This word is certain- ly more indefinite, and of far wider range, than "charitable" or "religious;" it would include all gifts prompted by good-will or kind feeling towards the recipient, whether an object of charity or not. The natural and usual meaning of the word would so extend it. It has no legal meaning separate from its usual meaning. "Charitable" has ac- quired a settled limited meaning in law, which confines it within known limits. But In all the decisions in England on the sub- ject it has been held that a devise or bequest for benevolent objects, or in trust to give to such objects, is too indefinite, and therefore void. 19 N. J. Eq. 307, 313; 20 N. J. Eq. 489. This word, as applied to objects or pur- poses, may refer to those which are in their nature charitable, and may also have a broad- er meaning and include objects and purposes not charitable in the legal sense of that word. Acts of kindness, friendship, forethought, or good-will might properly be described as benevolent. It has therefore been held that gifts to trustees to be applied for "benevo- lent purposes" at their discretion, or to such "benevolent purposes" as they could agree upon, do not create a public charity. But where the word is used in connection with other words explanatory of its meaning, and indicating the intent of the donor to limit it to purposes strictly charitable, it has been held to be synonymous with, or equivalent to, "charitable." 132 Mass. 413. See, also, AM.DICT.LAW-9 tered under the friendly societies act, 1875, for any charitable or benevolent purposes. Benigne faciendæ sunt interpreta- tiones chartarum, ut res magis valeat quam pereat; et quælibet concessio for- tissime contra donatorem interpretanda C est. Liberal interpretations are to be made of deeds, so that the purpose may rather stand than fall; and every grant is to be taken most strongly against the grantor. 4 Mass. 134; 1 Sandf. Ch. 258, 268. Benigne faciendæ sunt interpreta- tiones, propter simplicitatem laicorum, ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Con- D structions [of written instruments] are to be E made liberally, on account of the simplicity of the laity, [or common people,] in order that the thing [or subject-matter] may rather have effect than perish, [or become void.] Co. Litt. 36a; Broom, Max. 540. alibus F Benignior sententia in verbis gener- seu dubiis, est præferenda. 4 The more favorable construction G is to be placed on general or doubtful ex- pressions. Coke, 15. Benignius leges interpretandæ sunt quo voluntas earum conservetur. Laws are to be more liberally interpreted, in order H that their intent may be preserved. Dig. 1, 3, 18.