Definition
A catch-all phrase appearing in wills, trust instruments, and statutes to extend the scope of a charitable or religious bequest beyond specifically named institutions. The phrase functions as residual or expansive language, capturing religious objects or organizations not individually enumerated in the operative document. Courts construing such language must determine whether the phrase limits bequests to institutions similar in kind to those previously named (applying the ejusdem generis canon) or whether it operates as a broadly inclusive grant encompassing any lawful religious purpose.
The phrase appears most commonly in two contexts: (1) testamentary instruments, where a testator leaves property to named churches or religious bodies "and any other religious institution or purpose," and (2) enabling statutes or charitable corporation acts, where the phrase defines the class of organizations authorized to receive or hold property for religious ends.
Why It Matters in Research
The interpretive difficulty of this phrase lies in the tension between two competing canons of construction. Ejusdem generis would confine "any other religious institution or purpose" to entities or ends resembling those already listed. Against this, courts have at times treated the phrase as a deliberate drafting choice to avoid limitation, giving it the broadest reading consistent with the charitable purpose doctrine.
Researchers working with historical testamentary records should be alert to the fact that what counted as a qualifying "religious institution" shifted considerably across the nineteenth century. Early American courts often required that the beneficiary institution be an organized, incorporated body with identifiable membership and creed. Later decisions, particularly in jurisdictions with liberal charitable trust statutes, accepted unincorporated religious societies and even loosely organized missionary or benevolent purposes as sufficient.
The phrase also intersects with the cy-près doctrine. When a specifically named religious legatee no longer exists or cannot take, courts applying cy-près will look to whether a residual phrase like this one was intended to provide an alternative destination or whether the gift fails entirely. The presence of "or purpose" language — not merely "institution" — has often been decisive in allowing cy-près application, because it suggests the testator's intent was attached to the religious object rather than the particular organizational vehicle.
Historical reporters indexed under adjacent headwords (ANY PERSON, ANY SUIT, ANY TERM OF YEARS) follow the same pattern visible in Rapalje & Lawrence: the phrase is treated as a unit of statutory or instrument construction, with meaning derived entirely from judicial exposition of specific documents rather than from any fixed legal definition. Researchers should not expect a stable, jurisdiction-neutral meaning; the operative definition is whatever the construing court held in the instrument under review.
Historical Dictionary Support
Rapalje & Lawrence treat the phrase as part of a series of "any ___" construction entries, each of which functions as a headnote collection pointing researchers to leading cases on the interpretive scope of broadly worded instrument language. The entry pattern for this group — ANY PERSON, ANY SUIT, ANY TERM OF YEARS, ANY TOWN — reflects the late nineteenth-century practice of treating judicial construction of particular words as the dictionary definition. No general definition is offered; authority alone carries the weight.
This approach is useful for locating leading cases but leaves significant gaps. Rapalje & Lawrence do not address the interaction between such phrases and the cy-près doctrine, do not flag jurisdictional variation in what constitutes a cognizable religious purpose, and do not account for the post-Civil War expansion of charitable trust law that materially changed the range of qualifying beneficiaries. Researchers relying solely on the historical dictionary will miss this doctrinal development.
Jurisdictional Note
In jurisdictions that follow the English Statute of Charitable Uses (1601) tradition closely, "religious institution or purpose" has been construed broadly to include propagation of faith, religious education, and maintenance of worship. Jurisdictions with more restrictive charitable trust statutes — particularly those requiring a definite, ascertainable beneficiary class — have sometimes declined to give effect to open-ended religious purpose language unless a supervising court or trustee mechanism is specified.