AUDIRE - The Law Mind Legal Dictionary

AUDIREAuthored

The Law Mind • 834 words

Definition

A Latin term meaning "to hear." In legal usage, *audire* appears not as a standalone doctrine but as the root of several procedural maxims and forms of action that together express the law's commitment to hearing before judgment. Three primary forms carry legal weight:

*Audi alteram partem* — "Hear the other side." The foundational principle that no person may be condemned without an opportunity to be heard. This maxim underlies modern procedural due process and natural justice requirements across common law systems.

*Audita querela* — "The complaint having been heard." A common law writ by which a judgment debtor could challenge the enforcement of a judgment on grounds arising after the judgment was entered — grounds that could not have been raised in the original proceeding.

*Auditor* (derived form) — An officer of government or court whose function is to examine, verify, and approve or reject accounts submitted by those who have disbursed public or trust funds.

Why It Matters in Research

Researchers working in historical legal materials will encounter *audire* almost exclusively through its derivative forms rather than as a freestanding entry. The practical consequence is that searching for *audire* alone will underperform; searches should extend to *audi*, *audita*, *auditor*, and *auditorium* (a hearing room or court) depending on the period and jurisdiction.

*Audi alteram partem* is the form most likely to appear in constitutional and administrative law materials. In modern corpus materials, the maxim is often cited without the Latin, translated as the "right to be heard" or embedded in due process analysis. Researchers tracing the principle across time should be alert to this shift in vocabulary: pre-twentieth century sources use the Latin freely; mid-to-late twentieth century sources increasingly translate or paraphrase it.

*Audita querela* presents a different research trap. The writ was abolished in federal practice by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, which rendered it largely superseded by Rule 60(b) motions for relief from judgment. However, it has survived or been revived in a number of state courts, and federal courts have occasionally acknowledged its continued availability in narrow circumstances where Rule 60(b) provides no adequate remedy. Researchers should not assume uniform obsolescence; jurisdiction-specific verification is essential.

The *auditor* function, as described in Anderson, reflects an older governmental and judicial role distinct from the modern professional accountant or public auditor. In historical equity and chancery practice, an auditor was a court-appointed officer tasked with examining accounts in estate, trust, and public fund matters. This usage differs from both the modern accounting profession and the modern governmental audit function, and conflating them in historical research will produce errors.

Historical Dictionary Support

Anderson's Dictionary of Law provides the core entry. Anderson defines *audire* as the Latin "to hear" and connects it directly to *oyer* (the Anglo-French parallel), *audi alteram partem*, and *audita querela*, while also treating the *auditor* as a derived governmental and judicial officer. The entry is compact but structurally accurate: it correctly identifies the maxim, the writ, and the officer as the three operational manifestations of the root.

Anderson's cross-reference to *oyer* is significant. *Oyer* (from the Anglo-French *oyer*, also meaning "to hear") is the common law parallel to *audire* and appears in *oyer and terminer* commissions and in the *oyer* of a deed. The two roots — Latin *audire* and Anglo-French *oyer* — functioned in parallel streams of legal authority, the Latin dominating in equity, canon, and civilian-influenced courts, the Anglo-French dominating in common law courts. Anderson flags this connection without fully developing it; researchers should treat *oyer* as a necessary companion entry.

No entry for *audire* appears in Black's Law Dictionary's early editions under that exact heading, though derivative entries (*audi alteram partem*, *audita querela*, *auditor*) receive treatment. This is characteristic: historical legal dictionaries tended to index by the operative form rather than the Latin root, so corpus searches anchored to the root will miss substantial related material indexed elsewhere.

Jurisdictional Note

*Audi alteram partem* as a constitutional or statutory principle varies significantly in its scope and enforcement across jurisdictions. In English administrative law it is a core common law principle of natural justice with centuries of development. In U.S. law the functional equivalent is procedural due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, but the doctrinal framing differs. Researchers should not assume that citations to the Latin maxim and citations to "due process" are interchangeable across jurisdictions or across time periods.

AUDIREmain

Anderson's Dictionary of Law • 1890

L. To hear. Compare OYER. Audi alteram partem. Hear the other side - the accused, the defendant. No man is to be condemned unheard.1 See NoTICE, 1, Judicial. lawful, or rejects as unlawful, the items of an account or accounts. An officer of government whose duties are, chiefly, to examine, verify, and approve or reject, the accounts of those who have disAudita querela. The complaint having bursed public moneys or furnished supplies.1 been heard. An audita querela lies where a defendant, against whom a judgment is recovered. and who is therefore in danger of execution, may be relieved upon good matter of discharge which has happened since the judgment: as if the plaintiff has given him a general release, or if the defendant has paid the debt without procuring satisfaction to be entered on the record. In these and like cases, wherein the defendant has good matter to plead, but has had no opportunity of pleading it, an audita querela lies, in the nature of a bill in equity, for relief against the oppression. The writ is directed to the court below; states that the complaint of the defendant has been heard (audita querela defendentis); and, after setting out the matter of the complaint, directs the court to call the parties before it, and, having heard their allegations and proofs, to cause justice to be done between them.2 The writ was invented lest in any case there should be an oppressive defect of justice, where a party who has a good defense can not make it in the ordinary forms of law. But the indulgence shown in granting summary relief upon motion has rendered the writ almost useless.2 It is a judicial writ, founded upon a record, and directed to the court in which that record remains. It has the usual incidents of a regular suit. It is not a means for obtaining relief from negligence. The same end is now very generally secured by a motion. See MOTION, 2.