Definition
A bribe is any money, property, privilege, advantage, or other thing of value given or promised to a person in a position of public trust or official capacity, with corrupt intent to influence that person's conduct in the exercise of their duty. The corruption is mutual: the bribe is the thing offered or received, and the offense is complete when the offer is made or accepted with the requisite intent — delivery of the thing of value is not required.
Two elements distinguish a bribe from a lawful gift or payment: (1) the recipient holds a position of duty or trust — public official, juror, witness, voter, or similar — and (2) the thing of value is given specifically to influence or pervert the exercise of that duty. Value is broadly construed. Courts have consistently held that intangible benefits — promises of future employment, political favors, forgiveness of debt — satisfy the value requirement.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): Something, usually money, given in exchange for influence or as an inducement to breaking the law; also the act of offering or paying such a payment.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): A price, reward, gift, or favor bestowed or promised with a view to prevent the judgment or corrupt the conduct of a judge, witness, voter, or other person in a position of trust. Also: that which seduces or allures more generally.
The common and legal meanings track closely in modern usage, but an important gap remains. Ordinary language treats "bribe" as something paid to induce wrongdoing generally. Legal usage is more precise: the recipient must hold a specific duty — official, fiduciary, or public — and the corrupt purpose must target the exercise of that duty. Paying a private citizen to lie to your neighbor is not bribery in the legal sense; paying a witness to lie to a court is.
Common Confusion
BRIBE vs. GRATUITY: A bribe is given before or during the act it is intended to influence, as an inducement. A gratuity is given after the fact as a reward for conduct already taken. Federal law treats these as distinct offenses with different intent requirements. Researchers working with federal materials should not assume the terms are interchangeable.
BRIBE vs. EXTORTION: A bribe flows from the payer toward the official to influence conduct; extortion flows the other direction, with the official using the power of the office to compel payment. In practice the facts are sometimes entangled — particularly in public corruption prosecutions — but the legal structure differs and conflating the terms distorts the analysis.
Core Elements
The following elements appear consistently across both statutory frameworks and common law formulations:
1. A thing of value — Money, property, or any tangible or intangible benefit. Promises of future value satisfy this element.
2. Given, offered, or promised — The offense does not require completed transfer. An offer or promise is sufficient to constitute the bribe.
3. To a person in a position of duty or trust — At common law this centered on public officials, judges, and jurors. Modern statutes extend coverage to witnesses, voters, arbitrators, and in commercial bribery statutes, to private-sector fiduciaries.
4. With corrupt intent — The giver must act with purpose to influence the exercise of the recipient's official duty. Intent is the operative element; a gift given without corrupt purpose, even to an official, is not a bribe.
5. In connection with official or fiduciary duty — The thing of value must be linked to some act or omission within the recipient's authority. Gifts unconnected to any duty do not meet this element.
Why It Matters in Research
Historical sources define bribe primarily in its public-official context — judges, witnesses, jurors, voters. Researchers working with modern materials must account for a significant doctrinal expansion: commercial bribery statutes now reach private-sector actors, and federal statutes like 18 U.S.C. § 666 extend bribery law to agents of organizations receiving federal funds. If your research crosses the public/private line, do not assume the historical definitions are sufficient.
The element of value has been consistently litigated. Early common law sources assumed tangible property. By the twentieth century, courts and legislatures had broadened value to include intangibles — a point the historical dictionaries do not fully anticipate. When reading older sources, treat their examples as illustrative minimums, not exhaustive definitions.
Corpus researchers should note that "bribe" appears in both its noun and verb forms ("to bribe") across historical materials. Bouvier and Black treat the noun form; the verb "to bribe" and the gerund "bribing" appear frequently in indictment language and should be searched separately.
The distinction between bribery and extortion matters significantly for corpus navigation. Cases and treatises addressing official misconduct frequently discuss both offenses in proximity. A case that uses "bribe" in the heading may turn on extortion doctrine, and vice versa. Track the directionality of the payment.
Jurisdictional variation in commercial bribery — i.e., bribery outside the public official context — is substantial. Many states criminalize commercial bribery; others do not, or reach it only through civil law. The historical dictionaries are silent on this variation, which developed largely in the twentieth century.
Historical Dictionary Support
Black's Law Dictionary (1st Ed.) provides the most expansive definition in this group, treating bribe as covering any valuable thing given or promised corruptly in connection with official or public capacity. The phrase "right in action" in the original text confirms that intangible legal rights were understood as cognizable value even at early common law.
Bouvier offers a crisper formulation, emphasizing the transactional structure: gift or promise accepted as inducement for an illegal act or omission, or as consideration for preferring one person to another in a legal act. Bouvier's inclusion of preference-in-a-legal-act is notable — it captures the scenario where the underlying act (e.g., awarding a contract) is not itself unlawful, but the corrupt inducement to do so in a particular way constitutes the offense.
The two Black's editions align closely on the public-official focus. All three historical sources are silent on commercial bribery, on the offer-alone-as-sufficient rule as a formal doctrinal matter, and on federal statutory frameworks. Researchers should treat the historical definitions as accurately reflecting common law foundations while understanding that statutory evolution — federal and state — has substantially expanded the field.
Webster's 1913 notes an obsolete meaning of "bribe" as simply a gift begged, drawn from Chaucer. This archaic sense is irrelevant to legal research but may surface in very early historical materials and should not be confused with the corrupt-inducement meaning that governs legal usage.
Jurisdictional Note
Federal bribery law (18 U.S.C. § 201) covers public officials and applies the bribe/gratuity distinction as a matter of statutory construction, requiring proof of a quid pro quo for bribery charges. State bribery statutes vary in scope, covered persons, and value thresholds. Researchers should not assume a uniform definition across jurisdictions, particularly for commercial bribery and bribery of private fiduciaries.