Definition
A chose in possession is a tangible personal property right that the owner presently holds and physically controls — as distinguished from a chose in action, which is a right to personal property that must be claimed or recovered through legal proceedings. The term derives from the French *chose* (thing) and signals that the owner's entitlement is already reduced to physical possession rather than awaiting enforcement.
In practical terms: a book on a shelf, money in hand, livestock in a field, or goods delivered under a contract are all choses in possession. The owner can use, transfer, or enjoy them without first invoking a court or legal process. The classic illustration from Blackstone captures the distinction neatly — taxes and customs already paid are a chose in possession in the hands of the government; taxes and customs still owed but unpaid are a chose in action, requiring enforcement to collect.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): "Property that is capable to be possessed."
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): No dedicated entry; "chose" appears only as a legal term of art.
The ordinary-language definition is not wrong, but it is incomplete in a way that misleads. The legal meaning of chose in possession is relational — it exists only in contrast to chose in action. Saying that a chose in possession is simply "property capable of being possessed" erases the analytical work the term actually does, which is to classify whether a personal property right is already in the holder's hands or still requires legal assertion. A bond or promissory note is technically capable of physical possession (you can hold the paper), yet it is a chose in action, not a chose in possession.
Common Confusion
CHOSE IN POSSESSION vs. CHOSE IN ACTION: These are paired opposites, not overlapping categories. The confusion arises because the same underlying asset can shift classification depending on circumstances. An unpaid debt is a chose in action; once paid, the money received becomes a chose in possession. A judgment is a chose in action; the funds levied and collected under it become a chose in possession. Researchers working with older commercial or probate records must track this transformation — instruments that begin as choses in action may appear later in inventories and conveyances as choses in possession.
CHOSE IN POSSESSION vs. REAL PROPERTY: The chose framework applies only to personal property. Land and interests in land are governed by the real/personal property distinction, not the chose taxonomy. A leasehold, however, occupies complicated historical ground and was sometimes treated as quasi-personal.
Why It Matters in Research
Chose in possession is primarily a term of classification that structures how personal property was described, inventoried, conveyed, and litigated across centuries of Anglo-American law. Researchers encounter it most often in three contexts:
**Probate and estate records.** Inventories of decedents' estates historically distinguished between choses in possession (goods, chattels, cash on hand) and choses in action (debts owed to the estate, bonds, notes). A failure to recognize this classification when reading historical inventories can cause a researcher to misread the economic picture of an estate — assets listed as choses in action represent contingent value, not liquid wealth.
**Commercial law and assignment doctrine.** For much of English legal history, choses in action were not freely assignable at common law, while choses in possession transferred by delivery. This asymmetry generated substantial litigation and was a major driver of equity jurisdiction. By contrast, choses in possession transferred cleanly and were largely outside the assignment controversy. Researching 17th–19th century commercial disputes requires understanding which category applies before the relevant rules become legible.
**Bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings.** Historical insolvency schedules sorted assets by this classification. Modern bankruptcy law uses different vocabulary, so researchers bridging pre- and post-code materials must translate.
The term itself has become largely archaic in modern American legal writing, where "personal property," "tangible property," and "intangible property" have displaced it. Researchers working in modern sources will rarely encounter it; researchers in English common law, early American treatises, or colonial and 19th-century records will find it essential.
Historical Dictionary Support
Black's (both editions), Bouvier's, and Burrill's are in near-complete agreement — all four sources reproduce the same Blackstone formulation and the same taxes-and-customs illustration, citing 2 Bl. Comm. 408 (Black's 1st Ed. and Bouvier's) or 2 Bl. Comm. 406 (Black's 2nd Ed., likely a variant page reference to the same passage). This uniformity signals that the term was treated as settled and uncontroversial — the dictionaries were transmitting Blackstone's taxonomy rather than synthesizing competing authorities.
Black's 2nd Ed. adds two case citations — *Sterling v. Sims*, 72 Ga. 53, and *Vawter v. Griffin*, 40 Ind. 601 — which provide American judicial application of the concept and are absent from the other sources. Researchers needing 19th-century American case law on the term should begin there.
What the historical dictionaries collectively omit: any discussion of how equity modified the rules applicable to choses in possession, the intersection with the law of bailment, and the transformation of the classification in modern statutory regimes. They treat the term as a static taxonomy rather than a functional concept with doctrinal consequences. For the fuller picture, researchers should consult Blackstone's Commentaries directly and subsequent treatise writers such as Benjamin on Sales for commercial applications.
Jurisdictional Note
The chose in possession / chose in action distinction was received across American jurisdictions from English common law and operated consistently as a classificatory framework through the 19th century. Modern American law has largely abandoned the terminology in favor of UCC Article 9's categories of tangible and intangible personal property, though the underlying conceptual distinction persists. English law retains the terminology more actively.