COMMERCIAL AGENCY

3 definitions found across Law Mind sources

COMMERCIAL AGENCYAuthored
The Law Mind • 966 words
Definition
Commercial agency, in its primary historical legal sense, refers to a business engaged in gathering, compiling, and reporting credit and financial information about persons and firms engaged in commerce — what modern usage would call a credit reporting agency or mercantile reporting bureau. Such agencies collected data on the financial standing, solvency, and creditworthiness of merchants, manufacturers, and tradespeople, then sold that information to subscribing businesses — wholesalers, jobbers, creditors — who relied on it when deciding whether to extend credit or enter commercial dealings. In a secondary and broader sense, the term also describes any agency relationship arising in a commercial context — that is, a principal-agent arrangement formed for business or trade purposes, as distinguished from purely personal or domestic agency. Under this usage, a commercial agent is one authorized to act on another's behalf in trade transactions: buying, selling, negotiating contracts, or otherwise conducting business in the principal's name. Researchers should note which sense is operative. The credit-bureau meaning dominated nineteenth and early twentieth century legal sources. The broader agency-in-commerce meaning is more likely to appear in comparative law, international trade, and modern contract discussions. ---
Common Confusion
The two meanings of commercial agency are frequently conflated in historical sources, and context is the only reliable guide. When Bouvier's or other period dictionaries discuss privilege, malice, and defamation in the same breath as commercial agency, they are discussing the credit-reporting bureau — an entity whose core function involved communicating potentially damaging financial opinions about named individuals. The defamation and qualified privilege questions that surrounded these bureaus have no natural connection to general agency-in-commerce doctrine. Researchers following a citation chain that mixes these threads should stop and reorient. Do not confuse commercial agency (in either sense) with commercial bribery, which involves corrupt inducements to agents — a distinct wrong that may arise within a commercial agency relationship but is a separate legal category. ---
Why It Matters in Research
The credit-bureau meaning of commercial agency is the one most heavily litigated in the period covered by Bouvier's and similar sources, and it generated a distinct body of defamation and qualified privilege law that is easy to misread without context. Nineteenth-century commercial agencies — predecessors to modern credit bureaus — occupied a peculiar legal position: their entire business model depended on communicating negative financial opinions about identifiable individuals, which raised immediate defamation exposure. Courts responded by developing a qualified privilege doctrine specific to these communications. The privilege attached when the agency reported to a subscriber with a legitimate commercial interest in the information, but it was defeated by proof of malice. The burden structure was specific: the agency bore the burden of establishing the privilege prima facie; once established, the plaintiff bore the burden of proving malice. Researchers working in nineteenth-century commercial law, early consumer protection history, or the history of credit markets will find that commercial agency cases are a primary site for early American defamation doctrine applied to business communications. The cases cited in Bouvier's (including early federal reporter and New York reporter citations) reflect this litigation-heavy environment. For researchers following the broader agency-in-commerce meaning, the relevant corpus connections run through general agency doctrine — ratification, apparent authority, termination — rather than through privilege and defamation. Be alert to which thread a source is pulling. Jurisdictional variation in the credit-bureau era was significant: some states imposed statutory duties on commercial agencies; others left the field entirely to common law privilege analysis. Modern researchers should not assume uniformity across states in period sources. ---
Historical Dictionary Support
Bouvier's Law Dictionary treats commercial agency primarily in the credit-bureau sense, defining it as a person, firm, or corporation engaged in collecting and reporting financial standing and creditworthiness information to subscribers. The entry emphasizes the agency's role as an intermediary information broker in large-scale commercial transactions — serving retail jobbers and wholesalers alike — and then pivots directly into the legal questions of privilege and malice that dominated litigation. What Bouvier's captures well is the evidentiary and burden-allocation structure of the privilege defense, including the subsidiary evidentiary question of whether a witness should be asked whether knowledge of the true facts would have changed their conduct — a question that arose in cases where inaccurate agency reports were alleged to have caused commercial harm. What Bouvier's does not address is the broader agency-in-commerce meaning, nor does it anticipate the statutory transformation of the credit-reporting industry that occurred in the twentieth century (culminating in legislation like the Fair Credit Reporting Act in the United States). Researchers should treat Bouvier's treatment as period-specific and not assume its privilege framework remains the operative law. ---
Jurisdictional Note
In the United States, the common law commercial agency (credit bureau) framework has been largely displaced by federal and state statutory regimes governing consumer reporting agencies. The Fair Credit Reporting Act governs modern credit reporting, and the qualified privilege doctrine Bouvier's describes now operates within a heavily statutory environment. Outside the United States, the term commercial agent carries specific statutory meaning in EU law (the Commercial Agents Directive) and in the domestic laws of many civil law jurisdictions, where it typically describes an independent intermediary with authority to negotiate or conclude contracts on behalf of a principal. ---
Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
Agency — Ratification and Estoppel in Agency (The Law Mind Business Organizations & Corporate Law Encyclopedia) Agency — Termination of Agency Relationships (The Law Mind Business Organizations & Corporate Law Encyclopedia) ---
Related Terms
Agency; Principal and Agent; Apparent Authority; Ratification; Qualified Privilege; Defamation; Credit Reporting; Mercantile Agency; Commercial Bribery; Factor; Broker
COMMERCIAL AGENCYmain
Bouvier's Law Dictionary • 1928
A person, firm, or corporation engaged in the business of collecting information as to the financial standing, ability, and credit of persons en- gaged in business and reporting the same to subscribers or to customers applying and paying therefor. "They have become vast and extensive factors in modern com- mercial transactions for furnishing infor- mation to retail jobbers as well as to whole- sale merchants. The courts are bound to know judicially that no vendor of goods at wholesale can be regarded as a prudent business man if he sells to a retail dealer, upon a credit, without first informing him- self through these mediums of information of the financial standing of the customer, and the credit to which he is fairly en- titled: "1 Ind. App. 573; s. c. 28 Ν. Ε. Rep. 103. See also 83 N. Y. 31; 20 Mo. App. 661. How far the agency may contract against its own negligence. An exception is made to some extent in favor of such agencies to the rule against stipulations by a person against liability for his own negligence. The agency usually contracts that their agents shall be considered as the agents of their patrons, and that they shall not be liable for the negligence of their agents. Where in an action upon such a contract the plaintiff contended that under it the agency was protected only against gross anu not against ordinary negligence, the court thought otherwise, and on motion to take off a non-suit said:- "By the contract the plaintiffs expressly agreed to take such loss upon themselves. The authorities to which we have been referred have, in our judg- ment, no application to the case. Common carriers, innkeepers, and others, engaged in the exercise of a public calling, cannot thus protect themselves against the consequences of gross negligence in the agents whom they employ. This limitation of the right to contract, as parties may choose, is an excep- tion from the general rule and confined to the class of cases named, when the public interests are sup- posed to demand its application. It has no place here. The contract which these parties entered into must be enforced as they made it. It may have been unwise, but with that we have nothing to do. One or the other must bear the risk involved in de- pending upon agents scattered over the country, of whom neither could know much. The plaintiffs agreed to bear it and they must take the conse- quence; " 7 W. N. C. Pa. 248. Under a contract that the actual verity or correctness of the information was in no manner guaranteed, the agency was not liable for loss occasioned to a subscriber by the wilful and fraudulent act of a sub- agent in furnishing false information; 58 Fed. Rep. 174, reversing 51 id. 160. Where the inquiry was made concerning a grocer and the agency reported concerning the wrong person, who had the same name and was a grocer and saloon keeper, the plaintiff could not recover from the agency the value of goods sold on the strength of the report, the evidence being held to show that there was not such gross negligence as would render the agency liable; 70 Hun 334; but such a contract does not protect the agency from an error made in the publica- tion of its books of reference giving the financial responsibility of merchants and others, and upon which a subscriber of the agency relied in selling goods and suffered a loss, and in such case it is unnecessary to thus establish the insolvency of the pur- chaser by suit before suing the agency; 134 Pa. 161. When reports are privileged and when libellous. Such an agency is a lawful busi- ness and beneficial when lawfully con- ducted, but not exempt from liability for false and defamatory publications when other citizens would not be exempt. Its communications to a person interested in the information are privileged even if false, if made in good faith and without malice, but if communicated to its subscribers gen- erally they are not privileged; 72 Tex. 15; 116 Ν. Υ. 211; id. 217; 81 Mich. 280; 116 Mo. 226; 48 Wis. 348; 18 Fed. Rep. 214; 4 McCrary 160; 77 Ga. 172; 8 Phila. 617. See also 3 Montreal, Q. B. 83; 5 id. 42; 18 Can. S. C. 222. The contract of the agency to furnish information to all its subscribers, including those who have no special inter- est in it, is no defence to an action for libel; 49 Ν. Υ. 417; nor was the fact that the in- formation was given by printed signs of which each subscriber had the key; 46 Ν. Y. 188; the matter is privileged if com- municated to the proper person by a clerk or agent as well as by the proprietor of the agency; 49 N. Y. 417; 12 Fed. Rep. 526; (but see 5 Blatchf. 497 and s. c. 10 Wall. 427, criticised in the two cases just cited;) or if specially reported upon proper occasion to subscribers having special interest in them, though not applied for by such subscribers; 22 Fed. Rep. 771; but if a subscriber apply for special information from the agency, a false denunciation of the person inquired about, coupled with the report, is action- able; 22 S. W. Rep. (
COMMERCIAL AGENCYmain
Bouvier's Law Dictionary • 1928
to ask a witness to the effect of such state- ment, whether if he had known the actual fact his conduct would have been the same; 141 Pa. 501. The burden of proof is upon the agency to show privilege prima facie, and after its character is established the burden is on the plaintiff to show malice; 12 Fed. Rep. 526; 87 Ν. Υ. 477; and it is matter of law for the court to determine whether the matter published is libellous per se; 85 Hun 16. Blacklisting. An action for libel may be brought by a person whose name is pub- lished in a book containing a list of delin- quent debtors, printed and distributed to subscribers, manifestly for coercing the payment of claims, who is denied credit be- cause of such publication, or by one to whom a letter is sent in an envelope on which is printed the name of an association and a statement that it is an organization for the purpose of collecting bad debts; 77 Wis. 236; but the publication and circula- tion by a corporation among its officers and employés, of a list of discharged employés, who are considered incompetent or untrust- worthy, is not libellous, and a person whose name is on the list has no action unless he can show that the publication was mali- cious or known to be false; 78 Tex. 568. Effect of fraudulent representations by vendee to agency upon vendor who relies upon them. An action for deceit will lie against persons or corporations making false representations of pecuniary responsi- bility to an agency in order to obtain credit and defraud those who may rely upon the reports; 50 Mo. App. 94; 83 N. Y. 31; 18 Hun 44; in such action the statements falsely made to the agency are admissible, if relied on by the vendee; 1 Ind. App. 578; or if approved by him after being written out by the agency, but not if not known to the vendor until after thesale; 81 Ala. 134; 75 Mich. 188. A contract for the sale of goods to the person making such represen- tations, who proves to be insolvent at the time of making them and of the sale, may be rescinded and possession of the goods re- covered; 58 Hun 610; 42 N. Y. 802; 31 Mo. App. 199; 85 Mich. 535; 61 Ia. 667; 77 Tex. 48; but where there were no representations other than those obtained by the agency from the seller, a fraudulent intent on the part of the vendee to use the agency as an Instrument of fraud must be clearly shown; 33 Hun 549; 2 Cent. Rep. (Md.) 620; 99 Ν. Y. Rep. 9; s c. 2 N. E. Rep. 19; 2 N. E. Rep. (N. Y.) 19. The vendor may show that he refused to make the sale until he received the report of the agency, and the agent may show his business methods; 85 Mich. 535. The right to rescind the sale is not affected by a refusal of the vendee to give further statements of his condition, as the original one is presumed to continue if not recalled by the agency; 36 N. Y. St. Rep. 728; but if the vendee has made subsequent reports showing an impaired responsibility, the sideration, and not only on the original one; vendor must take all the reports into con- sequent reports unless he actually becomes but the vendee is not required to make sub- insolvent or knows that he will soon be; 83 Mich. 419; 75 id. 188. Reports made six weeks before the sale may be relied on; 20 Mo. App. 173; but not those made from five to seven months before; 88 Mich. 418; 85 id. 535; 58 Hun 606; 99 N. Y. 353; 49 id. 417. How affected by the statute of frauds. With respect to the liability of the agency for representations not made in writing when the liability was contested, on the ground that the contract was within the statute of frauds, there is not a satisfactory result to be found in decisions; but it has been held that the action was upon the ori- ginal contract with the customer, which was by no statute required to be written; U. C. 39 Q. B. 551; (reversed on other points and doubted on this; 1 Ont. App. 153;) and also that the action was sustainable on the origi- nal contract to furnish accurate statements, in response to inquiry respecting any per- sons; 12 Phila. 316. No remedy in equity against publication. An injunction will not be granted to restrain the agency from the publication of matter

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