Definition
A Latin maxim meaning "concerning the faith and official duty of a judge." The principle holds that a judge's good faith and honest purpose in deciding a case cannot be called into question, but the correctness of the decision itself — whether the judge erred in law or in fact — remains open to challenge and review. In short: a judge's integrity is presumed beyond attack, but a judge's judgment is not.
The maxim is most fully rendered in its complete form: De fide et officio judicis non recipitur quaestio, sed de scientia, sive error sit juris sive facti — "Concerning the fidelity and official conduct of a judge, no question is entertained; but concerning his knowledge, whether the error be of law or of fact, [such a question is received]."
Common Confusion
This maxim is sometimes read as granting judges absolute immunity from all scrutiny. That reading is wrong. The maxim draws a precise line: personal integrity and motivation are shielded; legal correctness is not. A party cannot challenge a judgment by alleging that a judge acted in bad faith or with corrupt intent (the proceeding would be barred), but the same party may appeal on the ground that the judge reached the wrong legal conclusion or misapprehended the facts. The protection runs to the person, not to the result.
Why It Matters in Research
Researchers will encounter this maxim in two distinct research contexts that should not be conflated.
First, judicial immunity doctrine. The maxim is a foundational source for the common law rule that judges are not personally liable in civil proceedings for their judicial acts. When tracing the intellectual lineage of modern absolute judicial immunity, this maxim — and Bacon's treatment of it — appears in early English and American authorities as a conceptual anchor. Researchers working backward from modern immunity cases through nineteenth-century treatises will find the maxim cited as bedrock.
Second, appellate review doctrine. The maxim's second clause — that error of law or fact may be examined — is the historical counterpart to the modern scope-of-review framework. It affirms that the existence of an error, not the character of the judge, is the proper subject of appellate inquiry. Historical sources treating the grounds of writ of error or appeal frequently invoke this principle.
A research trap: the maxim appears in sources under variant spellings and abbreviations (De fide et officio, De fide judicis, the Bac. Max. citation alone). Black's 2nd Edition's entry is truncated and should be supplemented with Broom's Legal Maxims, which provides fuller treatment and contextual commentary.
Historical Dictionary Support
Black's Law Dictionary (2nd Ed.) reproduces the core of the maxim and supplies two reference anchors: Bacon's Maxims (reg. 17, p. 68) and Broom's Legal Maxims (p. 85). The Black's entry is incomplete as printed — the source text cuts off mid-sentence — but the substance is clear from what survives.
Broom's statement captures the operative rule with useful precision: "The bona fides and honesty of purpose of a judge cannot be questioned, but his decision may be impugned for error either of law or fact." This formulation makes explicit what the Latin alone might obscure: the immunity is personal and motivational, while the decision remains fully reviewable on the merits.
Bacon's Maxims, the older authority, frames the rule within a broader jurisprudence of judicial function and is the source most frequently cited by subsequent compilers. Researchers relying solely on Black's should be aware that the entry was likely abstracted from Broom, who was in turn drawing on Bacon; consulting the primary source adds depth that the dictionary entry cannot provide.
Historical legal dictionaries generally agree on the meaning of this maxim and do not exhibit significant divergence. The evolution worth noting is doctrinal rather than definitional: the immunity branch of the maxim grew in scope and formality through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries into the modern absolute judicial immunity rule, while the reviewability branch became the unremarkable baseline assumption of appellate practice — no longer needing maxim support because it is simply structural.
Jurisdictional Note
The maxim originates in English common law and was received into American jurisprudence through that channel. The immunity principle it encodes is recognized across common law jurisdictions, though its precise contours in modern statutory and constitutional frameworks vary. Civil law systems do not invoke this maxim but have analogous doctrines governing judicial accountability.