Definition
De Frangentibus Frisonam (Latin: "concerning those that break prison") is the title of an English statute enacted in the reign of Edward II (1 Edw. II) that limited the punishment for prison breach. Before the statute, breaking prison — escaping from lawful custody — could itself be treated as a capital offense regardless of the underlying charge. The statute changed this by providing that a prisoner who escaped would not suffer judgment of life or limb for the act of breaking prison alone, unless the original offense for which he was held was itself one that carried such a judgment upon lawful conviction. In short, the severity of punishment for the escape was capped at the severity warranted by the underlying crime.
Common Confusion
The statute is sometimes loosely described as decriminalizing prison escape, which overstates its effect. De Frangentibus Frisonam did not abolish punishment for breaking prison; it calibrated that punishment to the underlying charge. A prisoner held on a capital charge who escaped could still face the gravest consequences. The statute's reform was procedural and proportional, not a general amnesty for escapees.
Why It Matters in Research
This term appears almost exclusively in historical English legal sources and is unlikely to surface in modern case law or statutory research. Researchers encounter it primarily in three contexts: (1) histories of the common law of escape and prison breach, where the statute marks a significant doctrinal turning point away from automatic capital punishment for flight; (2) treatises on medieval English criminal procedure, particularly discussions of how the severity of the original charge governed collateral consequences; and (3) secondary sources tracing the lineage of modern escape statutes, where De Frangentibus Frisonam is cited as foundational authority.
The principal trap in historical sources is anachronistic reading. Pre-statute authorities treated prison breach as independently punishable at the highest level; post-statute authorities reflect the proportionality principle. Researchers must establish which side of the statute's enactment a given source falls on before drawing doctrinal conclusions. Coke's treatment in 2 Institutes (at 589) is the most commonly cited classical exposition and should be consulted directly when tracing the statute's interpretation through the common law tradition.
Because the statute is referenced by its Latin title rather than by a regnal citation in many older sources, researchers may encounter it without recognizing it as statutory authority. The title is also spelled inconsistently across historical texts — variations on "frangentibus," "frisonam," and "prisonam" all appear.
Historical Dictionary Support
Black's Law Dictionary (2nd Ed., Supplemental) provides a compact and accurate summary: the statute ordained "that none from thenceforth who broke prison should have judgment of life or limb for breaking prison only, unless the cause for which he was taken and imprisoned required such a judgment if he was lawfully convicted thereof." Black's directs readers to Reeve's History of the English Law (vol. 2, p. 290) and Coke's Institutes (2 Inst. 589) as the substantive authorities.
No broader synthesis across multiple historical dictionaries is possible from the available sources, as only Black's (2nd Ed.) provides an entry. The Black's entry is faithful to the primary sources it cites and captures the statute's operative principle without significant distortion. What it does not address — and what researchers should seek in Reeve and Coke — is the pre-statute common law backdrop that gave the reform its significance.
Jurisdictional Note
De Frangentibus Frisonam is an English statute with no direct American statutory counterpart. Its relevance in U.S. legal research is historical and comparative only, appearing in discussions of the common law antecedents of American escape and prison breach offenses.