injury; 3 M. & W. 150; 69 Miss. 478; 93 Cal. 476; 80 Fla. 148; 27 Tex. App. 562; 49 Ark. 548; 86 Ky. 39; but it must be in de- fence, and not in revenge; 1 C. & M. 214; 11 Mod, 48; Poll. Torts 255; 85 S. C. 288; for one is not justified in shooting another, if such other party is retreating or has thrown away his weapon; 129 Ind. 587; nor is a mere threat to take one's life, with nothing more, a sufficient defence or excuse for committing homicide; 85 8. С. 197. A man may also repel force by force in defence of his personal property, against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a known felony, as robbery, by any force short of taking the aggressor's life; 1 Bish. New Cr. L. § 875; or short of wounding or the em- ployment of a dangerous weapon; 148 Mass. 529. In the latter case, Holmes, J., said :- "We need not consider whether this ex- planation is quite adequate. There are weighty decisions which go further than those above cited, and which can hardly stand on the right of self-defence, but in- volve other considerations of policy." See 42 III. App. 427. With respect to the defence or protection of the possession of real property, although it is justifiable even to kill a person in the act of attempting to commit a forcible felony, as burglary or arson, yet this justi- fication can only take place when the party in possession is wholly without fault; 1 Hale, Pl. Cr. 440, 444; 1 East, Pl. Cr. 259, 277. And where an illegal forcible attack is made upon a dwelling-house with the intention merely of committing a trespass, and not with any felonious intent, it is generally lawful for the rightful occupant to oppose it by force; 7 Bing. 305; 20 Eng. C. L. 139. See, generally, 1 Chit. Pr. 589; Grotius, lib. 2, c. 1; Rutherford, Inst. b. 1, c. 16; 2 Whart. Cr. L. § 1019; Bishop; Clark ; Wharton, Criminal Law; Thompson, Cases of Self-Defence; ASSAULT; SELF-DEFENCE. In Pleading and Practice. The denial of the truth or validity of the complaint. A general assertion that the plaintiff has no ground of action, which is afterwards extended and maintained in the plea. 3 Bla. Com. 296; Co. Litt. 127; 33 Ind. 448. In this sense it is similar to the contestatio litis of the civilians, and does not include justification. In a more general sense it denotes the means by which the defendant prevents the success of the plaintiff's action, or, in criminal practice, the indictment. The word is commonly used in this sense in modern practice. Half defence was that which was made by the form "defends the force and injury, and says" (defendit vim et injuriam, et dicit). Full defence was that which was made by the form "defends the force and injury when and where it shall behoove him, and the damages, and whatever else he ought to defend" (defendit vim et injuriam quando et ubi curia consideravit, et damna et quicquid quod ipse defendere debet, et dicit), commonly shortened into "defends the force and injury when," etc. 8 Term 632; 3 Β. & P. 9, n.; Co. Litt. 127 b; Willes 41. It follows immediately upon the state- ment of appearance, "comes" (venit), thus: "comes and defends." By a general de- fence the propriety of the writ, the com- petency of the plaintiff, and the jurisdic- tion of the court were allowed; by de- fending the force and injury, misnomer was waived; by defending the damages, all exceptions to the person of the plaintiff; and by defending either when, etc., the juris- diction of the court was admitted. 3 Bla. Com. 298. The distinction between the forms of half and full defence was first lost sight of; 8 Term 633; Willes 41; 3 B. & P. 9; 2 Saund. 209 c; and no necessity for a technical defence exists, under the modern forms of practice. Formerly, in criminal trials for capital crimes the prisoner was not allowed counsel to assist in his defence; 1 Ry. & M. 166;3 Campb. 98; 4 Sharsw. Bla. Com. 856, n. This privilege was finally extended to all persons accused of felonies in England, by 6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 114; and in the United States by statute or universal practice; 3 Whart, Cr. L. § 3004.