Definition
A common law writ of dower that lay for a widow when no portion of her dower had been assigned to her whatsoever. The writ directed the defendant — typically the heir or person seised of the land — to assign the widow her rightful dower, being one-third of the freehold lands of which her deceased husband had been seised during the marriage. The phrase translates roughly from Latin as "of dower in that whereof she has nothing." Distinguished from other dower writs by the totality of the deprivation it addressed: this writ was the appropriate remedy when the widow had received nothing, not merely when she had received less than her full share.
Why It Matters in Research
This term is a navigational marker for a specific procedural context within dower law rather than a substantive doctrine in its own right. Researchers must distinguish it from related dower writs — particularly the writ ad quod damnum and actions styled simply as "dower" — that addressed different grievances. The distinction matters when reading historical pleadings, abridgments, or real property treatises, where the choice of writ signals what was being alleged.
A critical research trap: the sources are not fully consistent on the treatise page references. Black's 1st edition cites Kent at page 63 and Stearns at page 302; Black's 2nd edition cites Kent at page 68 and Stearns at page 402. Researchers relying on these cross-references to verify the writ's scope should be alert to the discrepancy and should consult the referenced treatises directly rather than relying on the dictionary citations as authoritative locators.
The writ's practical relevance in American law is narrow but not zero. Both Black's and Bouvier's note that while the writ itself fell into disuse, forms closely resembling it continued to be used in the United States well into the nineteenth century. This means that in examining early American real property records, particularly in states that preserved common law real actions, researchers may encounter pleadings that functionally replicate de dote unde nihil habet without using the Latin name. Stearns's Treatise on Real Actions and Washburn's Real Property are the primary secondary sources the dictionaries point to for American practice context.
The writ belongs to the larger family of common law real actions — a category that itself became largely obsolete in England following the Real Property Limitation Act 1833 and in American jurisdictions through various nineteenth-century procedural reforms. By the time of the later editions of Black's, the writ was a historical artifact being documented rather than a living tool of practice.
Historical Dictionary Support
The four source dictionaries are in substantial agreement on the core definition, with only minor variation in expression. Rapalje & Lawrence offers the most compressed statement, stripped to essentials: a writ for a widow to whom no dower had been assigned. Bouvier adds the Latin gloss and is slightly more precise in specifying that dower had not been assigned "to a widow," clarifying the plaintiff's identity. Black's 1st and 2nd editions agree in substance and share common language almost verbatim, with the unexplained discrepancy in page references to Kent and Stearns noted above.
None of the historical dictionaries situate the writ within the broader procedural framework of dower actions or explain how a plaintiff's attorney in 1820 would have chosen between this writ and an action on the case for dower. That contextual guidance must be sought in the treatise literature, particularly Kent's Commentaries and Stearns's Real Actions, both of which the dictionaries consistently cite. Washburn's Real Property provides the most sustained American treatment of dower rights and their enforcement and remains the best starting point for understanding how these writs translated into American jurisdictional practice.
Jurisdictional Note
The writ was a product of English common law pleading and had no independent statutory basis in American jurisdictions. Its American survival depended on the extent to which individual states preserved the common law real actions. States that early adopted reformed pleading codes — beginning with New York's Field Code in 1848 — displaced these forms. Researchers working in states with longer adherence to common law pleading forms may find traces of the writ in practice through the mid-nineteenth century.