Definition
"Cuj" is an abbreviated Latin legal term, a shortened form of "cujus" (genitive of "qui," meaning "whose" or "of whom"), appearing in older common law pleading and real property contexts. In practice, the term surfaces most prominently in connection with the writ and doctrine of non dedit, non concessit, and related real actions, where the Latin phrase cujus (or its abbreviated form) was used to identify the party whose title, grant, or act was at issue. The abbreviation functions as a pronoun-anchor in Latin pleading formulas — identifying whose right, whose estate, or whose act formed the operative legal fact in dispute.
The term is not a standalone legal doctrine. It is a grammatical particle of Latin pleading, carrying meaning only in context. Researchers will encounter it embedded in writ forms, Year Book entries, and early common law texts where full Latin pleading formulas were standard.
Common Confusion
"Cuj" should not be confused with the fuller Latin terms "cujus rei" (of which thing) or "cujuscumque" (of whomsoever), which appear in separate pleading contexts. Because the abbreviation is context-dependent, a reader encountering "cuj." in an old writ or index must look to the surrounding Latin phrase — the abbreviation alone carries no fixed, independent legal meaning. It is also distinct from "cui," the dative form of the same Latin pronoun, which appears in different pleading formulas (notably "cui in vita," a real action by a widow against a grantee of her deceased husband).
Why It Matters in Research
Researchers in Law Mind's historical common law corpus will encounter "cuj." most often in two places: as an abbreviation within writ registers (Registrum Omnium Brevium) and in secondary digests and abridgments that condense Latin pleading language. The Burrill entry itself appears in the middle of a passage referencing Reg. Orig. 233, F.N.B. 204, and Blackstone's Commentaries (3 Bl. Com. 183, note) — all sources dealing with real actions and the forms of original writs.
The practical research trap: because "cuj" is an abbreviation rather than a term of art, it does not appear as a standalone headword in most historical digests. A researcher searching for it as an index entry will often find nothing. The term must be traced through the writ formulas themselves, particularly those governing real actions (writs of right, writs of entry, and related forms). Crabb's History of English Law and Reeves' History of English Law, both cited in Burrill at this passage, provide useful narrative context for the real action framework in which these Latin pleading particles operated.
This term is essentially extinct in modern legal drafting. No American jurisdiction uses Latin writ pleading, and the English common law reforms of the nineteenth century (culminating in the Judicature Acts) swept away the real action system that gave "cuj" its context. Encountering it in a modern document would be highly unusual and almost certainly signals direct quotation from a historical source.
Historical Dictionary Support
Burrill's Law Dictionary treats "cuj" in the context of real actions and writ register forms, cross-referencing Blackstone, the Registrum Originale, Fitzherbert's Natura Brevium, Termes de la Ley, Crabb, Reeves, and Roscoe's Real Actions. The entry is essentially a citation cluster rather than a definition — Burrill assumes the reader already knows the Latin and is looking for authority, not explanation. This reflects the general character of early legal dictionaries, which served as finding aids for practicing lawyers already embedded in Latin pleading culture rather than as explanatory resources for the uninitiated.
No other major historical legal dictionary in the Law Mind corpus (not Tomlin, not Bouvier's, not Black's early editions) carries "cuj" as an independent headword, which confirms that the abbreviation was considered self-explanatory to its intended audience and required no formal definition. Its appearance in Burrill at all is a function of Burrill's unusually thorough treatment of Latin pleading abbreviations.
Modern legal dictionaries do not include the term. The gap between Burrill's era and the present is total: there is no living legal usage to track.