Definition
Champertous describes an arrangement, agreement, or action that has the character of champerty — that is, one tainted by an improper bargain in which a third party finances or assists another's litigation in exchange for a share of the proceeds or recovery. A champertous agreement is void or voidable under the law of jurisdictions that prohibit champerty, and any contract or assignment so characterized may be unenforceable.
The term is purely adjectival. It modifies agreements, contracts, assignments, fees, and similar instruments, signaling that the underlying arrangement violates the doctrine against champerty. A fee arrangement may be champertous; a litigation funding contract may be champertous; an assignment of a legal claim may be champertous.
Common Confusion
CHAMPERTOUS vs. MAINTENANCE: Maintenance refers to the improper support of another's litigation without a stake in the outcome; champerty is maintenance plus an agreement to share in the recovery. A champertous arrangement necessarily involves maintenance, but not all maintenance is champertous. Researchers encountering either term in historical sources should check which doctrine applies, because the two were often treated together but carry distinct legal consequences.
CHAMPERTOUS vs. BARRATROUS: Barratry involves the habitual stirring up of litigation or quarrels. A champertous agreement concerns a specific financing arrangement; barratry is a pattern of conduct. The three doctrines — maintenance, champerty, and barratry — frequently appear together in historical treatises and statutes and are sometimes loosely conflated.
Why It Matters in Research
Champertous is a term of art that derives its entire meaning from the underlying doctrine of champerty, which has undergone dramatic transformation in modern law. In historical sources through the mid-twentieth century, champertous carries a strongly pejorative and often absolute legal significance: an agreement so described was typically void as against public policy, and counsel who entered into one risked professional discipline. Researchers working with older primary sources — contracts, assignments, pleadings, bar disciplinary records — should treat champertous as a red flag signaling potential unenforceability under the law of that era and jurisdiction.
The modern picture is sharply different. The rise of litigation finance and third-party funding has caused many jurisdictions to relax or effectively abolish champerty doctrine. Agreements that would have been condemned as champertous in 1900 may be entirely enforceable today, particularly in commercial litigation contexts. Researchers should not read modern permissiveness back into historical sources, nor should they assume historical condemnation applies to contemporary arrangements.
Because champertous is an adjective rather than a defined doctrine in its own right, it does not appear as a standalone entry in most legal databases and indexes. Researchers searching for it should also search CHAMPERTY to locate the governing doctrine, and should trace how champerty was defined in the specific jurisdiction and time period at issue.
In practice, the term appears most frequently in: (1) challenges to the enforceability of contingency fee arrangements or third-party funding agreements; (2) challenges to assignments of legal claims or choses in action; (3) professional responsibility proceedings against attorneys; and (4) older English and American equity opinions addressing unconscionable litigation bargains.
Historical Dictionary Support
Both editions of Black's Law Dictionary define champertous simply and identically: an arrangement "of the nature of champerty" or "affected with champerty." This spare treatment reflects the term's derivative character — it carries no independent doctrinal content beyond its root noun. Neither edition elaborates on the consequences of a champertous arrangement or addresses how courts were to assess whether a particular contract met the threshold, leaving those questions to the champerty entries and to case law.
The brevity of both entries is itself informative. Black's apparent assumption that readers would understand the significance of being "affected with champerty" reflects the once-settled and widely understood nature of the prohibition. Later editions of Black's reflect the doctrinal fracturing of champerty across jurisdictions, but neither of the two editions available here signals that uncertainty.
Neither source addresses the adjectival form in the context of modern litigation finance, which postdates both editions as a developed commercial practice.
Jurisdictional Note
Champerty and its adjectival form champertous remain operative legal concepts in some U.S. states and in England and Wales, but the doctrine has been abolished or severely limited in others. In jurisdictions where champerty survives, courts differ on whether the prohibition extends to all third-party funding or only to specific categories of agreements. Researchers should determine the applicable jurisdiction's current standing before treating historical condemnation of a champertous arrangement as controlling.