Definition
A common law plea in bar interposed by a defendant against a plaintiff who has brought an action on a claim that was previously submitted to arbitration and resolved by an award. The plea asserts that the matter has already been adjudicated through the arbitration process, and that the resulting award bars any further litigation on the same cause. In effect, it operates as a defense analogous to res judicata, substituting the finality of an arbitral award for the finality of a court judgment.
The compound phrase captures both sides of the completed arbitral process: "arbitrament" refers to the submission of the dispute to arbitration and the authority exercised by the arbitrators, while "award" refers to their final determination. Together, the phrase denotes not just the outcome but the entire concluded proceeding that forecloses re-litigation.
Common Language
The word "award" in ordinary modern English refers broadly to a prize, honor, or recognition given for achievement (Wiktionary). In Webster's 1913, "award" carries a closer legal flavor — "to give by judicial determination" — though still used in general contexts of prizes and grants.
"Arbitrament" has no meaningful life in modern common usage; it survives almost exclusively in legal and archaic literary contexts, where it means the power or right to decide, or the decision itself. The gap that matters for researchers is this: in modern English, "award" suggests a one-sided grant, while in this legal phrase it means a binding bilateral determination on a contested dispute. The compound term has no common-language counterpart and will not be encountered outside legal sources.
Common Confusion
Arbitrament and award should not be confused with the modern plea or defense of res judicata, though they operate on the same logic. Res judicata bars re-litigation of matters decided by a court; arbitrament and award bars re-litigation of matters decided by arbitrators. Historically, the distinction mattered procedurally because the plea was distinct in form. Researchers reading older pleading records should also be careful not to confuse the plea of arbitrament and award with a plea of accord and satisfaction, which similarly bars suit but arises from a different mechanism — a negotiated settlement rather than a third-party arbitral determination.
Why It Matters in Research
This term is a relic of common law pleading and will appear almost exclusively in pre-twentieth-century sources — English cases, early American reports, and treatises on arbitration and pleading from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Researchers encountering it in historical records should understand that it signals a formal procedural defense, not a substantive legal doctrine. The phrase will not appear in modern pleading because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their state analogues replaced the old system of special pleas with affirmative defenses; a defendant today would simply plead that a prior arbitration award bars the claim, without invoking the archaic formula.
The maxim embedded in Black's entry — Arbitramentum æquum tribuit cuique suum ("A just arbitration renders to every one his own") — appears in Noy's Maxims and occasionally surfaces in older judicial opinions as rhetorical support for the finality of arbitral decisions. Researchers finding this maxim in historical opinions should treat it as a rhetorical flourish rather than a rule of decision.
One research trap: the word "arbitrament" alone (without "award") appears in historical sources in a broader sense, meaning simply the power or act of deciding. Wharton's Law Lexicon and older pleading treatises sometimes use it this way. Do not assume every use of "arbitrament" refers to the specific plea.
For corpus researchers, this term connects the history of arbitration law to the history of common law pleading. Sources on one topic will often illuminate the other. Watson's treatise on arbitration, cited in both Black's and Bouvier's, is the key historical reference for the plea's procedural mechanics.
Historical Dictionary Support
Black's and Bouvier's entries are nearly identical, both tracking Watson's Arbitration (page 256) as the primary authority. This convergence is unsurprising — Bouvier's was a principal source for Black's on archaic pleading terms. Neither dictionary elaborates on the elements of the plea or its procedural requirements beyond the bare definition. Both treat the term as settled and self-explanatory, which itself is a signal that by the time these dictionaries were compiled the plea was already becoming obsolete in practice.
Black's adds the Latin maxim from Noy's Maxims, which Bouvier's omits. This small divergence is useful: it suggests Black's editors saw the term as worth contextualizing within the broader principle of arbitral finality, while Bouvier's kept strictly to procedural description.
Neither dictionary addresses how courts tested the sufficiency of the plea — what a defendant had to show to make it stick — nor do they flag that English and American practice may have diverged on this point. Researchers needing that level of detail must go to Watson's treatise directly or to the older pleading manuals.
Jurisdictional Note
The plea of arbitrament and award developed in English common law and was carried into early American practice, but its relevance varies sharply by period. American jurisdictions abolished or substantially modified common law pleading at different times throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The term is essentially inoperative in any jurisdiction that has adopted code or rules-based pleading.
Encyclopedia Cross-Reference
No Law Mind Encyclopedia entry directly addresses common law arbitration pleading. Researchers may find contextual support in: Prejudgment Interest — Availability, Rate, and Discretionary vs. Mandatory Award (The Law Mind Remedies & Equity Encyclopedia), for background on how courts have historically treated finality of awards.