Constraint; compulsion; force. Direct or positive coercion takes place when a man is by physical force compelled to do an act contrary to his will: for ex- ample, when a man falls into the hands of the enemies of his country, and they com- pel him, by a just fear of death, to fight against it. See 4 Ct. Cls. 1; id. 288, 317. Implied coercion exists where a person is legally under subjection to another, and is induced, in consequence of such subjec- tion, to do an act contrary to his will. As will is necessary to the commission of a crime or the making of a contract, a person actually coerced into either has no will on the subject, and is not responsible; 1 East, Pl. Cr. 225; 5 Q. B. 279; 45 Mich. 2; 90 Pa. 161. The command of a superior to an inferior; 8 Wash. C. C. 209, 220; 12 Metc. 56; 1 Blatchf. 549; 18 How. 115; of a parent to a child; Broom, Max. 11; of a master to his servant, or a principal to his agent; 18 Mo. 246; 3 Cush. 279; 5 Miss. 304; 14 Ala. 365; 22 Vt. 82; 14 Johns. 119; do not amount to coercion. As to persons acting under the constraint of superior power, and, therefore, not crimi nally amenable, the principal case is that of married women, with respect to whom the law recognizes certain presumptions. Thus, if a wife commits a felony, other than treason or homicide, or, perhaps, highway robbery, in company with her husband, the law presumes that she acted under his coer- cion, and, consequently, without any guilty intent, unless the fact of non-coercion is distinctly proved; Clarke, Cr. L. 77. See 2 C. & Κ. 887, 903; 103 Mass. 71; 65 N. C. 398. This presumption appears on some occasions to have been considered conclu- sive, and is still practically regarded in no very different light, especially when the crime is of a flagrant character; but the better opinion seems to be that in every case the presumption may now be rebutted by positive proof that the woman acted as a free agent; and in one case that was much discussed, the Irish judges appear to have considered that such positive proof was not required, but that the question was always one to be determined by the jury on the evidence submitted to them; Jebb 93; 1 Mood. 143. It seems that a married woman cannot be convicted under any circumstances as a receiver of stolen goods, when the property has been taken by her husband and given to her by him; 1 Dearsl. 184. Husband and wife were jointly charged with felonious wounding with intent to disfigure and to do grievous bodily harm. The jury found that the wife acted under the coercion of the husband, and that she did not personally inflict any violence on the prosecutor. On this finding, the wife was held entitled to an acquittal; 1 Dearsl. & Β. 558. Whether the doctrine of coercion extends to any misdemeanor may admit of some doubt; but the better opinion seems to be that, provided the misdemeanor is of a ser- ious nature, as, for instance, the uttering of base coin, the wife will be protected in like manner as in cases of felony; although it has been distinctly held that the protec- tion does not extend to assaults and batter- ies or the offence of keeping a brothel; Russ. Cr. 38; 2 Lew. 229; 80. & P. 19, 541; 1 Metc. 151; 10 Mass. 152. Indeed, it is prob- able that in all inferior misdemeanors this presumption, if admitted at all, would be held liable to be defeated by far less stringent evidence of the wife's active co- operation than would suffice in cases of felony; 8 C. & P. 541; 2 Mood. 53; 1 Tayl, Ev. 152. The law upon responsibility of married women for crime is fully stated in 1 B. & H. Lead. Cr. Cas. 76-87.