Definition
A false statement of fact, communicated to a third party, that injures the reputation of another. Defamation is the umbrella term covering both libel (written or recorded defamation) and slander (spoken defamation). To sustain a defamation claim, the statement must be false, must be about the plaintiff, must be published to at least one person other than the plaintiff, and must cause reputational harm. In modern American law, constitutional requirements imposed by the First Amendment add a further layer: plaintiffs must satisfy fault standards that vary depending on whether the plaintiff is a public official, public figure, or private individual.
Defamation carries both civil and criminal dimensions, though criminal defamation prosecutions are rare in contemporary practice. The civil action is the dominant form and is the sense in which the term is most commonly encountered in research.
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Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): "The act of injuring another person's reputation by any slanderous communication, written or oral; the wrong of maliciously injuring the good name of another."
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): "Act of injuring another's reputation by any slanderous communication, written or oral; the wrong of maliciously injuring the good name of another; slander; detraction; calumny; aspersion."
The common definition is close but misleads in two ways. First, both historical and modern common usage fold "slander" into the definition of defamation itself, obscuring that slander is a species of defamation rather than a synonym. Second, "maliciously" in common usage carries its ordinary moral meaning; in legal defamation doctrine, malice has a precise technical meaning — actual malice, as defined in constitutional doctrine, means knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth, not ill will or spite.
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Common Confusion
DEFAMATION vs. LIBEL vs. SLANDER: Defamation is the genus; libel and slander are the species. Historical sources, including Webster's 1913, frequently use "slander" as a synonym for defamation generally, which can obscure meaningful legal distinctions. In modern law, the libel/slander classification affects which damages a plaintiff must prove and, in some jurisdictions, whether a claim is actionable without proof of actual harm. Researchers working with older sources should not assume that "slander" refers only to spoken statements.
DEFAMATION vs. DEFAMATION PER SE: Certain categories of statements are treated as defamatory on their face — defamation per se — without requiring the plaintiff to plead and prove specific damages. Statements that do not fall into per se categories require proof of actual harm to reputation. The distinction matters significantly for pleading and damages analysis.
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Core Elements
Modern defamation doctrine requires the plaintiff to establish:
1. A false statement of fact (not opinion) — statements of pure opinion are generally not actionable, though the line between fact and opinion is contested.
2. Publication — communication of the statement to at least one third party other than the plaintiff.
3. Identification — the statement must be of and concerning the plaintiff.
4. Fault — the required level varies: public officials and public figures must prove actual malice (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth); private plaintiffs must satisfy standards set by individual states, which may require negligence or actual malice depending on the matter's public concern.
5. Damages — reputational harm, with the proof required depending on whether the statement is per se or per quod.
These elements are a modern synthesis. Historical doctrine did not require the same fault analysis; the constitutional fault requirements were introduced by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) and its progeny and are entirely absent from the historical dictionary sources.
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Recognized Forms
/SUBTYPES
LIBEL: Defamation in written, printed, or otherwise recorded form. Historically treated as more serious than slander because of its permanence and wider potential dissemination.
SLANDER: Defamation in spoken form. Generally requires proof of special damages unless the statement falls within per se categories.
DEFAMATION PER SE: Statements so inherently harmful that the law presumes damage without proof. Traditional per se categories include accusations of criminal conduct, statements injurious to a person's trade or profession, imputations of loathsome disease, and (historically) imputations of sexual misconduct.
DEFAMATION PER QUOD: Statements that are not defamatory on their face but become so in light of extrinsic facts. Plaintiff must plead the extrinsic facts (the inducement) and prove special damages.
TRADE LIBEL / INJURIOUS FALSEHOOD: A related but distinct tort involving false statements about a person's goods, services, or business rather than about the person's character. Not technically defamation, though often researched alongside it.
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Why It Matters in Research
The most consequential trap in historical research on defamation is the absence of constitutional fault requirements in pre-1964 sources. Every historical dictionary entry in the Law Mind corpus predates New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny. Descriptions of defamation as requiring only "false and malicious statements" reflect common law doctrine, not the constitutional floor that governs modern cases. A researcher using Bouvier or Black's to understand what a plaintiff must prove will arrive at an incomplete and potentially misleading picture.
The libel/slander distinction, while present in all historical sources, is treated with varying precision. Burrill and Bouvier correctly identify the written/oral divide; neither fully develops the damages consequences of that distinction. Modern research on slander per se categories and the special damages requirement needs to move beyond the historical dictionaries entirely.
Criminal defamation appears in Bouvier's treatment but has contracted dramatically in modern practice. Some states have abolished criminal defamation statutes; others retain them but they are rarely invoked. Researchers encountering criminal defamation in historical sources should not assume the doctrine has modern vitality in any given jurisdiction.
The corpus connections are significant: the encyclopedia entries for General Principles (torts_119), Defamation Per Se Categories (torts_123), and Private Plaintiffs and State Standards (torts_122) pick up precisely where the historical dictionaries leave off. The per se/per quod distinction and the private plaintiff fault standards are addressed in depth there and should be consulted alongside this entry.
Jurisdictional variation in the damages framework — particularly which per se categories a state recognizes and what fault standard applies to private plaintiffs — makes defamation one of the more jurisdiction-sensitive torts in the corpus.
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Historical Dictionary Support
The historical sources are in substantial agreement on the basic structure: defamation is the genus encompassing both libel and slander, defined by injury to reputation through false statements. Burrill's formulation — "injuring a person's character, fame or reputation, either by writing or by words" — is the clearest structural statement and matches Black's closely. Both editions of Black's use identical core language, suggesting the definition was stable across that period.
Rapalje & Lawrence adds useful texture in defining "disparaging" to include statements that expose the subject to contempt, ridicule, or public hatred, or that cause the person to be feared or avoided — a broader catalog of reputational harm than the other sources provide. The reference to Underhill on Torts situates the entry within late nineteenth-century treatise learning.
Bouvier's is notable for explicitly identifying both civil and criminal dimensions, a distinction that the other sources leave implicit. Bouvier's also uses the Latin formulation — de bona fama aliquid detrahere — reflecting the ecclesiastical and civil law heritage of the doctrine that influenced early English and American defamation law.
What the historical sources miss entirely: the constitutional fault requirement, the actual malice standard, the distinction between public and private figures, and the per quod/per se damages framework as it developed through twentieth-century case law. Researchers should treat the historical definitions as accurate statements of common law foundations, not as complete accounts of the modern tort.
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Jurisdictional Note
State law governs the substantive elements of defamation beyond the constitutional floor. States vary meaningfully on which categories of statements qualify as defamation per se, what fault standard applies to private plaintiffs on matters of public concern, whether libel per quod requires special damages, and whether retraction statutes affect the damages available. Researchers should not assume uniformity even on questions the historical sources treat as settled.
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Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
Defamation and Privacy Torts — General Principles (Libel and Slander) (torts_119)
Defamation and Privacy Torts — Defamation Per Se Categories (torts_123)
Defamation and Privacy Torts — Private Plaintiffs and State Standards (torts_122)
The Law Mind Torts & Personal Injury Encyclopedia
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