then. neither at law nor in equity can effect be given to it; 1 R. & M. 116. If it is impossible to ascertain any definite meaning, such agreement is necessarily void; [1892] Q. B. 478. As to uncertainty of contract see 93 Mich. 491; 75 Md. 80; 70 Hun 575; 8 Wash. 458. It is a maxim of law that that is certain which may be made certain: certum est quod certum reddi potest; Co. Litt. 43. For example, when a man sells the oil he has in his store at so much a gallon, al- though there is uncertainty as to the quantity of oil, yet, inasmuch as it can be ascertained, the maxim applies, and the sale is good. See, generally, Story, Eq. § 240; Mitf. Eq. Pl., Jeremy ed. 41; Cooper, Eq. Pl. 5; Wigram, Disc. 77. In Pleading. Such clearness and dis- tinctness of statement of the facts which constitute the cause of action or ground of defence that they may be understood by the party who is to answer them, by the jury who are to ascertain the truth of the allegations, and by the court who are to give the judgment. 13 East 107; 2 B. & P. 267; Co. Litt. 303; Comyns, Dig. Pleader, c. 17. See 21 Or. 435. Certainty to a common intent is attained by a form of statement in which words are used in their ordinary meaning, though by argument or inference they may be made to bear a different one. See 2 H. Bla. 530; Andr. Steph. Pl. 384. Certainty to a certain intent in general is attained when the meaning of the statute may be understood upon a fair and reason- able construction without recurrence to possible facts which do not appear; 1 Wms. Saund. 49; 9 Johns. 317; 5 Conn. 423. Certainty to a certain intent in particular is attained by that technical accuracy of statement which precludes all argument, inference, and presumption against the party pleading. When this certaincy is required, the party must not only state the facts of his case in the most precise way, but add to them such as show that they are not to be controverted, and, as it were, an- ticipate the case of his adversary; Lawes, Pl. 54. The last description of certainty is re- quired in estoppels; Co. Litt. 303; 2 H. Bla. 530; Dougl. 159; and in pleas which are not favored in law, as alien enemy;8 Term 167; 6 Binn. 247. See 10 Johns. 70; 1 Rand. 270. With respect to an indict- ment, it is laid down that "an indictment ought to be certain to every intent, and without any intendment to the contrary; " Cro. Eliz. 490; and the charge contained in it must be sufficiently explicit to sup- port itself; for no latitude of intention can be allowed to include anything more than is expressed; 2 Burr. 1127; 92 U. S. 542; 96 id. 360; 40 Ia. 148; 81 Me. 401; 114 Mass. 263; 71 Mo. 460; 58 N. H. 348; 19 Tex. App. 383. These definitions, which have been adopt- ed from Lord Coke, have been subjected to severe criticism, but are of some utility in drawing attention to the different de- grees of exactness and fulness of statement required in different instances. Less certainty is required where the law pre- sumes that the knowledge of the facts is peculiarly in the opposite party: 8 East 85; 13 id. 112; 3 Maule & S. 14; 13 Johns. 437. Less certainty than would otherwise be requisite is demanded in some cases, to avoid prolixity of statement. 2 Wms. Saund. 117, n. 1. See, generally, 1 Chit. Pl.