Definition
In law, "artificial" carries two related but distinct senses that together define a large portion of legal vocabulary.
1. Created or existing by operation of law, not by nature. An artificial person or artificial entity is one that has legal existence only because the law recognizes it as such — a corporation, public body, or statutory creation that can hold rights and bear obligations but has no biological existence. This is the dominant legal meaning and the foundation of entity law.
2. Pertaining to technical or professional terminology; produced by art or skill rather than arising naturally. A document or legal instrument is "artificially drawn" when it employs formal legal language and structure, as opposed to lay or informal expression. Anderson's usage captures this sense most directly: a will is artificially drawn when it employs technical legal words and a lawyerlike arrangement.
In patent law, a third specialized sense applies: an artificial force is a natural force that has been transformed by human application or engineering to acquire new capabilities, distinguishing patentable inventions from mere applications of unmodified natural principles.
Common Language
Modern common usage (Wiktionary): Man-made; made by humans; of artifice. Also: insincere, fake, or feigned; not natural or normal; imposed arbitrarily.
Historical common usage (Webster's 1913): Made or contrived by art; produced or modified by human skill and labor, in opposition to natural. Also: feigned, fictitious, assumed, affected; artful or cunning.
The common-language meaning emphasizes the man-made/natural opposition and carries connotations of inauthenticity or contrivance. The primary legal meaning retains the man-made/natural opposition but strips away the pejorative register entirely. An artificial person in law is not a fake or inferior person — it is a fully recognized legal actor with defined capacities. The legal term is descriptive and structural, not evaluative.
Common Confusion
ARTIFICIAL VS. FICTIONAL
"Artificial person" is sometimes loosely equated with "fictional person," but the two framings differ in emphasis. A fictional person implies something invented or imaginary. An artificial person in law is a technical category: a real legal actor created and defined by legal operation, with genuine rights and liabilities. The distinction matters in entity law and constitutional analysis, where the legal standing of corporations and other artificial persons is a substantive question, not a metaphor.
Recognized Forms
/SUBTYPES
Artificial person (also: artificial entity, legal person): Any non-human entity — corporation, municipality, association, or statutory body — that law treats as a person capable of holding rights and incurring obligations. The core example in all historical dictionaries.
Artificial force (patent law): A natural force so transformed by human ingenuity as to have new functional capabilities. Distinguished from the mere use of a natural force in its existing state. The transformation is the inventive act.
Artificial instrument or will (drafting): A document drawn with technical legal language and professional structure. Contrasted with an inartificial instrument, which uses plain or lay expression.
Why It Matters in Research
Researchers encounter "artificial" most frequently as a modifier — artificial person, artificial entity, artificial intelligence, artificial force — and the meaning depends entirely on context. Navigational priorities:
The artificial/natural person distinction is foundational to pre-20th century corporate and entity law. When historical sources discuss rights, capacity, or standing, "artificial person" is the governing category for corporations and public bodies. Bouvier and Black both define artificial person in exactly these terms. Researchers tracing corporate constitutional rights, municipal liability, or entity capacity should treat "artificial person" as the controlling term in historical materials, not "corporation" alone.
The drafting sense (artificially drawn will or instrument) is less commonly indexed but appears in probate and testamentary literature. Anderson's is the clearest source. A researcher evaluating historical discussions of will construction should note that "artificial" in this context is a term of approval, not criticism — it signals professional competence.
The patent law sense (artificial force) is narrow and case-specific. It appears primarily in late 19th and early 20th century federal patent decisions and treatises. Researchers working in early patent law should distinguish artificial force (a transformed natural force, potentially patentable) from a natural force in its raw state (not patentable as such).
Modern usage introduces a fourth trajectory: artificial intelligence. This term is absent from all historical dictionaries, but it is now generating its own legal vocabulary across criminal, intellectual property, health, and administrative law. Researchers should treat historical "artificial" entries as distinct from AI-specific legal doctrine, which develops from the 1950s onward and is governed by separate bodies of emerging law.
The etymological grounding in Burrill ("made by art; created by law; the opposite of natural") accurately describes how the term functioned as an organizing opposition across legal literature — artificial versus natural was a structuring distinction in entity law, patent law, and property theory throughout the 19th century.
Historical Dictionary Support
The five shelf sources converge on the core definition but weight it differently.
Black's (1st and 2nd editions) offer the cleanest doctrinal statement: "created by art, or by law; existing only by force of or in contemplation of law." The 2nd edition adds the artificial force definition from patent law, grounding it in federal circuit authority.
Bouvier provides the most explicit formulation of artificial person — "a body, company, or corporation considered in law as an individual" — and connects it directly to the legal/natural opposition.
Burrill reaches furthest back, noting the Latin derivation and framing "artificial" as simply the opposite of "natural." This framing was conceptually prior: the artificial/natural distinction organized 19th-century legal thinking about entities, forces, and capacities well before the specific sub-doctrines were fully elaborated.
Anderson's stands apart by capturing the drafting sense — artificial versus inartificial instruments — which the other sources omit. This reflects Anderson's broader attention to professional and technical usage across legal practice.
No historical dictionary addresses artificial intelligence or any computational meaning; that entire domain postdates the shelf sources by decades and requires independent research tools.
Jurisdictional Note
The recognition and legal capacities of artificial persons vary by jurisdiction, particularly for non-corporate entities such as partnerships, trusts, and unincorporated associations. Constitutional rights attributed to artificial persons — standing, due process, First Amendment protections — have been the subject of ongoing U.S. federal litigation and are not uniform across systems. Civil law jurisdictions may use different conceptual frameworks for legal personality.
Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
Artificial Intelligence and Emerging Technology Crimes (The Law Mind Criminal Law Encyclopedia)
Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare — Liability, FDA Regulation, and Algorithmic Bias (The Law Mind Health Law & Bioethics Encyclopedia)
Artificial Intelligence and Copyright — AI-Generated Works and Training Data (The Law Mind Intellectual Property Encyclopedia)