held to be the proximate cause of the latter; 50 N. W. Rep. (Minn.) 927; but where by reason of injury in a collision a passenger became disordered in mind and body and eight months after committed suicide, in a suit for damages against the railroad com- pany it was held that his own act was the proximate cause of his death; 105 U. S. 249. Consequences which follow in unbroken sequence, without an intervening sufficient cause, from the original wrong, are natural; and for them the original wrongdoer is responsible, even though he could not have foreseen the particular results, provided that by the exercise of ordinary care he might have foreseen that some injury would result; Webb's Poll. Torts 36, note and cases cited; 99 N. Y. 158. In order to displace an apparent efficient cause and to prevent it from being treated as the proximate cause, an intervening event must be wholly independent of the first. If the act in which the defendant is engaged is one which circumstances in- dicate may be dangerous to others, and the event whose occurrence is necessary to make the act injurious can readily be seen as likely to occur under the circumstances, it will not be considered an independent intervening cause and the defendant is liable; 53 Pa. 436; a woman's illness caused by fright from the shooting of a dog in her presence is not such a consequence as would be supposed naturally to follow the act; 36 Minn. 90. If two causes operate at the same time to produce a result which might be pro- duced by either, they are concurrent causes, and in such case each is a proxi- mate cause, but if the two are successive and unrelated in their operation, one of them must be proximate and the other re- mote; 149 Pa. 222. As an illustration of concurrent causes, where lumber was neg- ligently piled, and remained a long time in that condition, and was caused to fall by the negligence of a stranger, the negligence in piling concurring with the negligence of the stranger, was the direct and proxi- mate cause; 41 Cal. 87. Where the intervening cause which dis- places a prior one is the negligence of the party injured it is designated contributory negligence, and where that exists there can be no recovery. But although the sub ject of contributory negligence has become so important as to constitute a distinct head of the law, it is a phrase, however well es- tablished, not free from objection; Poll. Torts, Webb's ed. 569; and the penal theory on which it is sometimes considered as resting is discarded by the most authori- tative writers; id.; Whart. Neg. § 300; Camp. Neg. 180. The view which is sup- ported by reason and now likewise fully by authority is that the defence of contribu- tory negligence of the plaintiff finds its true basis in the application above made of the doctrine of proximate cause, and that it is a conclusive answer to the action because it takes its place as the proximate, direct, immediate, or, to use the apt phrase of Pol- lock, the decisive cause of the injury (Torts 573, 575). In the leading English case it was left to the jury to say whether the negligence attributed to the plaintiff "di- rectly contributed to the injury; " 2 C. B. N. S. 740; and on appeal the rule was laid down that negligence of the plaintiff would not prevent recovery, unless it were such that without it the injury would (not could) not have happened, or "if the defendant might, by the due exercise of care on his part, have avoided the consequences of the neglect or carelessness of the plaintiff;" 5 C. B. N. S. 573. This general view was sustained in a subsequent case by the house of lords and great stress was laid on the evidence that the contributory negligence claimed was the immediate cause of the accident; 1 App. Cas. 754; the negligence set up as contributory must in order to con- stitute a defence substantially or essenti- ally or directly tend to produce the injury, or be an actual and efficient cause of it; if it remotely contribute, it will not debar the plaintiff from a recovery; 86 Ala. 381; it