That system of law or form of the science of jurisprudence which has prevailed in England and in the United States of America, in contradis- tinction to other great systems, such as the Roman or civil law. The common law is reason dealing by the light of experience with human affairs. One of its merits is that it has the capacity to reach the ends of justice by the shortest paths. 100 U. S. 584. Sce COUTUME. Those principles, usages, and rules of action applicable to the government and security of persons and of property, which do not rest for their authority upon any express and positive declaration of the will of the legislature. 1 Kent 492. The body of rules and remedies adminis- tered by courts of law, technically so called, in contradistinction to those of equity and to the canon law. The law of any country, to denote that which is common to the whole country, in contradistinction to laws and customs of local application. The most prominent characteristic which marks this contrast, and perhaps the source of the distinc- tion, lies in the fact that under the common law neither the stiff rule of a long antiquity, on the one hand, nor, on the other, the sudden changes of a present arbitrary power, are allowed ascendency, but, under the sanction of a constitutional govern- ment, each of these is set off against the other; so that the will of the people, as it is it is gathered both from long established custom and from the expres- sion of the legislative power, gradually forms a sys- tem-just, because it is the deliberate will of a free people-stable, because it is the growth of centuries -progressive, because it is amenable to the con- stant revision of the people. A full idea of the genius of the common law cannot be gathered without a survey of the philosophy of English and American history. Some of the elements will, how- ever, appear in considering the various narrower senses in which the phrase "common law" is used. Perhaps the most important of these narrower senses is that which it has when used in contradis- tinction to statute law, to designate unwritten as distinguished from written law. It is that law which derives its force and authority from the uni- versal consent and immemorial practice of the people. It has never received the sanction of the legislature by an express act, which is the criterion by which it is distinguished from the statute law. When it is spoken of as the lex non scripta, it is meant that it is law not written by authority of law. The statutes are the expression of law in a written form, which form is essential to the statute. The decision of a court which establishes or declares & rule of law may be reduced to writing and pub- lished in the reports; but this report is not the law; it is but evidence of the law; it is but a written ac- count of one application of a legal principle, which principle, in the theory of the common law, is still unwritten. However artificial this distinction may appear, it is nevertheless of the utmost importance, and bears continually the most wholesome results. It is only by the legislative power that law can be bound by phraseology and by forms of expression. The common law eludes such bondage; its prin- ciples are not limited nor hampered by the mere forms in which they may have been expressed, and the reported adjudications declaring such principles are but the instances in which they have been ap- plied. The principles themselves are still unwritten, and ready, with all the adaptability of truth, to meet every new and unexpected case. Hence it is said that the rules of the common law are flexible; 1 Grav 263: 1 Swan 42; 5 Cow. 587, 628, 682. It naturally results from the inflexible form of the statute or written law, which has no self-con- tained power of adaptation to cases not foreseen by legislators, that every statute of importance be- comes, in course of time, supplemented, explained, enlarged, or limited by a series of adjudications upon it, so that at last it may appear to be merely the foundation of a larger superstructure of unwrit ten law. It naturally follows, too, ows, too, from the less defi- nite and precise forms in which the doctrine of the unwritten law stands, and from the proper hesita- tion of courts to modify recognized doctrines in new exigencies, that the legislative power fre- quently intervenes to declare, to qualify, or to ab- rogate the doctrines of the common law. Thus, the written and the unwritten law, the statutes of the present and the traditions of the past, interlace and react upon each other. Historical evidence sup- ports the view which these facts suggest, that many of the doctrines of the common law are but the common-law form of antique statutes, long since overgrown and imbedded in judicial decisions. While this process is doubtless continually going on in some degree, the contrary process is also con- tinually going on; and to a very considerable ex- tent, particularly in the United States, the doc