The right of action in this case is entirely statutory. At common law no civil action could be maintained, but such an action was given in England in 1816 by Lord Campbell's Act, and similar statutes exist in most of the United States. For a collation of statutes see Tiff. Death Wrongf. Act c. 9. These statutes are held constitutional even where applicable to one class of cor- porations; 92 Ky. 233; 33 N. H. 215. See 75 Ala. 449; 4 Col. 162; 24 Ga. 356. By some courts they are construed strictly as being remedial; in others strictly as in dero- gation of common law; Hale, Dam. § 125; Tiff. Death Wrongf. Act c. 2. § 12, where the cases are collected. These statutes are said to operate not by way of exception or repeal of the common law, but to create an action totally new in species, quality, prin- ciple; Blackburn, L. J., in 10 App. Cas. 59. This bears upon the measure of damages. It has been said that life is to be regarded as property to be compensated for "with- out regard to past earnings or capacity to earn at time of death;" 67 Pa. 300; but this case is severely criticised as unsound rea- soning; 2 Sedg. Meas. Dam. §572, where it is remarked that at common law life was not property, and no civil action lay for its loss, which "rule has only been modified by this statute, under which juries are al- lowed to give, in most states, damages for pecuniary injuries only." These pecuniary damages embrace: (1) Present pecuniary loss; (2) prospective pecuniary loss; (3) the interest of one who would presumably derive pecuniary benefit from the serv- ices of the deceased. Any case may in- volve one or all of these elements. Pres- ent pecuniary loss is based upon actual compensation for loss to the time of ac- tion, and although the action is main- tainable only where it might have been brought by the deceased if he survived, the measure of damages rests upon different principles. The deceased might have recovered both for pecuniary loss and his pain and suffering, physical and mental, while his representatives re- cover only for the injury to his family re- sulting from his death; 18 Q. B. 93; 23 Ν. Υ. 465; and not for his suffering, medical at- tendance, funeral expenses, loss of society of husband or wife, and the like; 2 Sedg. Meas. Dam. § 573, citing cases. See 83 Fed. Rep. 82. Prospective pecuniary loss is based on a reasonable expectation of pe- cuniary benefit from the life of the de- ceased; 3 H. & N. 211; 60 Md. 449; 66 N. C. 154; 74 Wis. 562. It is what the de- ceased would have probably earned during the residue of his life, taking into consid- eration his age, condition, ability, disposi- tion, habits, and expenditures, without any solatium for distress of mind; Sharswood, J., in 57 Pa. 335, 358; 86 Tenn. 343; 29 Gratt. 431; 88 N. Y. 641; and no account can be taken of income from investments; 47 N. J. L. 28. In the third class of cases damages are allowed to a husband for the loss of a wife's services, not her society; 11 Can. 422; to a wife for the loss of support; id.; for the same reason to a child during minority; 47 Ν. Υ. 317; 38 Wis. 613; 35 Minn. 84; 129 Ill. 91; 76 Cal. 240; and on the weight of authority, for the expectation of pecuniary benefit after majority; 110 N. Y. 504; 84 Cal. 515; 82 Minn. 518; and if the statute is in favor of the estate of the deceased, the damages are not limited to the minor- ity of a child: 73 Ind. 252; 86 Ia. 458; to a parent for the loss of a child to the extent of the pecuniary value of his services dur- ing minority; 71 Md. 573: 97 Mo. 253; 82 W. Va. 370; to the next of kin if dependent on the deceased for support; 43 III. 838: but not otherwise for nominal damages; 33 Kan. 543: 7 Ohio St. 836; 71 Md. 578. Exemplary damages cannot generally be given, but in some states they are expressly authorised, either generally or under special circumstances set forth in the act. Hale, Meas. Dam. § 128. In estimating the damages in these cases, the expectation of life may be reckoned; 91 Ala. 548; 19 Kan. 83; 85 Ia. 167. See