Definition
"Bottle" is not a term of art in general legal doctrine, but it carries specific statutory and indictment significance in contexts involving the sale, importation, and theft of liquor and other bottled goods. In these contexts, courts have construed "bottle" with precision: the term refers to a container of conventional bottle form and capacity, and the legal meaning does not automatically extend to non-standard vessels such as demijohns, nor does it encompass the liquid contents independently of the container.
Two principal legal questions have arisen under this term:
1. Statutory construction: Whether a given vessel qualifies as a "bottle" for purposes of statutes regulating the packaging or importation of liquor. A demijohn holding four gallons has been held not to be a "bottle" within the meaning of a statute requiring imported liquors to be put up in packages of not less than one dozen bottles each.
2. Criminal pleading: Whether an indictment charging theft of "bottles" of liquor is sustained by proof of theft of liquor held in bottles belonging to the defendant, into which he had drawn the liquor. Courts have answered no — the charge was not proven because the bottles themselves were not stolen; only the liquid contents were.
Anderson's also cross-references LEAKAGE and SEAL (definition 5) for related bottling and packaging contexts.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): A container, typically made of glass or plastic with a tapered neck, used primarily for holding liquids; also the contents of such a container; colloquially, intoxicating liquor.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): A hollow vessel, usually of glass or earthenware (formerly of leather), with a narrow neck or mouth for holding liquids; by extension, its contents; figuratively, intoxicating liquor.
The legal gap here is narrow but consequential for research: ordinary usage treats "bottle" broadly and interchangeably with its contents ("a bottle of wine" means either the vessel or the drink). Legal construction does not. Courts have insisted on precision — what is charged, what is regulated, and what is seized must track whether the term refers to the container, the contents, or both. A researcher reading liquor statutes or indictments must not assume that common usage governs.
Common Confusion
Two related confusions appear in historical sources. First, "bottle" and its contents are legally distinct. An indictment for stealing bottles of liquor is not proven by evidence of stealing only the liquor. The container and the liquid are separable objects for purposes of pleading. Second, not every liquid-holding vessel is a "bottle" for statutory purposes. A demijohn — a large, narrow-necked vessel typically encased in wickerwork — may hold liquids in a bottle-like manner but has been excluded from statutory definitions of "bottle" based on its unusual capacity and form. Researchers should not assume that functional equivalence determines statutory coverage.
Why It Matters in Research
This term matters primarily to researchers working in three areas of the Law Mind corpus:
Liquor regulation history: Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century statutes governing the importation and sale of liquor frequently specified packaging requirements using terms like "bottle," "package," "cask," and "case." Courts repeatedly construed these terms to determine compliance. The meaning of "bottle" in a given statute depended on the statutory context, the trade usage of the period, and the vessel's form and capacity — not just its everyday name. Researchers reading these statutes should not import modern assumptions about what counts as a bottle.
Criminal pleading precision: Historical indictments required exact pleading. A charge of larceny of "bottles" of liquor was a charge about the containers, not just their contents. This reflects the broader pleading rule that the thing stolen must be precisely described. Researchers examining historical larceny indictments involving goods in containers — liquor, medicine, oil — should pay close attention to whether the indictment charged theft of the container, the contents, or both, as courts enforced this distinction strictly.
Cross-references within this corpus: Anderson's directions to LEAKAGE and SEAL (5) connect "bottle" to the body of law governing damage to bottled goods in transit and the legal effect of sealed packages on liability and inspection rights. These connections are easy to miss if a researcher enters the corpus only through the larceny or importation cases.
Historical Dictionary Support
Anderson's Dictionary of Law treats "bottle" not as a defined legal term but as a term requiring judicial construction in specific statutory and indictment settings. The entry is brief and directive — pointing to two concrete legal propositions and two cross-references — rather than offering a general definition. This is typical of Anderson's approach to common English words that acquire legal significance only in narrow regulatory or pleading contexts.
What historical sources do not address: Anderson's does not address the use of "bottle" in product liability, consumer protection, or food and drug regulation — bodies of law that developed after Anderson's period and in which the definition of "bottle" as a container type has regulatory significance (e.g., glass vs. plastic, child-resistant closures, labeling surface area). Researchers working in those areas will not find useful guidance in nineteenth-century dictionary sources and should consult twentieth-century regulatory materials directly.
Jurisdictional Note
The specific holdings noted in Anderson's reflect nineteenth-century American case law interpreting liquor importation and larceny statutes. These constructions were jurisdiction- and statute-specific. Modern courts construing "bottle" in regulatory contexts — FDA labeling, alcohol beverage control, recycling deposit statutes — apply their own statutory definitions, which frequently supply express definitions and supersede common-law construction.