Definition
A thing annexed to or fixed in a particular place, such that it cannot be separated from that location without losing its essential character. The classic example given in the historical sources is a mill — an improvement so tied to the land and water rights of a specific site that it exists, legally and practically, as part of that place rather than as a movable asset.
Chose local is a subcategory within the broader taxonomy of choses (things), distinguishing property that is inherently place-bound from property that can be transferred or enforced without reference to a fixed location. It is most naturally understood in contrast to a chose transitory — a thing or right that follows its owner and may be pursued wherever the parties are found.
Common Confusion
CHOSE LOCAL vs. CHOSE TRANSITORY vs. CHOSE IN ACTION: These three terms carve the older common law property taxonomy along different axes and are easily conflated. A chose in action is a right enforceable only by legal action (not a physical thing at all), while chose local and chose transitory both refer to tangible things. The local/transitory distinction turns on whether the thing — or the right of action concerning it — is tied to a geographic location. Historically, this distinction had procedural consequences: actions concerning local things had to be brought in the jurisdiction where the thing was situated, while actions concerning transitory things could be brought wherever the defendant was found. Researchers treating "chose local" as a synonym for "chose in action" will reach incorrect conclusions.
Why It Matters in Research
This term belongs almost exclusively to the historical common law vocabulary. Researchers are most likely to encounter it in pre-twentieth-century English and American sources dealing with real property, local venue rules, or the classification of property rights.
The critical research trap is that "chose local" is not simply a geographic descriptor — it is a term of art with procedural consequences. In the older common law, the local or transitory character of an action determined which court had jurisdiction and where the action had to be commenced. A case or treatise invoking "chose local" may therefore be addressing questions of jurisdiction and venue as much as questions of substantive property classification.
Burrill's gloss that chose local answers "probably to the res immobilis of the civil law" is a useful navigational note for researchers working across common law and civil law sources. When tracing analogous concepts in Louisiana, Quebec, Scottish, or other mixed-jurisdiction materials, the res immobilis framework will often be the operative category.
The concept retains conceptual relevance in modern contexts even where the term itself has fallen out of use: the idea that certain property interests are inseparable from a fixed location underlies modern doctrine on fixtures, real covenants, easements appurtenant, and the situs rule in conflicts of law. Researchers working on those topics in historical sources may find chose local appearing as the doctrinal ancestor.
Historical Dictionary Support
Black's Law Dictionary and Burrill's Law Dictionary are in near-identical agreement on the core definition, both tracing the term to the same three historical authorities: Kitchin (fol. 18), Cowell, and Blount. This convergence on identical sources suggests the term was not a point of ongoing doctrinal development but rather a stable classificatory label drawn from the foundational common law property vocabulary.
Burrill adds the civil law parallel (res immobilis), which Black's omits — a divergence worth noting for researchers working in comparative or equity contexts, where civil law analogies were sometimes drawn by courts and treatise writers.
Neither dictionary situates the term within the local/transitory action distinction explicitly, though that procedural dimension is the reason the classification mattered. Researchers relying solely on these dictionary entries may underappreciate why the distinction was significant enough to warrant a dedicated term.
Neither source addresses the term's decline or its relationship to modern fixture law or conflicts of law doctrine. The historical record effectively ends with the classificatory label; the interpretive work of connecting it to surviving modern doctrine must be done by the researcher.