Definition
A Latin term meaning "it falls," "it fails," "it abates," or "it ceases." Used in legal writing and pleading, primarily in historical English practice, to signal that a claim, question, action, or legal issue has collapsed, ended, or become moot. Cadit does not stand alone as a substantive legal concept; it functions as a component of Latin maxims and pleading phrases, most commonly:
- Cadit quaestio: "The question falls" — meaning there is no further room for argument; the matter is settled or the issue is foreclosed. Used in judicial opinions to signal that a point of law or fact has been resolved, leaving nothing further to contest.
- Cadit assisa: "The assize fails" — a pleading term from old English practice indicating that the assize (a form of early common law jury proceeding) has abated or cannot proceed.
Common Confusion
Cadit is occasionally confused with cadere (the parent verb form) and caducus (an adjective describing property or rights that have lapsed or fallen away). These are related but distinct. Cadere is the infinitive from which cadit derives; caducus describes the condition of something that has lapsed, particularly property in Roman law that escheated due to a legatee's incapacity to take. Cadit describes the act or event of falling or failing in a procedural or argumentative sense. Researchers encountering any of these terms in historical sources should verify which form appears and in what context before treating them as interchangeable.
Why It Matters in Research
Cadit appears almost exclusively in pre-twentieth century legal writing, pleading records, and judicial opinions drawing on Latin common law vocabulary. Researchers working in historical English case law — particularly Year Books, early reports, and Chancery records — will encounter cadit quaestio as a standard judicial shorthand. Its appearance in an opinion signals finality on a point, not a substantive legal holding, which matters when tracing the reasoning of early decisions.
The phrase cadit quaestio occasionally migrated into nineteenth century American decisions when judges trained in classical legal education wished to close off argument on a settled point. Its use declined sharply through the twentieth century as plain-English judicial writing became standard. Finding cadit quaestio in a post-1900 American opinion is unusual enough to warrant attention to the court's rhetorical posture.
Cadit assisa is more narrowly confined to English legal history and the procedural mechanics of the assize system. It has no practical American law counterpart and appears in American legal sources only in historical or comparative discussions.
Researchers should note that Anderson's Dictionary of Law cross-references cadit under QUAESTIO rather than treating it as an independent headword, reflecting the editorial judgment that the term's significance lies almost entirely in its compound phrases rather than as a standalone term.
Historical Dictionary Support
The historical dictionaries agree on the core meaning — "it falls, fails, abates, ends, ceases" — without meaningful divergence. Black's (both editions) defines the term briefly and cross-references cadere. Burrill's Law Dictionary offers the most substantive treatment, connecting cadit assisa to Fleta (the thirteenth century English legal treatise) and grounding cadit quaestio in contemporaneous judicial usage, citing Bayly J. and Lord Ellenborough from early nineteenth century King's Bench decisions. These citations confirm that cadit quaestio was live judicial vocabulary in English courts through at least the 1810s.
Burrill's treatment is the most useful for historical corpus research precisely because it anchors the phrases in datable, attributable usage rather than simply offering a translation. Black's entries add nothing beyond the gloss.
What the historical dictionaries collectively understate is the rhetorical function of cadit quaestio in judicial writing: it was not merely descriptive but performative, used to foreclose argument and signal that the court considered a matter beyond further discussion. This distinction matters when interpreting the logical structure of early opinions.