discontinued as to his issue before his birth, the heir in tall was driven to his action to regain pos- session upon the death of his ancestor tenant in tail; and in this action the collateral warranty came in as an estoppel. 2 Washb. R. P. 670. The heir was barred from ever claiming the land, and, in case he had assets from the warranting ancestor, was obliged to give the warrantee other lands in case of an eviction. 4 Cruise, Dig. 436. By the statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I. c. 3, tenant by the curtesy was restrained from making such warranty as should bind the heir. By a favorable construction of the statute De Donis, and by the statute 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74, tenants in tail were de- prived of the power of making collateral warranty. By statute 11 Hen. VII. c. 20, warranty by a tenant in dower, with or without the assent of her subsequent hus- band, was prevented; and finally the statute 4 & 5 Anne, c. 16, declares all warranties by a tenant for life void against the heir, unless such ancestor has an estate of in- heritance in possession. See Co. Litt. 373, Butler's note [328]; Stearns, R. Act. 135 372. It is doubtful if the doctrine has ever pre vailed to a great extent in the United States, and the statute of Anne has not been gener- ally adopted in the American statute law, although re-enacted in New York; 4 Kent *469; and in New Jersey; 3 Halst. 106. It has been adopted and is in force in Rhode Island; 1 Sumn. 235; and in Delaware; 1 Harr. 50. In Kentucky and Virginia, it seems that collateral warranty binds the heir to the extent of assets descended; 1 Dana 59. In Pennsylvania, the statute of Gloucester is in force, but the statute of Anne is not, and a collateral warranty of the ancestor, with sufficient real assets de- scending to the heirs, bars them from re- covering the lands warranted; 104 Pa. 575. See 2 Bla. Com. 301; 2 Washb. R. P. 668. If the learning of collateral warranty has been called difficult, it is simply because the law of warranty came to be turned from the purpose of its, introduction, -that of protection and defence, and fashioned into a remedy to meet an entirely different purpose. Later, collateral warranty ceased to be used for the purpose of barring estates tail, and its use could never have been universal. Rawle, Cov. for Title, secs. 8, 9. See Litt. § 709; 12 Mod. 513; Year Book 12; Edw. IV. 19; Tudor, Lead. Cas. R. P. 695; Pig. Recov. 9.