Such a usage as by com- mon consent and uniform practice has be come the law of the place, or of the subject- matter, to which it relates. Custom is a law established by long usage. 9 Wend. 349. It differs from prescription, which is personal and is annexed to the person of the owner of a particu- lar estate; while the other is local, and relates to a particular district. An instance of the latter occurs where the question is upon the manner of conduct ing a particular branch of trade at a certain place; of the former, where a certain person and his an! cestors, or those whose estates he has, have been en- titled to a certain advantage or privilege, as to have common of pasture in a certain close, or the like. $ Bla. Com. 368. The distinction has been thus ex pressed: "While prescription is the making of a right, custom is the making of a law;" Laws. Us. & Cust. 15, n. 2. General customs are such as constitute a part of the common law of the country and extend to the whole country. Particular customs are those which are confined to a particular district; or to the members of a particular class; the exist- ence of the former are to be determined by the court, of the latter, by the jury. Laws. Us. & Cust. 15, n. 3; see 23 Me. 90. In general, when a contract is made in relation to matter about which there is an established custom, such custom is to be understood as forming part of the contract, and may always be referred to for the pur- pose of showing the intention of the parties in all those particulars which are not ex- pressed in the contract; 2 Pars. Contr. 652, 663; 1 Hall 602; 2 Pet. 188; 5 Binn. 285; 19 Wend. 889; 1 M. & W. 476; L. R. 17 Eq. 858; 25 Me. 401; 7 D. C. 105. Evidence of a usage is admissible to ex- plain technical or ambiguous terms; 8 B. & Ad. 728; 8 Ind. App. 299; 156 Mass. 331. But evidence of a usage contradicting the terms of a contract is inadmissible; 2 Cr. & J. 244; 118 Mass. 136; 74 N. Y. 586; 1 W. Va. 69; 114 III. 28; 1 Misc. Rep. 399; 44 Minn. 153. Nor can a local usage affect the meaning of the terms of a contract un- less it is known to both contracting parties; 144 U. S. 476; nor can it affect a contract made elsewhere; 140 U. S. 565. "Merely that it varies the apparent con- tract is not enough to exclude the evidence, for it is impossible to add any material in- cident to the written terms of a contract, without altering its effect more or less. To fall within the exception of repugnancy the incident must be such as, if expressed in the written contract, would make it insen- sible or inconsistent; " Per cur. in 3 E. & Β. 715. See Leake, Contr. 197; 7 E. & B. 274. In order to establish a custom, it will be necessary to show its existence for so long a time that "the memory of man runneth not to the contrary," and that the usage has continued without any interruption of the right; for, if it has ceased for a time for such a cause, the revival gives it a new beginning, which will be what the law calls within memory. It will be no objec- tion, however, that the exercise of the right has been merely suspended; 1 Bla. Com. 76; 2 id. 31; 14 Mass. 488; 8 Q. B. 581; 6 id. 383; L. R. 7 Q. B. 214; 80 Me. 500. See 32 Mo. App. 298. It must also have been peaceably ac- quiesced in and not subject to dispute; for, as customs owe their origin to common con- sent, their being disputed, either at law or otherwise, shows that such consent was wanting; 2 Wend. 501; 3 Watts 178. In addition to this, customs must be reason- able and certain. A custom, for instance, that land shall descend to the most worthy of the owner's blood is void; for how shall this be determined? But a custom that it shall descend to the next male of the blood, exclusive of females, is certain, and there- fore good; 2 Bla. Com. 78; Browne, Us. & Cust. 21. See 43 Fed. Rep. 777. Evidence of usage is never admissible to oppose or alter a general principle or rule of law so as, upon a given state of facts, to make the legal right and liabilities of the parties other than they are by law; Browne, Us. & Cust. 135, n; 2 Term 327; 19 Wend. 252; 6 Binn. 416; 16 C. B. N. S. 646; 10 Wall. 383; 104 Mass. 518; 85 Ala. 565; 113 N. Y. 530; but the rule is said by Mr. Lawson to extend no further than to usages which "conflict with an established rule of public policy, which it is not to the general interest to disturb." Laws. Us. & Cust. 486. With respect to a usage of trade, however, it is sufficient if it appears to be known, certain, uniform, reasonable, and not contrary to law; 8 Wash. C. C. 150; 7 Pet. 1; 5 Binn. 287; 8 Pick. 360; 4 B. & Ald. 210; 1 C. & P. 59; 87 Tenn. 350. See 159. Mass. 522. But if not directly known to the parties to the transaction, it will still be binding upon them if it appear to be so general and well established that knowledge of it may be presumed; 1 Cai. 43; 4 Stark. 452; 1 Dougl.