Definition
A Latin procedural term meaning "let the process stay." Cesset processus refers to a stay of proceedings formally entered on the court record, suspending further action in a case or on a particular issue without dismissing it outright. It operates as an official notation that the legal machinery of a proceeding is halted, typically pending some condition, resolution of a related matter, or court direction. The stay is a matter of record, distinguishing it from informal delays or continuances.
Common Confusion
Cesset processus should not be confused with a general continuance or an abatement. A continuance postpones a specific hearing or trial date; an abatement suspends or terminates a proceeding due to a defect, the death of a party, or a similar cause. Cesset processus is a formal stay entered on the record, signaling a deliberate judicial or procedural pause rather than a scheduling adjustment or a suspension caused by a legal defect. It is also distinct from a nolle prosequi, which is a prosecutor's or plaintiff's formal declaration to abandon prosecution or pursuit of a claim.
Why It Matters in Research
This term appears almost exclusively in older common law practice materials and English and early American case reports. Researchers encountering it in historical sources should understand that it describes a formal record entry — not merely a factual pause in proceedings — which gave the stay legal effect as part of the official record. The procedural significance of this formality was greater in early common law courts, where the record itself carried determinative weight.
In modern practice, the function of cesset processus has been absorbed entirely into the general concept of a stay of proceedings, governed by rules of civil or criminal procedure. The term itself has fallen out of use in contemporary American courts and will not appear in modern procedural codes or rules. Researchers working in pre-twentieth-century materials, particularly English reports or early state court decisions drawing on common law forms, are most likely to encounter it.
Because the stay was entered on the record, cesset processus had implications for the running of applicable time limits and for the parties' obligations during the suspended period — questions that are now handled explicitly by statute or rule but were less clearly defined when this term was in active use. Researchers tracing the history of stays and procedural suspensions should treat cesset processus as the historical precursor to the modern stay order.
The Burrill citation to 11 Mod. 231–234 points to Modern Cases, a series of English reports from the early eighteenth century, suggesting the term's active use in English practice of that period and its likely importation into early American common law courts.
Historical Dictionary Support
The three source dictionaries are in close agreement. All define cesset processus as a stay of proceedings entered on the record, with no significant variation in substance. Burrill's entry is the most detailed, specifying that the stay applies to "the process or proceedings on an issue" and providing a case reference that anchors the term to English common law practice of the early 1700s. Black's entries, first and second editions, offer the same core definition in compressed form.
None of the historical dictionaries address the conditions under which cesset processus would be granted, its duration, or its effect on the parties — gaps that a researcher must fill by consulting the underlying case law and practice materials of the period. The dictionaries treat it as a term of art requiring no elaboration, which itself reflects how familiar the concept was to practitioners working within a common law pleading and practice framework.
Jurisdictional Note
Cesset processus is a term of English common law origin and appears in English and early American common law sources. It has no meaningful presence in modern American jurisdictional practice and is not employed in civil law or hybrid jurisdictions. Researchers should treat it as a historical common law term with no current jurisdictional application.