Definition
A bill of privilege was a procedural device used in old English practice to commence a civil action against an attorney, solicitor, or other officer of the court who, by reason of their status as an officer, was exempt from ordinary arrest process. Because such persons could not be taken into custody like ordinary defendants, the standard writ of arrest was unavailable to plaintiffs wishing to sue them. The bill of privilege served as the functional substitute, initiating the action by petition to the court rather than by writ.
In form, the bill closely resembled a declaration in an action by bill, with one distinguishing feature at its conclusion: rather than ending with the phrase "and therefore he brings his suit," a bill of privilege concluded with "and therefore he prays relief." This closing formula signaled to the court that the proceeding was one of privilege, invoking the court's supervisory authority over its own officers in lieu of the arrest mechanism available against ordinary defendants.
The device was understood to benefit clients as much as it burdened officers — it preserved the ability to bring claims against court personnel while respecting the professional exemption that kept attorneys and officers available to serve the court and their clients without risk of arrest.
Common Confusion
The phrase "bill of privilege" can mislead modern researchers in two directions. First, "privilege" in this context has nothing to do with evidentiary privilege (the right to withhold information) or constitutional privilege. It refers to the procedural exemption — the privilege from arrest — enjoyed by court officers, and the bill was the mechanism for suing someone who held that exemption. Second, the term should not be confused with a "bill of rights" or other legislative or constitutional instruments bearing the word "bill." This is a pleading document, not a grant of rights.
Why It Matters in Research
This term appears almost exclusively in materials predating the procedural reforms of the nineteenth century. Researchers encountering it in English reports, abridgments, or early American common-law materials should understand it as a relic of the writ system, superseded when codes of civil procedure replaced the old forms of action and abolished arrest as a standard mechanism for initiating civil suits against defendants generally.
The practical significance today is almost entirely historical. A researcher tracing the procedural history of actions against attorneys or court officers — including early American malpractice-adjacent proceedings — may encounter this term in colonial-era practice materials and early republic case reporters that followed English common-law forms. The term will not appear in modern procedural codes.
One navigational trap: Bouvier notes that the bill of privilege was considered "confined to such as practise," meaning it applied to practicing attorneys, not merely any person holding a court appointment. Sources that treat the privilege broadly may be imprecise on this point, and Bouvier's citation to conflicting authorities (1 Bos. & P. 4; 2 Lutw. 1667) signals that even in the historical period there was uncertainty at the edges of who qualified.
Researchers using Blackstone should note the passing reference at 3 Bl. Comm. 289 — it is brief and contextual, not a full treatment. Burrill provides the most useful procedural description of the form itself, making it the better starting point for understanding how the bill actually functioned in practice.
Historical Dictionary Support
All three source dictionaries agree on the essential definition: a bill of privilege was a form of process used against court officers exempt from arrest, rooted in old English practice. The accounts are consistent and mutually reinforcing.
Burrill contributes the most procedural texture, specifying the distinctive closing formula ("prays relief" rather than "brings his suit") that distinguished the bill of privilege from an ordinary declaration by bill. This formal detail is absent from Black's and Bouvier's entries, making Burrill the more useful source for understanding the document as a drafting matter.
Bouvier adds the doctrinal gloss that the device was understood to be "a privilege for the benefit of clients" — a point that reframes what might seem like a shield for attorneys into a mechanism that protected the plaintiff's ability to sue. Bouvier also flags genuine uncertainty about the scope of the device through competing citations, a candor the other dictionaries lack.
Black's entry is the briefest, offering only the core identification and a Blackstone reference. It does not independently advance understanding beyond what the other two sources provide.
None of the three sources addresses American adoption or variation of the form, which is a gap. Early American courts in jurisdictions following English common-law pleading did employ analogous proceedings, but the historical dictionaries treat this as a purely English institution.
Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
No Law Mind Encyclopedia entry directly addresses this term. The matching entries returned — spousal privilege in evidence, incorporation of the Bill of Rights, and GI Bill education benefits — share vocabulary with this term only superficially and are not relevant to its legal meaning or historical context.