Definition
Latin. In civil law and Scots law, correi credendi (singular: correus credendi) refers to joint creditors — two or more persons who are entitled together to demand performance of a single obligation from a debtor, each holding their interest in solidum (as a whole). The term describes the creditor side of a solidary obligation: each correus credendi may, depending on the governing law, demand the full performance of the debt, not merely a proportional share.
The term is most naturally understood alongside its counterpart, correi debendi (joint debtors in solido), which describes the debtor side of the same structure. Together the two terms define the parties to a solidary — or joint and several — obligation as understood in the Roman law tradition and its civilian successors.
Common Confusion
CORREI CREDENDI vs. CORREI DEBENDI: The two terms are mirror concepts and are easily conflated because they appear together in the same doctrinal discussions. Correi credendi are the creditors; correi debendi are the debtors. Burrill includes both terms in sequence, which aids comparison but can blur the distinction for researchers scanning quickly. A solidary obligation may have multiple creditors on one side, multiple debtors on the other, or both simultaneously — the term in use identifies which side of the obligation is being described.
CORREI CREDENDI vs. JOINT CREDITORS (common law): The civilian concept of correi credendi does not map cleanly onto the common law notion of joint creditors. In common law, joint creditors typically must sue together and cannot individually demand full performance; the solidary structure of the civil law allows each correus credendi to demand the whole. Researchers should resist assuming equivalence when moving between civilian and common law sources.
Why It Matters in Research
This is a specialist term confined almost entirely to civil law and Scots law materials. Researchers will encounter it in:
CIVILIAN AND SCOTS LAW SOURCES: The term appears in Pothier's Treatise on Obligations and Erskine's Institute of the Law of Scotland — both of which are primary reference points in the historical dictionaries — as well as in Bell's Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland. Any research into the Scots law of obligations, particularly solidary obligations, will require fluency with this term and its counterpart.
HISTORICAL CORPUS NAVIGATION: Because correi credendi is a Latin term of art from the civilian tradition, it will appear in Latin form in older sources with little or no translation. Researchers working in 18th- and 19th-century Scots law materials should expect the term to appear without gloss. The plural form correi is the operative form in practice; the singular correus credendi appears less frequently.
RELATIONSHIP TO SOLIDARY OBLIGATIONS: Understanding correi credendi requires understanding the broader civilian doctrine of obligations in solidum. The term is not a freestanding concept — it only has meaning in the context of solidary (joint and several) obligations. Researchers who encounter the term without that doctrinal background risk misreading the nature of the creditors' rights being described.
AMERICAN RELEVANCE: The term has essentially no independent life in American common law. Its appearance in Black's Law Dictionary reflects the historical effort to document civilian and Scots law concepts that influenced Louisiana law and certain other jurisdictions with mixed legal heritage. Researchers working in Louisiana obligations law may find the civilian framework — and thus this term — directly relevant.
Historical Dictionary Support
Black's Law Dictionary and Burrill's Law Dictionary are in complete agreement on the core definition: joint creditors; creditors in solido in the civil and Scots law. Both cite the same authority — Pothier's Obligations, part 2 — as the primary source.
Burrill adds meaningful value by including the companion term correi debendi immediately after, with additional citation to Erskine's Institutes and Bell's Dictionary, effectively providing a paired doctrinal explanation that Black's omits. This makes Burrill the more useful starting point for a researcher trying to understand the full structure of solidary obligations in the civilian tradition.
Neither dictionary attempts to map the term onto common law equivalents, which is appropriate. The silence on common law analogues is itself instructive: there is no direct equivalent, and the historical dictionaries do not fabricate one.
What the historical sources do not address is the procedural dimension — that is, how correi credendi actually exercised their individual rights of demand, or how disputes among co-creditors were resolved. For that analysis, researchers must go to Pothier directly or to Scots institutional writers.
Jurisdictional Note
The term is operative in Scots law and in jurisdictions whose private law derives from the civilian tradition, including Louisiana. In purely common law jurisdictions, the concept has no direct application, and the term itself will not appear in domestic authority outside of comparative or historical discussions.