able writer, thus:-"A judgment at law was either simply for the plaintiff or for the defendant. There could be no qualifications or modifications of the judgment. But such a judgment does not always touch the true justice of the cause or put the parties in the position they ought to occupy. While the plaintiff may be entitled, in a given case, to general relief, there may be some duty con- nected with the subject of litigation which he owes to the defendant, the performance of which, equally with the fulfilment of his duty by the defendant, ought, in a perfect system of remedial law, to be exacted. This result was attained by the decree of a court of equity which could be so moulded, or the execution of which could be so controlled and suspended, that the relative duties and rights of the parties could be secured and enforced; " Bisph. Eq. § 7. It necessarily springs from the nature of the chancery jurisdiction that its determi- nations should be cast in a mould differing, toto cœlo, from a judgment at law, and it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the essential character of the decree, as described by the author quoted, is to be found in the literal application of the funda- mental maxim, "He who seeks equity must do equity." Accordingly, it is said that a court of equity will always reach, by a di- rect decree, what would otherwise be ac- complished by a circuity of proceedings; 4 Del. Ch. 410. And even when a complain- ant is entitled to relief which it is inequi- table to grant except upon a condition to be performed by him springing from an obligation of equity and good conscience, though not from legal right, a chancellor may make a decree only upon such condi- tion; 8 Wall. 557; Bisph. Eq. § 43. In such case, when something remains to be done by the party in order to entitle him to relief, while no present decree can be made, as the decree must be absolute and final and not contingent, the court will enter an inter- locutory decree and suspend the entry of a final decree until the performance of such condition; 8 Del. Ch. 124; and in default thereof in a reasonable time dismiss the bill; 4 id. 43. The doctrine of the wife's equity is a familiar instance of this prin- ciple. Decrees are either interlocutory or final. In the strictest sense all decrees are inter- locutory until signed and enrolled; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 6th Am. ed. 987, n. 1; but it is not in this sense that the terms are in practice used. But while there is a distinction well understood it is not always easy of exact definition. The existence of the two classes is, however, necessary in American chan- cery courts, as the right of appeal is fre quently confined to final decrees, as in the federal courts. The former is entered on some plea or issue arising in the cause which does not decide the main question; the latter settles the matter in dispute; and a final decree has the same effect as a judgment at law; 2 Madd. 462; 1 Ch. Ca. 27; 2 Vern. 89; 4 Brown, P. C. 287. See 7 Viner, Abr. 394; 7 Comyns, Dig. 445; 1 Belt, Suppl. Ves. 223; 28 Cal. 75, 85. For forms of decrees, see Seton, Decrees; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr. 986. Final Decree. One which finally dis poses of a cause, so that nothing further is left for the court to adjudicate. See 2 Dan. Ch. Pr. 994, n. A decree which determines the particular cause. It is not confined to those which terminate all litigation on the same right; 1 Kent 816. A decree which disposes ultimately of the suit. Ad. Eq. 375. After such decree has been pronounced, the cause is at an end, and no further hearing can be had; id. 888; Beach, Mod. Eq. Pr. 789. Prior to the establishment of the circuit courts of appeals there was an appeal to the United States supreme court only from final decrees of the circuit courts; U. S. Rev. Stat. § 692; and the same is still true of appeals from those courts; U. S. Rev. Stat. 1 Supp. 903; except that special provision is made for an appeal within a limited time from an order granting or refusing an in- junction; id. 904. Accordingly, the ques-