Definition
A Latin phrase meaning "in a like case" or "in a similar case." In old English law, casu consimili designated a specific writ of entry available to a reversioner when a tenant by the curtesy or a tenant for life improperly alienated the land — whether in fee, in tail, or for another person's life — during the tenant's lifetime and to the reversioner's prejudice. The writ was brought against the party to whom the tenant had alienated, not against the tenant directly. It operated as a possessory remedy allowing the holder of the reversion to recover the land that had been wrongfully conveyed away by the limited tenant.
The phrase itself describes the structural logic of the writ: it was available "in a case similar" to those already recognized by the common law, extending relief beyond the narrow situations addressed by earlier writs of entry. It is closely associated with the Statute of Westminster II (13 Edw. I, c. 24, 1285), which authorized new writs to be issued in cases analogous to existing forms where no precise writ existed — a legislative grant of flexibility to the chancery that gave the phrase much of its historical significance.
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Common Confusion
Casu consimili is frequently encountered alongside, or confused with, the broader statutory provision from which it drew authority. The Statute of Westminster II contained the famous "in consimili casu" clause, which directed that writs be created for new situations resembling cases already covered. The writ of entry called casu consimili is one specific application of that principle, not the principle itself. Researchers should also distinguish casu consimili from other writs of entry (such as ad terminum qui praeterit or cui in vita) that addressed related but distinct fact patterns involving wrongful alienation or disseisin.
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Why It Matters in Research
This term is almost entirely a creature of pre-modern English law and has no operative meaning in contemporary legal systems. Researchers will encounter it almost exclusively in:
1. Historical property law materials — treatises on real property, writs, and tenures from the medieval and early modern periods. Bracton, Littleton, and Coke's commentary on Littleton are natural companion texts.
2. Statutory history of Westminster II — any research tracing the development of the chancery's writ-making power or the evolution of forms of action will pass through the consimili casu clause, and casu consimili will appear nearby.
3. Forms-of-action scholarship — the writ sits within the abolished English forms of action system and is relevant to understanding how possessory remedies were structured before the Judicature Acts and later procedural reforms dissolved the distinctions.
The primary research trap is conflating the writ with the statutory clause that enabled it. The writ of entry in casu consimili had specific requirements — tenant by the curtesy or tenant for life, alienation in fee or in tail or for another's life, prejudice to the reversioner, suit brought during the tenant's lifetime — while the Westminster II clause was a general grant of analogical writ-drafting power. Treating them interchangeably will produce analytic errors when reading historical sources.
Bouvier redirects to the entry CONSIMILI, suggesting researchers using Bouvier should follow that cross-reference for fuller treatment. Burrill's entry is fragmentary and should not be relied upon as a standalone source; it gestures toward related entries (Casus foederis, Consimili casu) that must be consulted in conjunction. Black's (both editions) provides the most complete standalone definition, though neither edition supplies the statutory grounding that a researcher working in this area will need.
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Historical Dictionary Support
The historical dictionaries converge on the core definition — a writ of entry brought by a reversioner against a grantee of an improper alienation by a limited tenant — though with varying depth. Black's Law Dictionary (1st and 2nd editions) give substantively identical definitions and are the most useful of the four sources for initial orientation. Both specify the categories of tenants (curtesy, for life) and the types of alienation (in fee, in tail, for another's life) that triggered the writ, and both note that the action ran against the alienee, not the alienating tenant.
Bouvier contributes nothing independently, deferring entirely to its CONSIMILI entry. This is consistent with Bouvier's structure but means the dictionary cannot be used as a freestanding source for this term.
Burrill is the least useful here. The entry is visibly corrupted or incomplete as transcribed, making confident reliance on it problematic. It appears to gesture toward Casus foederis and Consimili casu as companion entries, which is accurate contextually, but the entry itself adds no independent analytical content.
None of the historical dictionaries foreground the Statute of Westminster II as the legislative foundation for the writ's availability in analogical cases. This is a meaningful gap: the statute is essential context for understanding why the writ existed and how it fits within the broader history of chancery practice and the forms of action. Researchers should supplement these dictionary entries with treatise-level sources.
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Jurisdictional Note
Casu consimili is a term of English common law with no direct American statutory or decisional counterpart. It was rendered obsolete in England by the abolition of the forms of action under the Common Law Procedure Acts and the Judicature Acts of the nineteenth century. American jurisdictions adopted simplified pleading even earlier in many cases. The term appears in American legal literature only in historical or comparative contexts.
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